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President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New Look security policy put nuclear weapons at the 
forefront of U.S. defense efforts. Due to the lack of an effective Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
in the mid-1950s, the U.S. required European cooperation to launch an attack on the Soviet 
Union. This dissertation reveals the difficulties of the New Look defense policy regarding 
missile development, allied cooperation, and an almost singular focus on Europe as the primary 
area of concern for U.S. and allied security. These difficulties arose from bureaucratic infighting 
between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, tensions between the U.S., U.K., and France, and the 
overarching threat of an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower did not 
have an easy task in balancing these competing interests and this study reveals the importance 
for U.S. political leaders to understand the impact of defense issues not only on U.S. interests but 
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 President Eisenhower faced many security threats during his administration. During his 
term in office, thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union was a constant threat. He and his Soviet 
counterpart, primarily Nikta Khrushchev, both had the ability to level weapons of previously 
unimaginable power. Understanding how Eisenhower dealt with this security threat is important 
to understanding his New Look defense policy and his views on how to wage war in the atomic 
age. A fundamental part of his approach to this security problem was putting more emphasis on 
technologically advanced atomic weapons. One of the primary weapons systems Eisenhower 
focused the nation’s research efforts on was the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). 
However, in the mid-1950s, no one believed that these weapons would be ready until the middle 
of the next decade. The President had to have a more immediate response to the ever growing 
Soviet military threat. This answer was the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The 
problem with these weapons was that they did not have ability to destroy Soviet targets from the 
continental United States; they would have to be launched from Europe to reach the U.S.S.R.  
 President Dwight Eisenhower’s decision to deploy IRBMs to Western Europe in the late 
1950s had strategic, military, and political objectives. Most works that previously discussed 
these weapons investigated them from a military point of view. According to this interpretation 
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only, the IRBMs were of limited value. The missiles, which were operational from 1959 through 
1963, were inaccurate, took a long time to launch, and once deployed were already obsolete
 because of the success of the Navy’s Polaris solid-fuelled IRBM program and unanticipated 
success in the ICBM research efforts. However, the military value of these weapons was not the 
most only component of the decision to deploy them to Western Europe. 
The IRBMs influence on the NATO alliance and American security concerns outweighed 
their relatively limited military value. As a result of the IRBM deployment, the Anglo-American 
relationship improved greatly. With this missile deployment, President Eisenhower began the 
process that he hoped would move America’s commitment to NATO away from ground forces 
and towards missile and strategic bomber forces.  He also used their deployment to calm 
domestic fears after the Soviet launch of Sputnik. However, not all the effects of this decision 
were positive. The establishment of IRBMs in Western Europe solidified a two-tiered alliance in 
NATO between nations with nuclear weapons – the U.S. and the U.K— and those without 
nuclear weapons.  Finally, the deployment of IRBMs contributed to the French exit, under 
Charles de Gaulle, from the military alliance.  
Deploying IRBMs was one part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New Look defense 
policy. This program sought to weave fiscal and national security into one strategy. In order to 
do this, Eisenhower had to find different solutions to the serious defense challenges faced by the 
nation. Atomic weapons seemed to provide a way to deliver maximum deterrence and protection 
at the lowest possible cost. By the mid-1950s, decreases in the size of nuclear warheads, 
improvements in guidance systems, and more effective propulsion methods made it possible for 
missiles to strike the Soviet Union from Western Europe. IRBMs offered a new way for the 
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United States to protect its European allies that did not require sustaining numerous Army 
divisions far away from the U.S. The problem for Eisenhower was how to integrate these 
weapons into the American and NATO defense structure; a corollary to this issue was 
determining how much control each individual nation would have over the use of these missiles.  
 IRBMs were part of the new focus on nuclear warfare under President Eisenhower. The 
controversy over atomic weapons and their use in defending Western Europe also stirred 
animosity in the U.S. defense community. The Army, which lost its long-range missile program 
to the Air Force, saw its budget and manpower levels erode after the Korean War. In contrast, the 
Air Force received almost half of the national defense budget under President Eisenhower. The 
deployment of IRBMs to Europe represented the dominance of airpower and the decline of 
ground forces in national security. The struggle over which service should control long-range 
missile research and development had political and budgetary implications that went beyond the 
control of specific programs. Again, looking at the IRBMs only from a military perspective 
clouds their real influence on the struggle between service branches to prosper under the New 
Look defense policy.   
 This clash between the Army and the Air Force took place in the new paradigm of atomic 
warfare. President Eisenhower had the capability to destroy nations with a large arsenal of 
thermonuclear weapons. The United States tested its first fusion weapon, otherwise known as a 
hydrogen bomb, in 1952. The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949 and its first 
hydrogen bomb in 1953. Britain also developed fusion nuclear weapons during the early 1950s. 
President Eisenhower was the first President to preside in an era when both superpowers had the 
capability to launch thermonuclear war. Examining Eisenhower’s decision to deploy IRBMs 
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from a military and political perspective explains how he intended to combat the Soviet threat, 
maintain a viable nuclear deterrent, and balance military spending in the thermonuclear era.  
During the 1950s, Great Britain and the United States were the only two nations in the 
NATO alliance with independent nuclear arsenals. By the end of the decade, nuclear weapons 
provided a barometer for judging a nation’s standing in the alliance. France, which did not have 
an independent nuclear weapons arsenal at the time, was not in the same tier as Britain and the 
United States. This influenced the character of the IRBM deployment agreements offered to 
Britain and then to other NATO nations. 
Charles De Gaulle, France’s President from 1959 to 1969 thought France deserved 
recognition for its importance to the alliance with an IRBM deal similar to the one offered to 
Great Britain. He believed that the U.S. offer of IRBMs held under U.S. control was insufficient. 
He did not believe that Washington would sanction the use of IRBMs to defend French national 
interest if it did not align with American security needs. Because of this France, in de Gaulle’s 
opinion, required independent control of the missiles in order to use these weapons best for its 
own protection. He also wanted the United States to offer technological assistance in addition to 
national ownership of IRBMs for France, both of which Britain received. President Eisenhower 
did not want the number of nuclear nations to increase. He wanted the deployment of IRBMs to 
Europe to offer the protection of atomic weapons without the problems of nuclear proliferation.  
Eisenhower hoped that this plan would forestall the creation of an independent French nuclear 
arsenal in favor of a unified European nuclear umbrella under NATO auspices. The roots of this 
decision are evident in the New Look defense policy, written in 1953. However, looking at the 
missiles from a military perspective leaves aside the discussion of issues like national control of 
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these weapons and why certain nations, like Britain, received more generous terms than other 
nations, like France. This dissertation, by including the political aspects of Eisenhower’s 
decision to deploy these missiles, will illustrate the importance of these weapons to the NATO 
alliance and the security of Western Europe. 
 In addition to the two-tier atomic structure, personality differences played a role in 
diplomatic relations between NATO senior member states. President Eisenhower, while Supreme 
Allied Commander in World War II, worked with both Charles de Gaulle and Harold 
MacMillan. His relationship with MacMillan, who would later serve as Prime Minister while 
Eisenhower was President, improved the Anglo-American alliance. De Gaulle, however, was a 
frustration for Eisenhower during World War II and this continued when de Gaulle became the 
French premier. These personal differences colored the diplomatic interactions between these 
three important NATO nations. Interpersonal conflicts do not receive sufficient attention when 
considering only the military aspects of the deployment of IRBMs. The addition of the political 
perspectives will show how important such issues were to the NATO alliance in the early Cold 
War period.  
 Underlying the reliance on nuclear weapons was the doctrine of Massive Retaliation. 
This was an evolution of the United States policy on the use of atomic weapons.  The term, 
coined by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations 
in 1954, formed the basis for President Eisenhower’s views of deterrence. The doctrine stated 
that the U.S. did not consider itself bound to limit its response to the scale of the Soviet attack or 
intervention. The focus on atomic warfare influenced the NATO alliance in terms of military 
planning and political prestige.   
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 Nuclear weapons were just as much a political barometer of power as they were a 
measure of military might. President Eisenhower’s defense policy’s focus on nuclear weapons 
made them paramount. The possession of an independent nuclear capability had a direct 
influence on the IRBM agreement offered to the United Kingdom. France did not receive the 
same offer of cooperation, in part, because of its lack of such a program. The Franco-American 
agreement came under NATO auspices, whereas the Anglo-American agreement was outside of 
the NATO alliance. Although these were military agreements, they revealed the political 
importance of being a nuclear nation.  
 The New Look defense policy focused defense spending on nuclear weapons and 
maintaining the ability to launch nuclear assaults on the Soviet Union. Part of this emphasis 
included improving the United States’ bomber and missile capability. ICBMs and IRBMs 
represented two different ways to strike the Soviet Union. IRBMs played an important role in the 
New Look and the defense planning for Western Europe.   
 These missiles would provide NATO forces the ability to withstand and destroy a Soviet 
invasion. Eisenhower did not want to increase America’s ground forces in the region and he 
believed that without an increase of manpower or IRBMs, NATO would be unable to stop a 
determined Soviet attack. IRBMs would provide the alliance the ability to destroy a significant 
amount of invading Soviet forces making it possible for a reduced ground force to fight and 
prevail. The missiles, in most cases, would remain under American or NATO control and would 
not be the property of the individual nations. Officially, American forces would control the 
nuclear warheads and only transfer them to the missiles in case of an attack. 
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 The first generation IRBMs were liquid fuelled rockets with a rudimentary guidance 
system. There were two different models, the Jupiter and the Thor. The Army developed the 
Jupiter missile, which it intended to use with a mobile launcher. This would allow forces on the 
ground to hide the weapons when they were not in use. However, the Army lost control of the 
program to the Air Force in 1956. This ended the mobile launcher concept. The Air Force design 
used fixed launch sites. These had hardened bunkers that housed the missiles. However, because 
hiding these facilities was impossible they became obvious targets in the opening salvo of a 
conflict. 
 Another drawback of IRBMs was that they were unable to launch quickly in response to 
a Soviet attack. The liquid oxygen fuel could not remain in the missiles on the launch pad for a 
prolonged period. In the event of an alert, the launch teams required almost an hour to fuel and 
prepare the missile for action. This lag between alert and ability to fire raised many question in 
host nations about the viability of these weapons as a real second-strike option. These were not 
the only doubts that nations had concerning the IRBM deployment.  
 Eisenhower’s understanding of warfare in the atomic age affected his view of the place of 
nuclear weapons in national defense. During his second term, he continued to see warfare in the 
post World War II period as atomic in nature. Although Campbell Craig argues in Destroying the 
Village that Eisenhower moved away from Massive Retaliation during this time, it is clear that 
this doctrine remained the central defense paradigm. Eisenhower often talked about balance in 
national defense and decried favoring only one type of weapon to protect the nation but his 
actions tell a different story. During the late 1950s, the Army continued to suffer budget and 
force reductions while the Air Force’s missile programs continued to receive significant funding. 
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Massive Retaliation was not just a doctrine that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles created, it 
also represented the vision that Eisenhower had of future conflicts. This understanding of the 
changing character of warfare made national control of nuclear weapons a matter of political 
importance and not only a military planning concern. 
 Massive Retaliation was Eisenhower’s creation, not just a policy that John Foster Dulles 
foisted upon the President. President Eisenhower thought that it was effective because of his 
understanding of Clausewitz’s work On War. Eisenhower intended this policy to increase the 
cost of starting a conflict for the Soviet Union to such a level as to make it impossible for any 
political goal to justify it. This connection between politics and warfare is a fundamental part of 
Clausewitz’s work and the New Look defense policy uses this to inform its stance on nuclear 
weapons. Eisenhower wanted to make it clear that the United States would fight a total nuclear 
war with the Soviet Union in the hopes that this would prevent the Soviet Union from risking 
such a conflict. This made the reliance on nuclear weapons seem like a viable option. These 
weapons provided a superior level of security and deterrence than conventional forces. One 
problem with the policy of Massive Retaliation was that it did not protect against the full range 
of possible conflicts. Limited wars, like the Korean War or communist insurgencies were a poor 
fit for such a black and white policy approach to warfare.    
 In order to fully appreciate why Eisenhower’s decision to deploy these missiles in the late 
1950s it is important to know how he viewed warfare in the atomic age. IRBMs and their role in 
Western Europe were a part of this understanding of how nuclear weapons changed warfare. 
These weapons accomplished the political objective of preventing a general war with the Soviet 
Union. Their importance was not their specific military capabilities but rather what they 
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represented to the Soviet Union and Eisenhower’s commitment to the doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation. 
 The Cold War pervaded every security concern that Eisenhower faced during his 
presidency. His first defense priority was preventing a general conflict with the Soviet Union. Of 
almost equal importance was maintaining the alliance against the U.S.S.R. This required keeping 
a viable deterrent and ensuring that America’s allies felt that an alliance with the U.S. provided 
more benefits and security than neutrality. Eisenhower had to address both the military and 
political tensions in the alliance. IRBMs became a tool to offer security to allies in Western 
Europe. They also became a way to repair relations with Great Britain after the Suez Crisis 
caused a rift between the U.S., the U.K., France, and Israel. 
 The Suez Crisis of 1956 had serious implications for NATO and the defense of Western 
Europe. President Eisenhower chose not to support U.S. allies, preferring instead to use 
diplomatic pressure to keep the Soviet Union out of the fight. In the aftermath of the conflict, the 
relationship between France, Great Britain, and the U.S. deteriorated. Although Eisenhower 
intended to repair the connections with both nations, he chose two different approaches to do so. 
 Thus, Great Britain received an offer of IRBMs and technological assistance in nuclear 
research. The Bermuda Conference in 1957, between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden, provided a venue for Eisenhower to mend relations with the United Kingdom. 
Vital to this was the offer of not only the IRBMs but the promise of future collaboration and 
sharing of nuclear research technology and information. Although President Franklin Roosevelt 
promised full cooperation with the British in atomic research, President Harry Truman changed 
American policy to make it much more restrictive and, in effect, broke the accord establishing 
10 
 
the joint Anglo-American nuclear program. Investigating how these weapons worked to address 
this political problem in the NATO alliance demonstrates their political importance. 
 In contrast to Britain, France did not receive such a generous offer of cooperation in 
nuclear research or of IRBMs. Although the administration offered the missiles to France in 
1958, it did so under the control of NATO. Britain received missiles independent of any 
agreement with NATO. France, at this time, did not have its own nuclear weapons arsenal. When 
President Charles De Gaulle took charge of France, he wanted to improve France’s position in 
the alliance. He expected America to provide some technological aid to shorten the time for 
France to achieve its own nuclear program, as a sign of France’s position in the alliance. 
However, President Eisenhower was against a nuclear armed France. President Eisenhower did 
not support any addition to the number of nations with atomic weapons. This placed France in a 
decidedly junior position in the alliance in relation to Britain and the United States, a position 
that maintained its World War II and post-World War II status.  
 The deployment of IRBMs to Europe did not have the effect that Eisenhower intended. It 
divided the three most senior members of the alliance and created suspicion in other nations 
about the true nature of America’s commitment to NATO. This work will show how the offer of 
these weapons to Britain and France fit into Eisenhower’s conception of atomic warfare and 
national security. Finally, it will describe how America’s allies, specifically Britain and France, 
reacted to the deployment of these new weapons to Western Europe.  
 The dissertation, by focusing on both the military and political ramifications of the 
IRBMs, will explain why considering the political impact of the deployment of IRBMs to 
Western Europe requires addressing their importance not only in NATO defense planning but 
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also how their arrival sparked tensions between the three senior members, France, Great Britain, 
and the U.S. This will add a level of understanding that is absent from other works addressing 
these weapons and their effect on the NATO alliance and American national security. 
 This analysis will demonstrate how the New Look defense policy operated during 
Eisenhower’s second term. Although there are many works concerning the New Look, few 
concentrate on how that policy actually influenced specific decisions. Although his conception of 
modern war decreased the role of ground forces in favor of the air forces, it did not realize the 
expected savings in defense appropriations and the over emphasis on technology created a 
pattern and culture that influenced defense procurement even today. This work investigates the 
development of IRBMs from both the technological and economic aspects to determine how the 
reliance on technologically sophisticated weapons impacted the budget outlays during 
Eisenhower’s administration.  
 Understanding Eisenhower’s conception of atomic warfare is important because it sheds 
light on why the New Look defense policy was so consistent. This work will discuss how the 
Army fared during the late 1950s under decreasing manpower and budget allocations, under a 
growing Communist threat in Europe and Asia. Eisenhower’s understanding of nuclear war 
influenced not only the New Look but the NATO alliance as well. The work begins with a 
discussion of the formation of the New Look defense policy, including how President 
Eisenhower created the policy and what he expected it to achieve. It will cover Project Solarium 
and how this conference provided the framework for writing the new defense policy. This gives 
insight into the foundation of the New Look and demonstrates Eisenhower’s focus on national 
defense combined with economic constraints.  
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 The second chapter explains how Eisenhower understood war in the atomic age. It 
discusses how his experience in World War II shaped his conception of how these weapons 
altered military conflicts. This supplements the chapter about the New Look defense policy and 
will prove that the doctrine of Massive Retaliation was something that meshed with 
Eisenhower’s conception of nuclear age warfare. 
The following chapter covers the development of American missile technology and the 
evolution of cooperation on nuclear matters between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
This chapter also discusses the changes in the cooperation between the U.K. and the U.S. from 
World War II through the early Cold War period. This will provide the context to demonstrate 
how much of a benefit the technical cooperation agreement offered to Britain at the Bermuda 
Conference was. This chapter will reveal the problems between Great Britain and the United 
States concerning nuclear cooperation and how the balance of power in the relationship inverted 
after World War II, leaving Britain in the junior position. 
 The fourth chapter deals with how the Suez Nationalization Crisis affected the NATO 
alliance. This chapter will not discuss the crisis in detail but will try to explain how it influenced 
relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France. The main focus will be on the 
Bermuda Conference and its role in repairing the Anglo-American alliance. Central to this 
rapprochement was the offer of IRBMs and nuclear cooperation.  
 The Soviet launch of Sputnik will be the basis for the fifth chapter. This event pushed 
Eisenhower to expand the deployment of IRBMs to other Western European nations and speed 
up the IRBM research effort. This chapter asserts that the domestic security concerns raised by 
the Soviet launch put more pressure on the IRBMs to narrow the gap between the perceived 
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superiority of Soviet military capability and the U.S. The launch of Sputnik spurred a broader 
IRBM program but the framework of the Anglo-American agreement was not the best platform 
for such an expansion.  
 Chapter six discusses the diplomatic and military agreements offered to the NATO 
alliance as a basis for the deployment of IRBMs. It shows the American point of view of the 
agreements and what concerns that American policy makers had. It will explain how President 
Eisenhower and his administration believed this program would work and how it fit inside of the 
NATO alliance.  
 The final chapter will show how France, and primarily Charles de Gaulle, reacted to the 
offer of IRBMs. It explains how the assumption of leadership by de Gaulle changed the 
relationship between the United States and France. This chapter argues that the informal two-tier 
alliance structure, based on independent nuclear programs, was not acceptable to the French 
premier. This chapter covers this relationship from the American point of view. This is important 
because it will reveal how American policy makers understood French reactions to American 
policy decisions. It will also describe how nuclear weapons, and the IRBMs specifically, were 
important politically in terms of perceived importance in the alliance. 
The literature concerning IRBMs and their deployment in the 1950s to Western Europe 
does not cover the major questions answered by this dissertation. There are few works that 
directly discuss these weapons, because of their military obsolescence. This dissertation shows 
that the weapons were not as important in military terms as they were political terms. 
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Philip Nash’s work The Other Missiles of October is one of the few works to directly 
address this issue.  His narrative spans the end of Eisenhower’s administration and the beginning 
of Kennedy’s administration.  Nash argues that the launch of Sputnik was the major international 
event that spurred the decision to deploy IRBMs to Europe.  Although Nash does discuss how 
the Suez Crisis of 1956 influenced the initial offer of IRBMs to Britain, he argues that Sputnik 
was more important.  Nash’s works accurately analyzes the complications of deploying IRBMs 
to Europe and the lack of enthusiasm for such weapons.  However, he does not discuss the 
formation of Eisenhower’s nuclear policy and how the Suez Crisis forced a major change in that 
policy.  In this dissertation, I investigate the evolution of Eisenhower’s nuclear policy in his 
second term and show the influence of the Suez Crisis, Sputnik, and the deployment of nuclear 
weapons to Europe in the late 1950s. Nash’s work focused on the deployment of IRBMs to 
Europe, this dissertation will focus more on Eisenhower’s nuclear policy, how that policy 
justified the deployment of IRBMs, and what the implications of that policy were.   
 Michael Armacost’s The Politics of Weapons Innovation discusses the strained politics 
that complicated the development of America’s first IRBMs, the Thor and Jupiter rockets.  Both 
the Army and Air Force developed an IRBM weapon system, because the services had different 
operational needs for such systems.  The political infighting prevented the rapid fielding of a 
missile and delayed the deployment of IRBMs.  The Army wanted to build a mobile launch 
vehicle, while the Air Force designed one that required a reinforced permanent launching site.  
Both services designed their missiles to use liquid fuels and neither contained effective targeting 
technologies. Finally the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, and Eisenhower decided to 
support the Air Force missile program and ended the Army’s IRBM program, but not before both 
services had made significant progress.  The delayed timeline meant that the first deployed 
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IRBMs were obsolete almost as soon as they reached their bases in Europe.   This dissertation 
expands on Armacost’s discussion.  It explores the development of the IRBMs to show why the 
missiles offered to European nations were not well received.  This will form the foundation for 
the argument that the primary benefit of the IRBM deployment was not the protection that the 
proposed nuclear weapons provided. Rather, the deployment of IRBMs exacerbated issues of 
national sovereignty. The decision to not offer France an agreement that was similar to that 
offered Great Britain called into question France’s position as a first-tier NATO member state. 
The IRBM agreement with Great Britain clearly cemented its junior position with respect to the 
United States on the world stage. 
 Robert Divine’s The Sputnik Challenge covers the political ramifications of the Soviet 
launch of Sputnik.  Divine argues that Eisenhower’s initial response to the Soviet launch was 
ineffective in calming American fears.  The American people thought that the United States had 
lost the space race.  Eisenhower, Divine shows, thought that Sputnik was more of a propaganda 
victory than a technical achievement.  Eisenhower did not communicate effectively to the 
American people the limited technical advances of Sputnik.  Eisenhower did overcome his initial 
setbacks in his response to the launch.  He created the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), a space committee to advise him on American research efforts, and 
encouraged improvements in math and science education.  Divine’s work shows that Eisenhower 
did not consider Sputnik a serious military threat and was unimpressed with the technical 
advances it represented.  Although Eisenhower misread the political fallout from the launch, he 
accurately gauged its technical ramifications.  The dissertation will include a brief section 
discussing Eisenhower’s domestic response to the launch of Sputnik, but will concentrate on how 
it influenced the international sphere.  This will show that Sputnik was not as damaging to 
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American credibility as Philip Nash argues.  Sputnik did challenge the assumption that the U.S. 
was immune from Soviet missile attacks. This put more emphasis on the deployment of IRBMs 
to Western Europe in order to counter the Soviet increased missile threat to U.S. domestic 
targets. Although Sputnik showed the advances of the Soviet space program, it did not invalidate 
America’s nuclear umbrella in Western Europe, since those nations lived under threat of Soviet 
rocket and conventional forces attack long before the satellite launch. 
 The intelligence picture began to clear up in the middle of the 1950s. The U-2 spy plane 
came online in 1956 and was fully functioning in reconnaissance of Soviet sights by 1957. 
Although the over flights were risky because of the potential political fall-out, the intelligence 
value greatly impressed Eisenhower. There would be problems with the program as the CIA 
handlers wanted to do more with the over flights than Eisenhower wanted to allow. It was also 
problematic using the information provided by the U-2’s amazing camera in a public forum. 
Eisenhower kept the information provided by the clandestine program classified even when it 
hurt him politically. He knew that the Soviet threat was not as great as many American 
politicians made it out to be but he did not divulge the truth about the state of Soviet missile 
development. 
 David Schwartz in his work NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas argues that America’s 
dominance in NATO, specifically in the nuclear realm, created the conditions for serious 
problems in the alliance.  Schwartz argues that most of America’s solutions to NATO nuclear 
problems revolve around hardware.  He sees the deployment of IRBMs as an example of this.  
The deployment of IRBMs was an attempt to bolster America’s nuclear umbrella protecting 
NATO member states.  This solution did not address the root of the problem, NATO member 
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states’ concern of Soviet aggression and the willingness of the U.S. to use nuclear weapons to 
defend them.  Schwartz argues that addressing the fears directly, instead of taking them for 
granted offered a more effective solution to the nuclear problem.  He argues that doctrinal issues 
do not receive enough attention because NATO was too concerned with material solutions.  
Schwartz shows that the range of solutions to NATO’s nuclear problems go beyond deploying 
weapon systems to include doctrinal and policy solutions.  Schwartz’s argument fails in one 
critical aspect; he posits that the three centers of power in NATO were Bonn, Paris, and 
Washington.  This dissertation shows that London was a senior member of the alliance and more 
important than Paris, at least in the early post war years.  Great Britain, throughout the 1950s, 
was the only other NATO nation to have possession of its own nuclear weapons.  It was also the 
only nation to receive important technical cooperation after the Suez Crisis of 1956.  This 
dissertation demonstrates the efficacy of policy solutions over material solutions to NATO’s 
nuclear problems, in the case of the IRBM offer to Britain. It will also describe how policy 
proposals that do not meet the critical needs of member states are just as ineffective as material-
based solutions. 
 Chris Tudda’s work The Truth is Our Weapon shows the importance of public statements 
in foreign policy.  He argues that Eisenhower and Dulles used their public statements to 
pronounce aggressive policy proposals that were not in line with their true policy positions.  He 
calls this “rhetorical diplomacy.”  Tudda argues that Eisenhower and Dulles used this type of 
diplomacy to pressure allies and the Soviet Union to accept the more moderate policy positions 
presented behind closed doors.  However, this type of diplomacy also backfired; it alienated the 
Soviet Union and convinced Soviet leaders that American interests were more hostile than not.  
It also convinced the allies of the dangers of the Soviet threat, which Tudda argues precluded the 
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development of the European Defense Community.  Tudda’s discussion of the disparities of 
public and private diplomacy is important.  This dissertation examines the public policy positions 
of Eisenhower before, during, and after the Suez Crisis and Sputnik launch to determine how 
these events changed public policy.  It will also analyze the secret policy discussions during the 
same period to determine if the disparity Tudda alludes to was present.   
Campbell Craig’s work Destroying the Village discusses the changes in Eisenhower’s 
views of nuclear warfare throughout the first part of his administration.  He argues that by the 
mid-1950s, nuclear war was so destructive that Eisenhower decided he needed to avoid it at all 
costs.  He did this by taking away all other options for limited conflict off the table.  Craig argues 
that Eisenhower took such a radical position in order to force his cabinet to push him to 
compromise on national security issues and away from war.  This analysis of Eisenhower’s 
position on war does not treat the issue with enough complexity.  Although Eisenhower wanted 
to avoid war, he did not completely abstain from using force.  He used covert operations to 
maintain American influence in Iran in 1954 and Guatemala in 1953.  His defense policy also 
encouraged allies to fight regional conflicts with American aid.  He supported the government of 
South Vietnam in its struggle with North Vietnam, although he declined to send combat troops.  
The New Look defense policy had at its heart an avoidance of atomic war, but Eisenhower 
understood that conflict occurred along a spectrum that ranged from psychological warfare to all 
out nuclear combat.  He wanted to limit the ability of the Cold War to escalate, but he did not 
shrink from confronting the Soviet Union.  Craig’s work is important because it shows the 
evolution of Eisenhower’s understanding of nuclear warfare and its growing destructive capacity.  
The dissertation continues this discussion into his second administration and shows how his 
nuclear policy changed to adapt to the evolving international scene.  It will reveal how the 
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deployment of IRBMs fit into Eisenhower’s understanding of deterrence and whether or not this 
was an accurate appraisal of their efficacy.   
 This dissertation will differ from previous works by focusing on the political value of 
IRBMs both to NATO member states and to America’s domestic security. It will demonstrate 
that only by considering the military and political value of these weapons can Eisenhower’s 
policy for their deployment come into focus. This is why previous works judged these weapons 
harshly, in a purely military sense they did not accomplish much. However, politically these 
missiles achieved several specific policy goals that Eisenhower intended, the rapprochement with 
the United Kingdom, the beginning of the transition away from a ground-force focused defense 
of Western Europe, the answer to domestic security concerns in the wake of the Sputnik launch, 














Chapter 1: Creating the New Look: Project Solarium and the 






President Eisenhower assumed office during a turbulent time. The Korean War continued 
to drag on showing the power of the Socialist world and relative impotence of the Free World to 
defeat the first Socialist invasion. Atomic warfare reached a new and incredibly more deadly 
stage with the creation of hydrogen bombs. These new atomic warheads were vastly more 
destructive than those used in World War II. Although the United States was the first nation to 
possess hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Union was not long in catching up. Only four years after 
the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb in 1949 they perfected a hydrogen weapon. Now 
large cities like New York faced instant annihilation in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.1 
Unfortunately for the new President, Eisenhower did not have the most cooperative 
partner in South Korean President Syngman Rhee, who wanted to expand the scope of the 
conflict and destroy North Korea. It is understandable why President Rhee would see this as a 
necessary objective but for Eisenhower this represented an unacceptable risk. However, 
Eisenhower understood that he could not continue to fight the Korean War for an indefinite 
period of time. In his memoir of his first term of office, Mandate for Change, he summed up his 
feelings about the need for some resolution in Korea. He wrote, “My conclusion as I left Korea 
was that we could not stand forever on a static front and continue to accept casualties without 
any visible results. Small attacks on small hills would not end this war.”2  
Communist incursion was nothing new to Eisenhower. He saw the Soviet Union as an 
expansionary force that wanted “to rule the world by any means, if necessary by force.”3 Even 
                                                 
1 David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), 87, 99 
2 Dwight David Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, A Personal Account, 1953-1956 (New 
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3 Eisenhower Mandate for Change, 78 
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though the Korean War was over by 1953, Eisenhower was under no delusions about future 
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. He also felt it his “duty to make clear 
to the world the wickedness of communist promises, and to convince dependent peoples that 
their only hope of maintaining independence, once achieved, was through cooperation with the 
Free World.”4  
Eisenhower’s success in avoiding another conflict with the Soviet Union did not come 
about because of some sense of ambivalence towards the Soviets. Rather, his ability to maintain 
peace came from his understanding of the horrors of war and what war in the nuclear era would 
mean for the United States. Eisenhower’s diary, which he kept intermittently from his time in the 
Philippines in the 1930s through 1967, sheds some light on his views of warfare. Below is a 
basic outline of Eisenhower’s views on war: 
Brutality of war: In May of 1942, Eisenhower struggled to advance the planning of 
Bolero, which was the name given for the build-up of troops in Britain. In his diary his 
frustration came through at those who thought they could “buy victory.” He wrote that “not one 
man in twenty in the government (including the war and navy departments) realizes what a 
grisly, dirty tough business we are in.” War was destructive and was something to be avoided 
unless the threat of not going to war was more dangerous than fighting it.5 
If the nation was going to fight, it should do so completely: At the initiation of the 
Korean War, Eisenhower went to Washington D.C. to see some of his old friends and discuss 
preparations for the oncoming conflict. He worried that those in charge of preparing the nation 
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for war did not understand the necessity of preparing for all-out war, even if they hoped it would 
be limited. Eisenhower did not think “that an appeal to force cannot, by its nature, be a partial 
one.” He continued by writing that “in a fight we (our side) can never be too strong.” America 
had to be ready for any eventuality “even if it finally came to the use of the A-bomb (which God 
forbid.)” War could not be something that you could put artificial limits on in the beginning of a 
conflict. This was another reason why Eisenhower was hesitant to use force as President, there 
was no reliable way to ensure that a limited war would remain limited.6  
Four pillars of future strength: Eisenhower thought future global wars would be 
“ideological” conflicts. He wrote that America, in order to be victorious in such a struggle, had 
to maintain “complete devotion to democracy… and practice of free enterprise”, “industrial and 
economic strength”, “moral probity in all dealing”, and “necessary military strength.” 
Eisenhower wrote this entry in 1946 but the four pillars of strength influenced the formation of 
his defense policy as President.  
Importance of maintaining parity with the Soviet Union in military technology, 
specifically guided missiles: Long-range ballistic missiles became a threat during World War II. 
Eisenhower saw their destruction first hand while he was in Britain during World War II; his 
headquarters was in line with the flight path of the V-2 rockets Hitler launched in the final years 
of WWII.7 There was little defense against such weapons. By the time Eisenhower was 
President, guided missiles and smaller atomic warheads combined to make it possible to use such 
weapons to launch a nuclear attack across thousands of miles. He understood that the American 
people considered these to be the “ultimate” weapon. Eisenhower, in his diary in 1956, wrote 
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that people had “a picture of guided missiles raining out of the skies in almost uncounted 
numbers, it is extremely important that the Soviets do not get ahead” of the United States “in the 
general development of these weapons.”8 This would become a significant problem for 
Eisenhower after the Soviet launch of Sputnik. 
Effect of atomic weapons on future wars: Eisenhower saw atomic weapons as a fact of 
future wars. He also believed that there were benefits to this new paradigm. Concentrating 
defense spending on atomic weapons would allow reductions in conventional troops.9 However, 
this would mean that any future conflict would be nuclear in nature. Any atomic conflict would 
be incredibly destructive, especially if it exploded into an unlimited atomic war between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. In his memoir of his first term in office, Eisenhower wrote 
that “modern global war would be catastrophic beyond belief.” This made him realize that 
“America’s military forces must be designed primarily to deter a conflict.”10 
Nuclear weapons were not going away, neither was the Soviet Union; Eisenhower 
understood that he had to balance the threat of war with the necessity to continue to maintain 
peace. His understanding that war was not something that you could contain came from his 
understanding of Clausewitz, which he read three times while a junior officer serving in Panama 
under General Fox Conner.11 Although Eisenhower knew he could not control war if it broke 
out, he was very effective in controlling the threat of war, which was what he intended to do with 
his defense policy as President.  
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Eisenhower’s defense policy, nicknamed the New Look, came out of the Project 
Solarium conference held in the summer of 1953. He intended this project to provide clear 
alternatives to President Harry S. Truman’s defense policy. Eisenhower wanted to avoid large 
budget deficits and provide an effective deterrent to prevent future conflicts equal to or greater 
than the Korean War. Balancing economic stability and national defense became a constant 
concern for Eisenhower. 
The New Look defense policy offered a constructive way to balance these two competing 
interests. It focused America’s national defense assets towards a massive nuclear response 
capability. Eisenhower intended this reliance on nuclear capacity, known as the doctrine of 
Massive Retaliation, to deter warfare and show the Soviet Union that America would not 
countenance communist expansion into specific areas. He also wanted to make clear how 
America would respond to future acts of aggression. Eisenhower hoped this focus on nuclear 
weapons would allow the U.S. to concentrate its defense allocations primarily on air power. In 
the early 1950s, building air power assets was cheaper than maintaining large ground forces 
deployed to defend Western Europe, Korea, and Japan. If the New Look policy proved effective, 
Eisenhower could realize economic stability through balanced budgets, made possible by 
relatively cheap air defenses. Eisenhower believed that a strong economy was the foundation of a 
strong defense.  
Although called the New Look, this name was misleading. It was not a dramatic shift 
from Truman’s defense policy or subsequent Cold War defense policies that followed it. Defense 
policies throughout the Cold War generally were variations on a theme and not markedly 
different. Containment, as espoused by NSC-68 under President Truman, continued to be the 
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dominant paradigm for combating the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. 
Although some of the details changed, the core idea did not. The Army remained forward 
deployed under President Eisenhower, albeit in smaller numbers. Nuclear weapons, the central 
component of Eisenhower’s policy, remained the main deterrent throughout the Cold War, with 
differing emphasis depending on the particular administration. Alliances formed a critical 
element of the New Look policy but they continued to be important in all administrations’ Cold 
War defense programs. Foreign and military aid provided a way for Cold War presidential 
administrations to garner influence with nations around the world and theoretically limit the need 
for American ground forces. Finally, scientific research to provide the best weapons technology 
continued to be important for U.S. strategy throughout the conflict. 
Understanding how Eisenhower constructed his defense policy shows the importance he 
placed, not only on massive retaliation, but also on economic stability. A deeper look at the 
policy will bring into focus the differences between the New Look and President Truman’s 
previous defense plan. Eisenhower’s concern for fiscal security did not stem purely from his 
conservative political roots. He thought that the economic health of the nation directly influenced 
its ability to continue to fight communism. Another guiding experience was Eisenhower’s time 
in the Army through the Great Depression; this showed him the damage that an economic crisis 
could bring to national defense.  
 In the past 20 years, historians have revealed much about President Eisenhower, 
particularly how he handled the administrative tasks of the presidency. Gone is the portrait of 
Eisenhower as a do nothing head of state. Peter Paret, with his work Eisenhower and the 
American Crusades showed how previous historians misjudged Eisenhower and his role in the 
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policy process.12 Fred Greenstein continued this with his work The Hidden Hand Presidency.13 
Eisenhower clearly played an active role in his administration. However, he delegated significant 
authority to his subordinates, just as he did when he was the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Forces in World War II. This delegation process increased the public profile of subordinates in 
the government, creating the impression that Eisenhower did little else than play golf. Although 
Eisenhower allowed his subordinates much leeway within their portfolios, he never delegated his 
responsibility when issues grew beyond the prevue of one individual department or grew so large 
that they demanded his attention. This process of delegation did not always have the intended 
result. Particularly, in the case of Project Solarium, delegating the policy formation process to an 
outside group was not as effective as Eisenhower hoped. 
President Dwight Eisenhower entered office confronting both the Korean War and a 
ballooning deficit. He wanted to reverse the trend of increasing defense costs, due to the ongoing 
conflict, and create a defense policy that balanced the security needs of the nation with the fiscal 
stability needed for a prosperous future. In a letter to General Alfred Gruenther, the Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) from 1953 to 1956, Eisenhower dismissed the shallow 
comments of his critics. He did not agree with those who argued that America’s potential for 
economic growth was limitless. Eisenhower also took issue with the question, “What would you 
pay to save your life,” which, he believed, oversimplified the issue of defense spending.14 
President Harry Truman was also a fiscal conservative; however, he had to contend with 
the necessary military buildup in order to fight the Korean War. Truman, when he took office, 
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worried that the Soviet Union “was trying to scare the United States into spending itself into 
bankruptcy.”15 The economic conundrum that the Korean War caused troubled Eisenhower as 
well. Truman was just as cautious and concerned about deficit spending as Eisenhower was but 
he had a major conflict that required immediate and drastic action to combat.   
 Eisenhower observed that the economic problems Truman faced were serious but the 
previous President’s solutions did not take into account the fact that the United States had a free 
market economic system. He believed that people depended on an effective economy to spur 
them to work hard and earn a return on their labor. If the economy did not provide the 
encouragement for strong production, Eisenhower felt it could invite more state control. This 
regimentation represented a reduction in the freedoms that the American system provided. 
Eisenhower believed that the economic system of free market capitalism directly correlated to its 
lack of government enforced economic and social regulations.16 
 In order to balance these forces, Eisenhower intended to strike a compromise between 
economic prosperity and national defense by reducing government spending. He wanted to 
decrease the cost of government in order to make it fiscally responsible. The U.S. had to have an 
“organized, effective resistance… over a long period of years” in order to defend against the 
Soviet Union. In order to do this, the U.S. economy had to remain robust. If the economy lost its 
vigor, as he stressed to his old friend General Gruenther, Eisenhower was convinced that 
America’s free market economy would not survive.17 
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 In his final budget, President Truman authorized an $11 billion deficit. Within his first six 
months in office, Eisenhower decreased this amount by half. He also cut the amount of federal 
spending by $13 billion.18 Much of this savings came because of decreased defense 
appropriations, following the cessation of hostilities in Korea. Balancing the federal budget 
consumed much of Eisenhower’s thoughts during this time. In a letter to George Whitney, a 
prominent Wall Street Banker, he wrote that he wanted a balanced budget “as soon as possible.” 
Eisenhower did not agree with the majority of Republicans who wanted to reduce taxes for 
political purposes. Eisenhower would not sacrifice the economic vitality of the nation for short-
term political pay-off.19 
 Protecting the nation’s confidence in its currency was also a vital part of Eisenhower’s 
economic concerns. He thought that the government should protect people’s fiscal stability by 
ensuring the value of their savings was not eroded through inflation. The absence of inflation 
would increase the desire to save money, which Eisenhower asserted was vital to a free market. 
In 1953, the U.S. dollar had the value of “about fifty-three percent of the dollar in 1939.” 
Eisenhower felt that citizens did not buy government bonds because these bonds lacked a 
sufficient return on their investment. Long-term investments provided “a great portion of the 
investments in America’s development.” If inflation decreased people’s desire to invest in 
America, it would retard the nation’s growth. Although President Eisenhower could not control 
all economic influences, he could control the deficit.20 
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 Since economic policy was so important, in Eisenhower’s analysis, to the nation’s future, 
he took an active role in forming his economic policy. Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors (CEA) under Eisenhower, said that the CEA was one of two appointments 
that the President scheduled weekly; the other was the National Security Council. He compared 
the CEA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their access to the President showed his interest in economic 
issues. The CEA provided direction for Eisenhower’s economic policy, but did not make 
decisions without his input.21 
 Given Eisenhower’s desire to decrease the deficit, he was not willing to sacrifice 
everything to achieve his goal. He realized that finding the proper balance between fiscal 
conservatism and a strong defense would take time. On 29 July 1953, Eisenhower received a 
memo from Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey requesting an increase in the national 
debt above the $275 billion limit set by Congress. Humphrey, the former president of the M.A. 
Hanna Steel Company, served in the administration from 1953 until 1957. Humphrey argued that 
raising the debt limit to $290 billion provided the ability of the government to meet 
Congressional authorizations and maintain some fiscal freedom of movement. This also would 
force the administration to begin to reconcile its expenses with revenue and balance the budget. 
By doing so, America could provide a firm economic foundation, which would allow it to lead 
the defense of the non-communist world.22 
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 Taxes, deficits, and other economic factors all influenced national defense in multiple 
ways. For Eisenhower there was a hierarchy of national needs, as well as an interconnection 
between these issues. In his letter to General Gruenther, Eisenhower wrote that “we should not 
really kick about taxes until we know that we have made ourselves reasonably secure against any 
possible move by the Soviets.” In order to provide this security, the U.S. needed a sound 
perimeter of allies close to the Soviet Union. This required military and economic aid to foreign 
nations. If the U.S. cut taxes, defense budgets could suffer, as well as the outposts that provided 
security. Eisenhower hoped “that nothing will happen to damage irreparably the progress toward 
unified strength and collective security that we have been trying so laboriously to build up.”23 
 Finding the proper balance between defense and economic prosperity required discerning 
what technological advances and armed forces were most vital to national security. With the 
Korean War cease-fire recently signed, Eisenhower wanted to reduce military spending, but in a 
responsible manner. This required determining which weapons systems and military formations 
were vital and what their size and role in national defense should be. Project Solarium would be 
one way that Eisenhower began to solve this complex problem.  
 In order to help his administration strike the correct balance between financial security 
and military strength, Eisenhower directed that the Secretary of the Treasury attend National 
Security Council meetings. Bromley Smith, a NSC staff member, said the Secretary of 
Treasury’s attendance at NSC meetings showed Eisenhower’s acknowledgement that national 
defense required fiscal discipline as well. He thought that this understanding was the foundation 
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of many NSC conclusions. The impact of military spending on the nation’s economy was an 
important consideration that the many in the NSC shared.24  
 Atomic weapons complicated national defense issues, not only because of their economic 
impact. Scholar and theoretician Bernard Brodie, in a Foreign Affairs article, discussed the 
strategic complications of nuclear weapons. Public discourse concerning these new weapons 
coalesced around the nuclear fission warhead. This size of weapon Brodie cautioned would be a 
“city-buster.” It had significant latitude in targeting because of its damage radius. Any attack 
using such a weapon, even if targeted at military units or industrial sites, would destroy the 
surrounding urban infrastructure. The reason for this was that most military and industrial targets 
were close to cities. This meant that leaders knew that the decision to employ such weapons 
meant the destruction of civilians. He wrote that a series of attacks against the Soviet Union or 
the United States would not leave much for the survivors. The continuous increase in the 
lethality of nuclear weapons increased the moral cost of their use.25 
 The United States had to face the possibility of nuclear warfare, because it had no other 
option. John Slessor explained in his Foreign Affairs article, published in 1954, that free nations, 
which included America, could “not survive a ‘war of flesh’” with the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union, in turn, did not have the advanced air or nuclear assets that the United States possessed at 
this time, although the Soviet Union was quickly closing the gap between the two nations. Due to 
the disparity of manpower between the Soviet and American army, the U.S. had to compete with 
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assets and weapons that mitigated the manpower discrepancies between the two blocs. Central to 
this was the use of atomic weapons.26 
 Although John Slessor’s article argued that the Soviet Union would have a much larger 
army, the population differential between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the 1950s was about 
30 million, or about a 20% difference between the two populations.27 This population distinction 
was not as dramatic as Slessor contended but arguments similar to his permeated the 1950s 
strategic perception. American national security experts, including President Eisenhower, 
continued to believe that the Soviet Union’s military force would greatly outnumber those of the 
free world. 
Eisenhower, when he entered office, faced the ramifications of President Harry Truman’s 
administration. Truman faced a deteriorating economic situation in 1949. Eisenhower inherited 
an economy on wartime footing. Truman had to deal with shifting the nation to a peacetime 
economy and providing a way for the returning servicemen to integrate themselves into the labor 
market, this would not be an easy process. His Director of the Budget, Fredrick Lawton, 
recommended reducing military expenditures for fiscal year 1951, in order to reduce the 
deficit.28 Truman’s economic problems were not only a product of deficit spending; in 1949, the 
economy was in the midst of a recession, largely due to the removal of government purchases of 
war material. Although Truman’s Secretary of the Treasury, John Snyder, thought that the 
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economy would recover by the end of the year without significant help from the government, the 
economic outlook at the end of the 1940s was not particularly good.29  
 The Korean War started in the summer of 1950; this compounded the economic troubles 
that the nation faced. Truman had to increase the military spending that he previously decreased. 
The Korean War also gave more aggressive policy makers in the Truman administration, such as 
Paul Nitze, the Director of Policy Planning for the State Department from 1950 through 1953, 
the opportunity to turn the recommendations of NSC-68 into a reality.30 This paper, written prior 
to the outbreak of the Korean War incorporated George Kennan’s idea of containment but with a 
military emphasis. This paper militarized the containment program that dominated subsequent 
U.S. Cold War policy. NSC-68 centered on preparing for a year of maximum danger, 1954. By 
this time, under the planning assumptions in the document, the Soviets would possess enough 
nuclear weapons to deal a devastating blow to the United States. Although, at the time of its 
drafting, the fears of NSC-68 concerning Soviet nuclear power were projections, these 
predictions soon became a reality.31 
 When Eisenhower entered office, he saw two major problems with Truman’s defense 
policy. First, he thought that the concentration on a year of maximum danger was unsound. 
Eisenhower also believed that Truman’s policies were too rigid in their estimation of the Soviet 
threat. He concluded that the policies under Truman did not offer the needed flexibility to 
operate in a changing world. Apart from the policies lack of military vigor, Eisenhower believed 
that they relied too much on manpower, which was expensive. Eisenhower said “Today three 
                                                 
29 John Snyder to President Truman, June 28,1949, Student Research File #14, file The Attempt to Achieve Stable 
Economic Growth During the Truman Administration [7 of 13]. Truman Presidential Library, Independence. 
30 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 420. 
31 Paul Pierpaoli, Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1999), 26. 
 35 
 
aircraft with modern weapons can practically duplicate the destructive power of all the 2,700 
planes we unleashed in the great breakout attack from the Normandy beachhead.” He hoped, to 
replace soldiers with technology. This effort, to shift the burden of defense from manpower to 
technology, pervaded Eisenhower’s construction of a defense policy.32 
 In his first State of the Union address in 1953, Eisenhower outlined what he thought were 
the major issues confronting his administration. He said that his administration had to balance 
national defense and maintain a viable economy. If he concentrated on defense spending with too 
little focus on economic issues, Eisenhower worried that he would solve one problem while 
creating another. He thought he could blend both issues into one policy. In this policy, the 
number of soldiers was not the only indicator of power. In his speech, Eisenhower explained that 
he wanted a leaner military that would provide significant deterrence but at a reduced cost.33  
 The Korean War received special mention in the address. The war, which started after the 
North Korean invasion of South Korea, was entering its third year and there was little progress 
on the battlefield due to Truman’s decision to halt U.N. force’s at the 38th parallel, where the war 
began. Eisenhower explained that the war was “part of the same calculated assault that the 
[Communist] aggressor is simultaneously pressing in Indochina and Malaya.” However, the 
Korean War was not the only military problem Eisenhower faced when he entered office.34 
 Walter Millis, a staff and editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune, discussed the 
military problems facing Eisenhower as he entered office in 1953. Millis’s article in Foreign 
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Affairs, published the same year, claims that after WWII, the U.S. rested on its atomic laurels to 
prevent future wars. While there were no major wars, meaning global wars, the atomic threat did 
not stop Soviet expansion. Soviet power, according to Millis, continued to grow through means 
other than war such as subversion and covert programs. America’s atomic threat was not 
effective in stopping these communist incursions.35 
 The new administration faced several irreconcilable problems, according to Millis. He 
argued that the administration could construct a peace in Korea by looking at the issue from a 
new perspective. However, peace in Korea would not solve all of America’s security challenges. 
Millis argued that the redeployment of troops from Korea combined with reductions in defense 
spending, a more aggressive posture to deter Communist expansion, and decreasing military air 
power were contradictory goals. Eisenhower had to determine which of these objectives to 
sacrifice, in Millis’s estimation. However, in Millis’s opinion, this process was inevitable 
regardless of the electoral timeline. The election forced Americans to face the problems of their 
security and their economy. This required a new defense policy that reconciled these 
contradictory dilemmas. Millis contended that American policy, before Eisenhower, created a 
conflicting series of expectations; he would have to determine how to manage expectations and 
balance these discordant ideas.36 
 What Mills did not account for was the fact that the United States, after World War II, 
had little choice but to assume a leadership role in the free world. Eisenhower did not have the 
luxury of simply choosing one of the competing interests that Mills claimed were contradictory, 
such as pursuing a strong defense or focusing on domestic economic stability. In reality, 
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Eisenhower had to make progress in both of these areas. This was one of the many things that 
made his term in office so complex.  
 Against this focus on cost cutting, the nation faced what appeared to be an increasingly 
effective Soviet atomic threat. In order to counter this peril some, like T.F. Walkowicz, 
advocated using the U.S. Air Force as a strategic deterrent. Walkowicz served in the Air Force as 
an aeronautical engineer and was a consultant for the Army for airborne forces. After his service 
in the military, he worked for the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences founded by Laurance 
Rockefeller. If the Air Force were the primary deterrent force, instead of U.S. ground forces, 
then expensive land bases and foreign deployed troops could come home. This would reduce 
defense spending; as well as consolidate U.S. forces in the continental United States. This 
concentrated force would be a strategic reserve, capable of deploying to counter any Soviet 
ground attack. 37 The preference for air power stemmed from two assumptions: its cost-
effectiveness and the efficacy of its deterrent value. If either one of these did not hold true, then 
it would degrade the rationale for choosing air power as the main deterrent protecting the United 
States. 
In a nuclear war, Walkowicz theorized the outcome would result from “forces in being.” 
This term refers to trained, equipped, and ready forces; as opposed to, military units that a nation 
had to recruit, train, and deploy, in response to a conflict. The reason America and its allies won 
both world wars was America’s ability to create a fighting force both in manpower and material 
after the conflict started. In the Cold War, the U.S. could not rely on Europe to fight the initial 
phases of a conflict; the U.S. needed to build a nuclear force prepared to fight the Soviet Union 
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at the start of any hostilities. This rationale, centering on the necessity of constant preparedness 
for war, suffused Eisenhower’s view of national defense. The luxury of time that the U.S. used in 
both previous global conflicts was no longer feasible.38 Eisenhower wanted to construct a policy 
that blended the need for quick reaction to Soviet aggression, smaller defense budgets, and less 
reliance on large ground formations. This fundamentally changed how America prosecuted wars. 
The U.S. had to be ready to strike back quickly; it could not wait to build its forces, after the first 
enemy attack.  
 Top government officials were not the only ones who thought that the Soviet Union 
posed a serious threat. Most Americans believed that the Soviet threat centered on more than 
nuclear weapons. A Gallop Poll, released in 1953, shows that almost 80% of respondents felt that 
the Soviet Union wanted to rule the world. The American public did not cynically receive the 
rhetoric of the Cold War. They interpreted the threat as real and dire. This poll, released during 
the time of Project Solarium, shows the relevance of the Soviet threat. It also shows that most 
Americans saw the Soviet Union as an expansionist enemy.39 
 In constructing this new policy, Eisenhower expected Project Solarium to supply a 
definitive direction for his administration. The project came out of the need to explore different 
foreign and defense policy courses of action. His intent for the project was to provide different 
recommendations, from which he would choose the best way to proceed.40 Eisenhower expected 
this new program to give him the tools to cut defense spending, while maintaining sufficient 
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defense forces. Each of the three Task Forces had separate planning assumptions that drove their 
investigation. The Task Forces would report their findings to the President and the NSC. While 
each Task Force created a useful report, making a unified defense policy from these three 
recommendations proved difficult. 
 Task Force A, chaired by George Kennan, advocated a program similar to the 
containment policy under President Truman.41 George Kennan, a State Department official, who 
served in the Soviet Union during the mid-1940s, played a fundamental role in Cold War defense 
policy. His insights into Soviet behavior, as explained in his long telegram and “Roots of Soviet 
Conduct” published in Foreign Affairs in the 1947, gave the ideological framework for the 
containment policy of the Cold War. 42 Kennan wrote that his course of action, Alternative A, 
would preserve armed forces capable of securing the United States and providing assistance to its 
allies for a prolonged time. This required America to continue to support the free world with 
military and economic aid. Finally, the U.S. should exploit Soviet weaknesses in the social, 
political, and economic realms. This effort should not significantly increase the tensions between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. If carried out successfully it would avert another world 
war.43 
 Under the set of assumptions Kennan used for his Task Force the risk of war was not 
high. In response to this decreased risk, his plan recommended the reduction of defense 
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allocations. However, Kennan warned that to reduce the nation’s defense at the same rate as after 
WWII would raise the risk of Soviet aggression due to a diminshed American readiness to 
counter it.44 
 Kennan proposed a strategy centered on three areas, the United States, its allies, and the 
Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. If America focused its efforts in these areas towards the 
assumed contradictions of the Communist system, as understood by Kennan, then the Soviets 
would have to accept some form of peace with the West. The contradictions Kennan cited were 
the authoritarian state, the controlled economy, and the inability of the Soviet Union to provide a 
national defense, strong military alliance supported primarily by the Soviet economy, and robust 
economic growth for its citizens. Eventually, if put under enough pressure the Soviet system 
would demand too much of the people and the system would fall, according to Kennan. He 
further warned in the report, that the risk of war could not distract America from completing its 
objective of preventing the Soviet Union from increasing its hegemony. Kennan argued that his 
Task Force’s recommendations would provide the ability to curb, not stop, Soviet expansion if 
the administration followed its provisions.45 
 The Korean War was in its final stages during Project Solarium. Ensuring that America 
avoided another conflict was vitally important for Task Force A. Kennan understood this fact 
and the report contains a section explaining how to proceed during peacetime. The Soviet Union 
could easily misinterpret American actions, if Eisenhower chose Alternative A, as provoking war 
and not averting it. The U.S, under Alternative A, intended to reduce Soviet territory to that of 
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imperial Russia. This confinement, Kennan’s group argued, would discredit the Soviet Union, 
and cause its failure through its own contradictions in ideology, economy, and politics.46 
 One problem with Kennan’s task force was its assumption that its course of action would 
lead to the Soviet Union’s demise. If this were true, it was wishful thinking to argue that the 
Soviet Union would willingly accept this state of affairs. The U.S.S.R would, if faced with its 
imminent defeat, strike out in order to reverse its decline. Kennan’s group did not adequately 
address the problems with this fundamental assumption in their report.  
 Kennan encouraged Eisenhower to ensure that his foreign policy had a sense of 
consistency and predictability. America should be the solid foundation of the free world and of 
its resistance to the Soviet Union. Eisenhower, in Kennan’s opinion, had to ensure his 
government acted with one accord, and was consistent in its policy with its allies and the Soviets. 
This would provide a sense of discipline, which would not allow the Soviet Union to misconstrue 
changes in policy as aggressive actions.47 
 America’s position in relation to the Soviet Union was advantageous in Kennan’s 
opinion. However, there were dangers that could undermine the U.S. He encouraged America to 
build its alliances, ensure its allies understood the stakes of the conflict, and took on their fair 
share of the burden. In the end, Kennan’s Task Force recommended a continuation of America’s 
containment policy, with a few changes. These changes included the assumption of a strategic 
offensive against the Soviet Union, as opposed to the general defensive nature of Truman’s 
containment policy. Stalin’s death, in February of 1953, was an important turning point in 
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Kennan’s analysis; he thought that the U.S. could use this to start reducing the Soviet Union’s 
power over its satellites. However, this would occur through ideological and economic means, 
not a military confrontation. Finally, Kennan cautioned Eisenhower to avoid focusing solely on 
communism. America’s policy, though oriented to bring about the eventual defeat of the Soviet 
Union, should not imply that the only American concern was the elimination of the Soviet 
system. The Task Force closed their report by acknowledging the fact that though they did not 
choose the policy they researched; they thought it could not “be safely rejected.”48 
 This strategy did not advocate specific reductions or realignments of defense forces. 
However, it did imply that strategic forces would be more critical to U.S. defense than tactical 
units in the long-term against the Soviet Union. This policy, as with the other two policies 
presented in Project Solarium, only provided broad outlines. The specifics would come after 
President Eisenhower chose one, or a combination of, the courses of action and translated it into 
a defense policy. 
 Task Force B, chaired by Major General James McCormack, advocated a more 
aggressive position than Kennan’s group.49 General McCormack served as the director of the 
Division of Military Application of the Atomic Energy Commission in the early 1950s.50 
Alternative B compromised three stages. First, the United States would draw a line outside of 
which it would not allow the Soviet Union to expand. If the Soviet Union tried to expand outside 
of this line, then the U.S. would respond with a full-scale military reprisal. Second, U.S. leaders 
had to ensure that their Soviet counterparts understood the serious implications of continued 
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Soviet expansion. Finally, McCormack’s policy proposal stressed the need for “freedom of 
action” if communism expanded through revolutions. In this case, he thought America needed to 
do what was necessary to restore non-communist leadership. This was a primarily military-based 
proposal.51 
 McCormack identified several problems with the legacy of Truman’s containment policy. 
By trying to stop Soviet expansion, America surrendered its ability to shape the conflict between 
the two nations. This allowed the Soviet Union to assume the strategic offensive, and relegated 
America to playing a defensive role. Trying to stop all Soviet expansion did not allow America 
to concentrate its resources where they were most effective. McCormack thought that eventually 
this would push the conflict to a scale past what the American economy could bear.52 His 
alternative would take back the offensive from the Soviet Union, and allow America to dictate 
the terms of the struggle between the two superpowers.53 
 If Eisenhower chose to continue President Truman’s version of the containment policy, 
McCormack warned that it would escalate the arms race. He wrote that within 5 to 10 years the 
American atomic arsenal would be of sufficient size that the numbers would not be as important 
as the strategy for their use. Once America reached this “age of atomic plenty,” it would have 
sufficient atomic weapons to ensure the destruction of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the 
Soviet Union would not allow its nuclear program to remain in second place. This would create a 
nuclear standoff between the two nations, each having the capability to destroy the other. 
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McCormack believed Alternative B diverted the emphasis from atomic weapons in national 
defense and avoided such a future.54 
 Again, the devil was in the details of this proposal. As with Kennan’s policy the 
fundamental assumption of Soviet passivity was problematic. McCormack assumed that the 
Soviet Union would accept a state of affairs that ceded the strategic initiative to the United 
States. Arguing that this policy would halt the escalation in nuclear arms presumed that the 
Soviet Union would agree to act in the way that U.S. planners dictated. 
 The pivotal part of McCormack’s proposal was the line of defense, or the construction of 
Soviet and American spheres of influence. It would act as barrier to Soviet expansion, because 
America would interpret any effort to expand beyond this line as an act of aggression. Similar to 
the Monroe Doctrine, McCormack defined certain parts of the world as under American 
influence and others that were under Soviet influence. Constructing the line proved more 
difficult than anticipated. The line had to encompass the foreign land bases, sea-lanes, and 
airfields that allowed America to attack the Soviet Union. This required drawing the line well 
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States and its European and Asian allies. The line, 
as envisioned by McCormack, confined the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe, North of the Middle 
East, no farther South than South Korea, and China as its Eastern limit. The figure below is a 
representation of the Soviet sphere of influence55 
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  One of the benefits of this policy, in McCormack’s estimation, was the elimination of 
peripheral wars. Wars like Korea, which took place outside of American and Soviet strategic 
interests, would be too costly for the Soviet Union to contemplate supporting. As America’s 
nuclear threat grew, so did the cost of instigating such limited wars, since small-scale wars could 
escalate. Increasing the cost of aggression would become a fundamental aspect of Eisenhower’s 
New Look defense policy.57 
 By increasing the cost of aggression, and decreasing the likelihood of peripheral wars, 
McCormack’s alternative would give allied nations more faith in American international 
commitments. Under his recommendation, U.S. military power formed the main deterrent to 
Soviet aggression. It would reduce the doubts of America’s allies and make clear that the intent 
of U.S. aid was to prepare other nations to fight their own limited wars. This would ensure that 
limited wars did not take away precious defense resources. McCormack argued that because his 
policy would prevent Soviet expansion through limited wars, allied nations would not have to 
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waste their own defense assets combating small-scale conflicts that would otherwise be 
supported by Soviet aid.58  
 By concentrating on preparing for general war against the Soviet Union, McCormack 
believed his policy alternative delineated the roles of American forces and laid out a strategy that 
used them in an economically efficient manner. If America tried to win the smaller-scale 
conflicts, it could not create forces necessary to defeat the Soviet Union in a general war between 
the two super powers. This would put the nation “in mortal danger.” McCormack offered a 
policy that U.S. citizens could support; it did not require constant U.S. involvement in wars that 
wouldn’t bring a comprehensive peace any closer.59 
 McCormack identified several implications of his policy. The first was the fact that any 
Soviet military offensives would bring about a major war between the U.S. and the Soviets. This 
policy would make such military actions and any direct conflict between the two states unlikely. 
Although McCormack did not think that the Soviet Union wanted war, he thought it was still 
possible. Another large-scale conflict could arise from the escalation of several peripheral wars 
or from inaccurate Soviet perceptions of America’s limitations on Soviet expansion. Since 
McCormack’s recommendation would prevent small-scale wars and clearly explain America’s 
intentions, he felt that his plan clearly avoided general warfare, while maintaining U.S. 
supremacy in the Cold War.60 
 McCormack’s Task Force wanted no misunderstanding about the cost for subsequent acts 
of aggression by the Soviets. If Soviet leaders understood the risks of continued expansion and 
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the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly and decisively to acts of aggression then the Soviets 
would think twice about trying to change the balance of power. This would allow America to 
concentrate its defense spending on weapon systems that would be necessary to defeat the Soviet 
Union in a nuclear war. America could decrease its defense spending on the tools required to 
fight the peripheral wars, like Korea, since these conflicts would become needless risks to the 
Soviet Union. McCormack’s approach assumed that President Eisenhower and future Presidents, 
if they continued to use his proposal, would willingly involve the United States in a nuclear 
conflict with the Soviet Union in order enforce the American sphere of influence, this was a 
doubtful proposition.   
 Task Force C, chaired by Admiral Robert Connolly, differed dramatically from the stance 
adopted by the other two committees.61 Connolly recommended a policy that would sow chaos 
and confusion within the Soviet Union and its allies. This course of action was the most 
aggressive advocated by the three task forces. Connolly thought that increasing the pressure on 
the Soviet Union would prevent communism from spreading. The Soviet Union would focus on 
maintaining their sphere of influence and not on expanding it to new nations. A major drawback 
of Connolly’s policy was the increased risk of world war.62 
 In order to decrease the threat of general war breaking out, Connolly advocated several 
different strategies. The first would be the elimination of the Soviet-Chinese alliance. In order for 
this to occur, America had to remove the communist government from China. This would 
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eliminate a major Soviet ally. Next, the U.S. would concentrate its efforts on stripping away the 
allegiance of the Soviet satellite states. Finally, America had to stop communist expansion in 
Vietnam and Korea. Connolly argued that these courses of action would reduce the power and 
international prestige of communism, inhibiting the Soviet Union’s ability to maintain its global 
offensive.63 
 Soviet advances in nuclear weapons brought a sense of urgency to Connolly’s report. The 
assessment of the Soviet nuclear threat led him to conclude that in five years the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear arsenal would be roughly equivalent to that of the United States. Due to the increased 
military threat the Soviet Union would pose in near future, Connolly stressed that initiating his 
recommended courses of action was vital. Waiting too long exposed America to the anticipated 
increased Soviet nuclear response.64 
 Connolly stated that his Task Force’s plan would benefit the United States if accepted 
and executed by quickly resolving the Cold War, something neither of the other proposals 
promised.65 Although the policy could cause general war; it was the only alternative 
recommending an indirect offensive against the Soviet Union. If America did not act soon 
against the Soviet threat, then Soviet retaliatory capacity would grow to make such action almost 
impossible. Alternative C, in Connolly’s opinion, was a reasonable recommendation for 
achieving America’s objectives in the Cold War. He wrote that the best way to prevent general 
war was to end the current conflict with the Soviets. Bringing closure to the Cold War required 
the U.S. to confront and defeat the threat that the Soviet Union posed. Although Connolly 
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claimed his course of action would bring the struggle to a close, it was more likely that such an 
offensive would spur a war with the Soviet Union rather than end the Cold War.66  
 After six weeks of work, the task forces completed their recommendations. However, this 
was not the end of Project Solarium. One of the expected outcomes of the project was the 
creation of a Basic National Security Policy paper. Bromley Smith, a senior staffer on the NSC, 
observed that relying on written policy directives was a great benefit for governments. He 
thought it provided a coherent framework that explained U.S. national strategy.  This document, 
once written, would form the basis for many future decisions throughout Eisenhower’s tenure. It 
established the basic assumptions of America’s security policy. Smith thought Eisenhower’s 
military experience taught him the necessity of publishing specific guidance so every member of 
the administration understood the strategy that the President wished to pursue. However, 
constructing one security policy out of three very different recommendations proved difficult.67 
 After the groups drafted their reports, they presented them to Eisenhower and the NSC. 
The intent was to show the best aspects of each course of action and allow the NSC to make their 
decision about which to pursue. Andrew Goodpaster, the Staff Secretary to Eisenhower, 
explained that the presentations led to the realization that the overall strategy would be 
containment. There would be some notable differences from Truman’s policy, such as 
disseminating propaganda into Soviet territories and Eastern Europe, U.S. allies, and neutral 
nations. These nations consisted of states such as Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia.68  
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 Eisenhower, after the Solarium groups’ presentations, explained his general concerns 
about national defense. He wanted to make sure that the government did not demand more of 
U.S. citizens than they could freely give. He thought that asking more of people than they would 
willingly sacrifice required forceful action from the government. Eisenhower also wondered 
what America would do with the old communist state if it defeated and destroyed the Soviet 
Union. Eisenhower explained that Americans “have demonstrated their reluctance after a 
war…to occupy the territory conquered in order to gain our legitimate ends.” He clearly did not 
support Connolly’s aggressive policy recommendation of a quick and aggressive end to the Cold 
War. This aggressive roll back policy created more problems than it solved.69 
 Eisenhower wanted the Task Forces to continue their work, but with a significant change. 
He wanted a joint meeting of all the groups to discuss creating a plan that unified the salient 
points of their proposals. This would include an outline of a policy that unified the groups’ 
fundamental recommendations that the NSC could adopt.70 
 After Eisenhower made his comments and left the conference, the individual groups 
explained their disagreements with the competing plans. Eisenhower thought that the plans had 
many of the same recommendations which outshone their differences. The Task Forces did not 
agree. Admiral Connolly, spokesman for Alternative C, and George Kennan, spokesman for 
Alternative A, explained that the two groups could not compromise to create one policy. They 
thought that their groups’ estimates of Soviet objectives and capabilities were too disparate to 
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unify. Such a policy would eviscerate the essential recommendations of each group. Neither 
Kennan nor Connolly thought their group would give its approval to a unified policy.71 
 After Eisenhower learned from Robert Cutler, the Special Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs from 1953-55 and 1957-8, that the Task Forces could not reach a 
consensus, he told Cutler to proceed as he deemed best. He determined that the Special Staff of 
the National Security Council should summarize the major conclusions each group presented in 
their presentations to the President. Once representatives from each Task Force approved these 
summaries, the NSC would review them. Cutler hoped that this review would identify the 
similarities between each recommendation and allow the NSC to progress to writing one unified 
policy.  Task Force members in Washington D.C. would participate in the review process 
conducted by the NSC planning board, if possible.72  
 In a weekly meeting of the NSC on 30 July 1953, Eisenhower discussed the progress of 
Project Solarium after the NSC Planning Group gave its report and summary of the Task Forces’ 
reports. He thought that the NSC should continue to work on the problem and not assume that 
the project was complete. Eisenhower said he wanted to blend the three views of the task force 
into one coherent policy.73 
 The approved Basic National Security Policy, NSC 162/2 compiled by James Lay, the 
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, contained the compromised policies of 
Project Solarium and presented them as one coherent defense strategy. It outlined the response to 
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the Soviet threat. He wrote that America needed to maintain or develop the assets of an effective 
defense that focused on nuclear weapons. America and her allies had to be able to deploy their 
forces quickly, in response to Soviet aggression. This would allow the free world to maintain its 
influence and its alliances throughout the world. In case of a general war, America had to have 
the ability to produce a large number of soldiers and munitions to fight such a conflict. In order 
to achieve these goals, America needed a firm economic foundation that could maintain its 
citizen’s support for building national security.74  
 This paper described how Eisenhower wanted to deter war. He expected the threat of 
nuclear weapons to stop any Soviet aggression or expansion. This document combined several 
aspects of different Task Forces’ recommendations. Although Eisenhower did not approve of 
McCormack’s spheres of influence in total, his emphasis on the deterrent power of nuclear 
weapons clearly influenced NSC 162/2.  
Kennan’s containment policy also comes through in the paper. Lay wrote that America 
should use all means, covert and overt, to weaken Soviet control over its satellites and China. 
U.S. propaganda efforts should target the internal contradictions and complications of the Soviet 
Union. By showing Soviet allies how untrustworthy and problematic and alliance with the Soviet 
Union was, President Eisenhower hoped to limit Soviet ability to demand loyalty from other 
members of the union and China.75 
 The Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2) became the foundation of the New Look 
defense policy. This new defense policy contained what became known as the doctrine of 
                                                 
74 James Lay, “A Report to the National Security Council by The Executive Secretary on Basic National Security 
Policy” Folder NSC 162/2 (2), Box 11, Disaster File, White House Office, National Security Council Staff; Papers, 
1948-61, DDE Presidential Library, Abilene (hereafter cited as NSC 162/2), 5-6. 
75 NSC 162/2, 24-25. 
 53 
 
Massive Retaliation, a remnant of McCormack’s recommendations from Task Force B. This 
doctrine, as explained by Andrew Goodpaster, relied on the ability to use atomic weapons 
however the United States deemed appropriate. Goodpaster believed that this would allow 
Eisenhower the capacity to withstand any Soviet political or social subversion. He continued by 
stating that if military conflict did arise then the doctrine of Massive Retaliation would stop such 
action at a low level. He thought that John Foster Dulles’, Secretary of State from 1953 until 
1959, interpretation of Massive Retaliation stressed the threat of atomic warfare, not its 
implementation.76  
 Massive retaliation was part of the intent to decrease defense spending. In a conversation 
Eisenhower had with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Secretary Wilson, concerning the 
defense budget for fiscal year 1955, they discussed methods to realize reduced defense 
allocations. Secretary Dulles argued for the redeployment of manpower from Korea back to the 
United States. He thought that this would preclude further ground deployments in Asia and put 
more emphasis on American naval and air assets in the region. This would allow significant 
reductions in ground forces.77 The meeting concluded with the agreement that America’s forces 
in “Europe could be somewhat skeletonized.” The group decided that the Army would not get 
the 1.5 million soldiers it requested in 1955, unless the strategic situation deteriorated. 
Eisenhower also wrote that atomic weapons would provide the ability to reduce American 
reliance on conventionally armed units.78  
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Eisenhower intended to decrease his defense budget by focusing national defense policy 
towards a reliance on nuclear weapons. The corollary to this decision was the fact that, at the 
time, the U.S. could only launch nuclear weapons capable of hitting Soviet targets using long-
range bombers. This required the use of overseas air bases since aerial refueling would not 
become an operational capability until the introduction of the KC-135 in 1957. The Army and 
Navy were equally incapable of taking a prominent role in this new strategy, neither had the 
force projection capability. As a result, both the Army and Navy saw their allocation of defense 
spending decrease in Eisenhower’s first term. 
The Air Force was also the branch that most Americans thought would play the largest 
role in future conflicts. Almost 80% of the respondents to a Gallop Poll taken in October 1953 
said that the Air Force would be the most important defense asset in a future global war.79 The 
policy of Massive Retaliation reinforced the confidence that most Americans placed in the Air 
Force. The Air Force represented the modern method of warfare, strategic bombing and, in the 
near future, missiles.80 
The American public generally supported the idea of using nuclear weapons in a war with 
the Soviet Union. When asked in 1954 if they thought America should use the hydrogen bomb 
immediately in a conflict with the Soviet Union or wait for the Soviets to escalate the conflict to 
the nuclear stage, 57% of respondents said America should escalate the conflict first. This 
revealed how pervasive the threat of nuclear war was. In the same survey, most Americans 
thought that the hydrogen bomb made a future conflict less likely. Many Americans thought that 
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improving America’s nuclear arsenal would provide some form of deterrent. Much of this stems 
from the fact that a majority of those surveyed thought that a future conflict with the Soviet 
Union was inevitable.81 
 The rhetoric of the New Look defense policy mirrored feelings in the general population. 
Americans supported using nuclear weapons in a first strike capacity in conflicts with the Soviet 
Union. They also supported the belief that improved nuclear technology, which increased bomb 
yields, did reduce the chances of a general war breaking out. Finally, most Americans believed 
that America and the Soviet Union would eventually meet in combat. Project Solarium did not 
consider popular opinion; but the Cold War threat permeated society and influenced the process 
that created the New Look defense policy. 
 Eisenhower’s understanding of Clausewitz also contributed to his choice of massive 
retaliation as a means of deterrence.82 Clausewitz theorized, in his seminal work On War, about 
the nature of warfare. He spelled out how political and military leaders should approach it. 
Clausewitz explained that all military goals should stem from the overall political objectives of 
the conflict.83 This connection between military and political goals comes through in the New 
Look defense policy. Eisenhower’s main goal was political; he wanted to deter future conflicts, 
at minimal cost. In order to do this, he raised the cost of warfare exponentially, using military 
means. The New Look defense policy rested on the assumption that, to the Soviet Union, no 
political objective would be worth the cost of combating nuclear warfare. 
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 The French failure to defeat the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, in 1954, signaled the 
beginning of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. General Taylor argued that the inability of American 
forces to intervene and support the French in their struggle to maintain their Southeast Asian 
colony was indicative of the New Look’s failure. However, it was also an example of the 
policy’s strength. Since the political goal of retaining French hegemony in Indochina, later 
Vietnam, was not worth the risk of general war, the rubric of the New Look defense policy 
mandated that America stay out of the conflict. John Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford 
supported intervention, in some form. However, the Army, under General Ridgway, and 
Eisenhower did not want to enter another Korean-style conflict.84 Eisenhower supported the 
South Vietnamese in their opposition to the communist North Vietnamese with military advisors 
and aid, but not with combat troops. This was part of the New Look’s emphasis on supporting 
allies and increasing their ability to wage limited warf. While the New Look defense policy did 
not solve the problems that would lead to the Vietnam War, it did avoid significant American 
involvement in the early stages of the conflict. It also avoided a large-scale war in Vietnam 
during Eisenhower’s administration, largely by not forcing a decisive engagement with the Viet 
Minh.  
 Dien Bien Phu was indicative of the type of success of the New Look defense policy 
achieved. In the short-term, the policy achieved its objectives; America did not fight another war 
on the scale of the Korean War throughout Eisenhower’s tenure. However, the policy offered 
little in the way of long-term solutions to small-scale problems such as Indochina, Cuba, and 
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Iran. Each of these regions contained security threats that eventually required dramatic actions by 
subsequent administrations. 
 Project Solarium did not provide President Eisenhower with a single course of action he 
could use to create a defense policy. It is also doubtful that it greatly changed the ideas that he 
came into office with concerning defense issues. However, the project did provide Eisenhower 
with the ability to take stock of a range of ideas concerning how to combat the Soviet threat.   
Ramifications of the New Look Defense Policy through the 1950s 
 The implications of this policy and its influence on manpower and fiscal resources of the 
military is important to understanding the New Look and its focus on deterring warfare and 
limiting American involvement in future conflicts. When President Eisenhower took office, there 
were over 3.5 million active duty personnel. In the aftermath of the Korean War, there was a 
peace-time reduction so that, by the end of the decade, the total number of active duty personnel 
was approximately 2.5 million. The Army absorbed the majority of this decrease. It declined 
from its wartime high of 1.6 million soldiers to less than 900,000 by 1960. This was a 46% 
reduction in the active force.85 
 The Army’s drop in manpower was not the only indication of the New Look and 
Eisenhower’s influence on defense policy. By 1961, the year he left office, the Army and Air 
Force were roughly the same percentage of the overall force structure, in terms of manpower. 
The table below shows the differences between the services in the years 1953 and 1961. The 
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Army took the brunt of the decreases in manpower. The Air Force maintained approximately the 
same number of personnel as it had during the war.86 
 
 These tables show that under President Eisenhower, the Air Force clearly won the 
manpower and budget struggle. It grew 5% during under the New Look policy while the Army 
decreased 8% from its Korean War level. Of course, some of this was due to the transition from 
wartime to peacetime reductions. It is informative to look at President Truman’s force allocation 
prior to the Korean War in 1950. The table below shows that, prior to the war, the Army was the 
largest force in the Department of Defense. Compared to the force structure of 1961 the Army 
shrank by 6% and the Air Force grew by 5%. This was a force that had a total of 1.5 million men 
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in uniform. The table and graph below show the changes in manpower through the end of the 
Truman administration and the entire Eisenhower administration.87 
 
Year Total Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force
1950 1459462 593473 380739 74279 411277
1951 3249371 1531774 736596 192620 788381
1952 3635912 1596419 824265 231967 983261
1953 3555067 1533815 794440 249219 977593
1954 3302104 1404598 725720 223868 947918
1955 2935107 1109296 660695 205170 959946
1956 2806441 1025778 669925 200780 909958
1957 2764761 997994 676071 200861 919835
1958 2599518 898925 639942 189495 871156
1959 2503631 861964 625661 175571 840435
1960 2475438 873078 616987 170621 814752
1961 2482905 858622 626223 176909 821151
1962 2805603 1066404 664212 190962 884025  
                                                 













 The forces deployed to Europe also provide insight into the New Look defense policy. 
During the 1950s the Army personnel deployed in Europe did not radically change, as the chart 
below shows. Although there were several realignments of forces in the Army’s European 
command (USAEUR) the basic formation was two corps headquarters, one with three divisions 
and the other with two. These units fell under the overall command of 7th Army.88 
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 United States Army Europe stayed around 200,000 soldiers through Eisenhower’s eight 
years in office. He did not change the deployment numbers very much from Truman’s initial 
deployment in response to the Korean War. Although the Army as a whole continued to face 
severe reductions in manpower, USAEUR maintained its wartime footing. However, the number 
of American personnel deployed to defend Western Europe along with European forces was not 
sufficient to defeat a Soviet offensive without the help of atomic weapons. Although the numbers 
look impressive when compared to present military force levels, Eisenhower understood that if 
the Soviets invaded NATO nations it would require the use of nuclear weapons to stop the 
assault.  
 Although Eisenhower did not reduce forces in Europe after the Korean War, he also did 
not increase them to the level to fight a Soviet advance. At the height of the Korean War almost 
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contributions or the number of South Korean soldiers who fought in the conflict.89 Comparing 
the two forces shows that in order to fight a similar conflict in Western Europe against a fully 
mobilized Soviet force would require significantly more than 200,000 troops, especially if 
Eisenhower intended to fight the conflict without nuclear weapons. However, this was not the 
case; nuclear weapons would be part of any conflict with the Soviet Union in Western Europe in 
addition to significant troop contributions from NATO member states. 
The New Look defense policy did not completely focus on economic issues. Although 
reducing the fiscal burden of military spending was important, maintaining a solid, credible 
defense against Soviet aggression was paramount for Eisenhower. For this reason, nuclear 
weapons provided an effective solution. They would offer a counter to Soviet manpower at a 
reduced expense.  
One area where President Eisenhower assumed risk was in limited conflict. His defense 
policy centered on deterring a direct conflict with the Soviet Union, not at deterring limited 
conflicts. Understanding why this was acceptable requires knowing more about Eisenhower’s 
views on warfare as a whole and how nuclear weapons changed Eisenhower’s understanding of 
the character of war.
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Chapter 2: The Arguments against Massive Retaliation and 








On 24 May 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with President Eisenhower to discuss 
national military strategy. General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, requested the 
meeting to determine which point of view would guide military strategy in the future. He felt that 
the Joint Chiefs were in two different camps, the Army and Marines advocating for a more 
flexible policy and the Air Force and the Navy taking the position that “all planning must be 
based on the use of atomic weapons.” General Taylor argued that the presence of large 
thermonuclear arsenals made general nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United 
States less likely. Since big wars were less likely, Taylor wanted to be able to plan for small-
scale conflicts.90 
General Taylor stated that his main concern was the assumption that nuclear weapons 
would be a part of any conflict, large or small. He did not think that strategy reflected “the 
principle of ‘flexibility’ which [had] been worked into NSC papers.” Such an assumption could 
lead to the concentration of “tremendous atomic forces” while neglecting the resources “needed 
to handle small war situations.” President Eisenhower countered that he understood Taylor’s 
position but he thought that the Army Chief of Staff operated from a flawed premise concerning 
actions that the Soviet Union would take in a conflict.91 
President Eisenhower did not think that the Soviets would “abhor destruction as” 
 the United States did. He continued by stating that if war came, the Soviets would have very 
little to restrain them from using atomic weapons. Eisenhower wanted to “develop [U.S.] 
readiness on the basis of use of atomic weapons by both sides.”  
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General Taylor did not find a receptive audience to his concerns.  This would continue 
throughout his tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army under President Eisenhower. The root cause 
of their disagreement was the difference between his and Eisenhower’s conception of war in the 
atomic age. General Taylor wanted to ensure that the Army was ready for the myriad of small-
scale conflicts he thought would come about because of the deterrence of thermonuclear 
weapons. However, Eisenhower did not share this understanding of how atomic weapons would 
influence future conflicts.  
The President, in the conference on 24 May, told General Taylor that he did not think it 
would be possible to deploy large ground units to fight in the future. The Army, according to 
President Eisenhower, “would be truly vital to the establishment and maintenance of order in the 
United States.” Eisenhower was sympathetic to the fact that his strategy did not provide the 
Army with a “great role in the first year of war” relative to the other branches of the military.92 
In relation to small wars, President Eisenhower firmly stated that the U.S. would not 
“deploy and tie down our forces around the Soviet periphery in small wars.” He thought that the 
United States would provide “mobile support with the Air, Navy and Army supporting 
weapons.” He continued that, in order to bolster “critical points,” he could see the need to deploy 
“several battalions” but was adamant that such a deployment would not grow any larger. The 
President and General Taylor were of two dramatically different minds concerning small-scale 
wars as well as how to create a national military strategy that would deal with both the threat of 
thermonuclear war and limited wars.93 
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 General Taylor argued that it was important to have “diverse types of forces to deter large 
wars, and small wars as well.” He posited that concentrating only on thermonuclear war would 
lead to defense requirements that were “practically limitless.” General Taylor wanted to 
determine the necessities for deterring such nuclear conflict first and then “provide the 
requirements for flexible forces useable in small wars.” Any remaining defense resources would 
then go to filling the needs for combatting an atomic war with the Soviet Union.94 
Again President Eisenhower was unmoved by Taylor’s argument. Eisenhower stated that 
the most important thing the U.S. should do in the early stages of a conflict would be to “get our 
striking forces into the air immediately.” He told the Joint Chiefs that “massive retaliation… is 
likely to be the key to survival.” The President ordered his senior military commanders to 
continue to plan their strategy “on the basis of the use of tactical atomic weapon against military 
targets in any small war in which the United States might be involved.” General Taylor, just like 
Chief of Staff of the Army General Mathew Ridgway before him, faced an uphill battle in 
convincing President Eisenhower about the need for a large Army to combat limited wars.95 
Before discussing the views of those who disagreed with Massive Retaliation it is 
important to understand why President Eisenhower thought this was such an important aspect of 
his defense program. There were many influences on President Dwight Eisenhower’s defense 
policy and how he viewed matters of national security. Saki Dockrill in her work, Eisenhower’s 
New Look Defense Policy, focused mainly on the economic concerns of Eisenhower’s formation 
of a national defense policy.96 This economic interpretation is too simplistic; it overlooks how 
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Eisenhower’s military experience in World War II shaped his views on defense issues. It also 
does not account for the changes in the defense sector in the 1950s, especially in the area of 
nuclear weapons. In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the New Look 
defense policy and the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, it is important to understand how 
Eisenhower viewed warfare in the nuclear age. His conception of nuclear warfare centered on 
atomic weapons as the dominant threat, an emphasis on technologically sophisticated and ever 
more powerful weapons, a prominent role for the Air Force in future conflicts, and a 
significantly less important role for the Army in national defense. 
Eisenhower understood that atomic weapons dramatically changed warfare. In the 1950s, 
the pace of change in the yield and range of these weapons grew exponentially. In the beginning 
of the decade, strategic bombers were the only weapon system capable of projecting an atomic 
strike into the Soviet Union, using foreign air bases. By the end of the 1950s, the Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was a reality, although still in its infancy. The growth of missiles 
provided a new way to protect European allies and project American power. It was a modern 
way to fight a war. In addition, missiles were relatively inexpensive, especially, when compared 
to large ground forces, namely Army divisions.  
Missiles became more important in the New Look defense policy throughout the 1950s. 
Although the emphasis was on the ICBM, in the early years of Eisenhower’s administration no 
one foresaw the rapid success of the research program for these weapons. ICBMs, and to a lesser 
extend IRBMs, offered a way to project power without vulnerable air bases or putting pilots and 
crew in danger flying over enemy territory. Missiles fit well with Eisenhower’s and the 
American peoples’ conception of what future conflicts would be; they represented a more 
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efficient way of war that was technologically sophisticated. Throughout the decade, missiles 
became more prominent in the nation’s deterrent forces. This required more money for research 
and development. During this time, the Air Force used its position as the proponent for long-
range missile technology to increase its share of defense dollars, at the expense of the Army. 
Also, the Navy began to develop submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles in order to 
justify an increase in its budget allocation.  
President Eisenhower’s New Look defense policy relied on the threat of Massive 
Retaliation to deter warfare. Some observers, specifically Robert Osgood, Bernard Brodie, 
General Maxwell Taylor, and General Matthew Ridgway, correctly argued that this doctrine was 
not effective in deterring all possible threats that the Soviet Union posed. This difference of 
opinion came from disparate understandings of future conflicts. President Eisenhower 
understood the dangers of nuclear warfare and interpreted the events of his presidency through 
his conception of atomic warfare as the dominant paradigm for future conflicts. Discussions 
concerning military appropriations and the role of the Army in the atomic age clearly show how 
Eisenhower’s impression of future wars guided his defense policy. Massive Retaliation played a 
fundamental role in shaping this framework of warfare in the nuclear age. 
Campbell Craig argued in his work, Destroying the Village, that President Eisenhower 
altered the policy of Massive Retaliation during the middle 1950s. Craig posited that Eisenhower 
realized the limited freedom of action Massive Retaliation gave him and instituted a policy 
focused on flexible response and limited war, in avoidance of full-scale nuclear warfare. If this 
were true it was not reflected in Eisenhower’s defense budget, which continued to emphasize 
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strategic nuclear forces.97 The mid-1950s were a continuation of, not a retreat from, Massive 
Retaliation. Eisenhower’s decisions concerning military budgets show that his emphasis did not 
shift from nuclear weapons. As a result of this emphasis on atomic warfare, national defense 
fiscal allocations continued to center around a robust U.S. nuclear arsenal through the entirety of 
his administration. 
President Eisenhower’s speeches, National Security Council (NSC) meeting minutes, and 
Eisenhower’s diary entries shed light on his views of warfare and other defense issues. However, 
his words only give part of Eisenhower’s understanding of how atomic weapons influenced 
national security. Budget projections and fiscal decisions show where Eisenhower placed his 
focus in national security. Although many times Eisenhower referenced balance and flexibility 
when discussing national defense, his actions showed that the idea of atomic supremacy 
permeated his military planning principles. 
Nuclear weapons formed the backbone of Eisenhower’s defense policy.98 Although these 
weapons were expensive, using them as the foundation of national defense would allow the 
President to decrease American ground forces and shift that burden to U.S. allies. In the 287th 
meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) in June of 1956, one of his regularly scheduled 
weekly NSC appointments, President Eisenhower encouraged smaller Asian allies to build their 
ground forces. He stated that this would allow them to concentrate their defense resources on 
assets that the United States would not supply. He wanted the United States to supply air and 
naval aid, including an atomic umbrella, in order to provide strategic security. Eisenhower 
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preferred to support U.S. allies through technologically sophisticated weapons systems or atomic 
support, not in large combat forces deployed to aid them in fighting on the ground. Improved 
weapons would substitute for large ground forces.99  
The pervasive threat of Soviet nuclear attack was one reason why Eisenhower offered an 
atomic umbrella to U.S. allies. In 1956, the Soviet Union’s atomic capability was growing. 
Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the 288th meeting of the NSC 
in 1956, said that the Soviet Union would have a multi-megaton weapon sooner than the United 
States previously thought. This multi-megaton weapon was on par with the United States’ 
hydrogen bomb.100 Eisenhower’s offer of atomic protection, instead of ground troops, bolstered 
America’s European allies against a Soviet atomic strike. This strategy fit with the paradigm of 
providing strategic support for allies in order to avoid a long-term limited conflict fought with 
Army forces.   
There were two prongs in the defense of Western Europe. One was the military capacity 
of the conventional forces deployed to protect the region. The other was the superiority of 
America’s nuclear deterrent compared to Soviet atomic capability. Eisenhower’s idea of the new 
paradigm of future wars focused on the nuclear capacity of the United States and framed its 
effectiveness in bomb yields and operational ranges, not in conventional power metrics like 
soldiers on the ground. 
As part of the effort to design a nuclear age military, Eisenhower integrated these 
weapons into the U.S. defense system. The United States’ official policy concerning the use of 
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nuclear weapons in 1956, clearly stated that the administration considered these weapons a 
critical part of its arsenal and would use them in general and limited warfare, as the situation 
required. This understanding concerning the use of nuclear weapons suffused Eisenhower’s 
defense and budgetary policies. Eisenhower did not see atomic weapons as a separate part of the 
defense arsenal. The message was clear, in a conflict the United States would not hesitate to use 
nuclear weapons, in the middle of the decade Massive Retaliation was still a fundamental part of 
Eisenhower’s defense strategy.101 
In order for the doctrine of Massive Retaliation to be effective, the United States had to 
have the ability to survive an initial Soviet strike. The basic national security policy stated in 
NSC document 5501, approved in January 1955, focused the United States’ defense assets 
toward creating an effective atomic capacity to respond to Soviet attacks and surviving the 
opening stage of an all-out nuclear war.102 This retaliatory capability was part of the doctrine of 
Massive Retaliation. In order to maintain the efficacy of this deterrent, America needed to 
continue to research and develop new weapons systems. This ensured that the United States 
could strike back at the Soviet Union and offset any growing Soviet nuclear capability.  
Ground forces did not represent the cutting edge approach to warfare that nuclear 
weapons and guided missiles did. NSC 5501 explained that the role of American forces was to 
suppress hostilities quickly using atomic weapons before a conflict escalated. The document 
stated that “the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in 
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a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation.”103 In the 
context of New Look defense policy, the duty of deterring local aggression fell mainly to 
America’s allies. U.S. forces would assist and support local forces. By 1957, the Basic National 
Security Policy NSC 5707/8, which superseded NSC 5501, made the reliance on nuclear 
weapons more explicit; in this policy, these weapons were the “main” deterrent force.104 
Such statements about Eisenhower’s willingness to use atomic weapons did not mean that 
he was reckless. Rather, the intent of such policies was to ensure that military planners 
understood that nuclear weapons were the main focus of U.S. defense strategy. This did not sit 
well with the two Army Chiefs of Staff who served under Eisenhower, Generals Ridgway and 
Taylor. 
 The nuclear battlefield was a relatively new feature in the 1950s; Eisenhower and 
his administration had to develop new conceptions of warfare that integrated this new 
technology into the defense structure. However, not all security analysts agreed that 
nuclear combat would be the dominant paradigm of future wars. Robert Osgood, who 
served as dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International 
Studies, wrote Limited War in 1957. This work detailed the necessity of dealing with 
small-scale conflicts. He granted that there was a need to deter general war and that 
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Massive Retaliation effectively did this. However, Osgood correctly argued that it did not 
effectively restrain lesser conflicts.105  
 Bernard Brodie also participated in the criticism of Massive Retaliation. His work 
Strategy in the Missile Age, published in 1959, showed his concerns. He, as well as 
Osgood, argued that Massive Retaliation created a gap in America’s strategic defense. It 
deterred large-scale conflicts but did not prevent or prepare the nation to combat limited 
war. Brodie argued that the Soviet Union would take advantage of this gap in policy. 
Since the Soviet Union knew that the United States would refrain from launching a 
nuclear attack in response to small-scale conflicts, if it pursued limited goals with limited 
means it could be successful. The U.S. would have great difficulty answering these 
challenges, using the doctrine of Massive Retaliation.106 
 These two strategists did not accept the assumption of nuclear supremacy 
completely. They acknowledged that atomic weapons did have a place in defense policy 
and they agreed that deterring large-scale conflicts was a vital part of securing the United 
States. However, they did not concede that concentrating on large-scale conflicts 
completely neutralized the threat that the Soviet Union posed. The New Look defense 
policy stated that the central problem of America’s national security was to stop the “the 
Soviet threat to U.S. security”, and in doing so protect the U.S. economy and its essential 
ideals.107 The New Look defense policy also stated that the U.S. atomic threat inhibited 
                                                 
105 Robert Osgood. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy. (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 
1957), 1.  
106 Bernard Brodie. Strategy in the Missile Age. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). 
107 NSC 162/2. 1. 
 74 
 
the Soviet Union from launching “local aggression.”108 This differed markedly from the 
argument for limited war made by Brodie and Osgood. The belief in the efficacy of 
atomic deterrent across the full range of possible conflicts was a fundamental part of 
Eisenhower’s supposition of atomic supremacy. The effects of decolonization and future 
wars of national liberation, supported by the Soviet Union, would show the limitations of 
this policy. 
 Osgood, Brodie, and Eisenhower agreed on the necessity of countering small-
scale conflicts. They disagreed about the best way to accomplish this. For Brodie and 
Osgood, the answer lay in a robust ground force that could quickly stop limited wars on 
the perimeter of America’s area of influence. Direct U.S. action would stop these 
conflicts from escalating according to these two theorists. Eisenhower wanted to shift the 
burden of ground warfare to America’s allies. He also believed that the Soviet Union was 
the main enemy; his defense policy put the onus on the Soviets for stopping their client 
states from starting conflicts. In the 1950s, few questioned the ability of the Soviet Union 
to control the actions of its client states in Eastern Europe and Asia. So creating a defense 
policy with the main goal of stopping the Soviet Union from entering into limited 
conflicts made sense during Eisenhower’s administration. It is important to remember 
that Khrushchev would not announce the policy of supporting wars of national liberation 
until 1961, publicly stating what Soviet actions previously implied.109  
 Although Brodie and Osgood were more prominent there were other voices of 
discontent. Prior to the two most prominent academic critics of the policy senior military 
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leaders questioned the efficacy of Eisenhower’s defense program. General Matthew 
Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff from 1953-1955, grew frustrated under the New Look’s 
focus on the Air Force. He did not think that the Army had the appropriate funding or 
manpower to accomplish its mission. Ridgway asked for more resources but felt that his 
military opinion did not sway what he perceived as the politically motivated conclusions 
of Eisenhower’s security policy. This led to his termination as Chief of Staff after two 
years, in contradiction of the normal renewal of the initial two-year term for a second 
two-year term. He made his concerns about the New Look program public in an article in 
the Saturday Evening Post in January of 1956.110 
General Ridgway described the three reasons the administration gave him to 
justify the cuts to the Army budget, they were: the fact that new atomic weapons were 
more destructive, the new Army reserve system would make quick mobilization easier, 
and the creation of a West German military would reduce manning requirements from 
other NATO member states. The Army Chief of Staff did not think that these were 
sufficient reasons for what he believed were the dramatic cuts to the Army’s manpower 
and budget. Ridgway pointed out that the Army, during the middle of the decade, only 
had 30, 280-millimeter atomic howitzers in addition to a few Corporal missiles and 
Honest John rockets to defend a 400-mile front. He did not think that these resources 
were adequate, especially if the administration continued to decrease the number of 
                                                 




troops deployed to Western Europe. General Ridgway argued that telling the American 
public that atomic weapons would balance out troop cuts was disingenuous.111 
Concerning the new reserve system, the second justification of troop and budget 
cuts, the Chief of Staff was similarly skeptical of these soldiers ability to quickly join an 
atomic war. He claimed that ground forces had to be prepared to fight well before the 
initiation of hostilities. Otherwise the United States and its allies were at great risk. As to 
the addition of West German troops to make up for American decreases he found that 
recommendation wanting as well. Ridgway pointed out that by the beginning of 1956 
there were 6,000 of the planned half-million West German troops in uniform. The 
additional troops would not be ready for at least another three and a half years, according 
to the General.112 
Another difference between General Ridgway and President Eisenhower was in 
the estimation of the Soviet threat. Although both understood that the Soviets possessed a 
large ground force, Ridgway concluded that the Soviets were more likely to use 
conventional forces in order to prevent a nuclear war. This would make it necessary for 
the U.S. to establish a similarly powerful conventional force to meet the Soviet threat. He 
did not think that the U.S. would be able to justify using atomic weapons if the Soviets 
did not use them first. This would take the teeth out of Massive Retaliation. He also took 
the administration to task for entering into too many reciprocal defense agreements that 
Ridgway felt bound the nation to use force to protect its allies. He argued that the U.S. 
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might not have the military power on hand to fulfill its side of the numerous security 
pacts it signed, if it could not use atomic weapons in a conflict.113 
Matthew Ridgway summarized his concerns by outlining the problems he felt that 
the United States and its military faced in the coming years, if it continued with the New 
Look defense policy. He cited Soviet improvements in atomic weapons that would be 
able to deal “critical damage on the United States’ war-making potential.” He wrote that 
the Soviet air defenses would, by that time, degrade “the nuclear-air superiority which the 
United States” possessed in the late 1950s. In addition, the General did not see that U.S. 
and its allies’ forces could fight as a coordinated whole against a Soviet assault. He wrote 
that the myriad units deployed to fight the Soviet Union were “military detachments 
only.” He summed up his argument by stating that the U.S. military had to be able to 
fight “not only general war but” also “local, or so-called brush-fire wars.” Ridgway did 
see how the current forces and the planned organizational changes of the New Look 
would create a military prepared to combat this type of conflict.114 
General Ridgway was not the only Army leader to bristle under the restrictions of 
the New Look defense policy. The subsequent Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell 
Taylor, also did not subscribe to the arguments of Massive Retaliation or the supremacy 
of atomic warfare. Neither of these Army leaders accepted Eisenhower’s paradigm of 
warfare in the atomic age or his focus on preventing nuclear war in the belief that it 
would prevent limited wars as well.  
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General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army from 1955 through 1959, 
also saw the need for the United States Army to have a limited war capability. In a speech 
to the Executives’ Club of Chicago in 1955, he stated that America needed “an 
instrument which does not require mass destruction to obtain its end.”115 He took issue 
with people who thought that the next war would be short and devastating. General 
Taylor did not disagree with those who said that nuclear warfare would be horrendous. 
However, he stated that as the nuclear arsenals of both America and the Soviet Union 
grew in power it made the possibility of a general nuclear conflict much less likely. This 
left limited wars as the only viable alternative.116  
 The Army under the New Look defense policy faced severe budget cuts. General 
Maxwell Taylor explained the severity of the Army’s fiscal situation in his first speech to 
the Army staff after he assumed the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955. His 
unease with the New Look policy and Massive Retaliation also came through in his 
speech. General Taylor outlined his concerns for the Army in the immediate future. 
Referring to the recent budget cuts, he stated that “your heads be bloody but certainly 
unbowed.”117  The budget cuts to the Army in the aftermath of the Korean War were not 
simply returning the service to a prewar level of funding. These funding cuts decreased 
the ability of the Army to meet its commitments effectively. 
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 Under the New Look defense policy, limited warfare was the responsibility of 
America’s allies. In the 257th meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower stated that the United 
States did not want to send its troops to combat every small conflict. While America 
should support its allies in these conflicts with air and naval forces, if necessary, he 
continued, if small skirmishes became too frequent, the U.S. would have to “fight a major 
war because we can’t go around wasting our strength.”118 Eisenhower did not see limited 
hostilities as contributing to the overall security of the United States. Limited warfare was 
something that would only detract from the U.S. ability to wage general warfare.  
 This was not to say that the United States under President Eisenhower did not 
invest in military and financial aid to its allies in order to help bolster their defense 
forces. Rather, the focus for Eisenhower was not in creating a large-scale standing 
military force ready to combat limited wars in foreign lands, he wanted to concentrate 
America’s military assets towards deterring the most dangerous threat, a conflict with the 
Soviet Union.  
General Taylor also advocated for other forms of deterrent, outside of nuclear 
weapons. He said that the Army, with sufficient weapons systems and manpower, was an 
effective deterrent to future conflict. The Army’s ability to deter wars, according to 
General Taylor, extended beyond the immediate location of American troops. His 
conception of deterrence did not shift the requirement of local security to indigenous 
forces, as Eisenhower hoped to do. This difference of opinion arose because General 
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Taylor and the President had different ideas about the influence of atomic weapons on 
warfare.119 
General Taylor did not think that atomic weapons made ground forces obsolete or 
overly vulnerable. He believed that they still had a place in the nation’s deterrence 
program. When Taylor discussed future conflicts, as shown above, he argued that the 
Soviet Union would not risk a general war but that it would continue to prosecute smaller 
campaigns. He did not ascribe to Eisenhower’s view that warfare, at least as it concerned 
the U.S., was increasingly becoming an all or nothing proposition. Much of this came 
from the emphasis that the New Look defense policy placed on atomic weapons. The 
doctrine of Massive Retaliation did not leave much room in policy options for responding 
to any incursion of America’s security perimeter other than a full-scale nuclear conflict. 
This was not a policy oversight; it was a fundamental part of the effort to preclude rising 
tensions with the Soviet Union. 
As part of General Taylor’s efforts to improve the ability of the Army to fight and 
survive on a nuclear battlefield, he created the Pentomic division. This was a short-lived 
experiment that pushed nuclear weapons down to the tactical level, defined as the 
division level and below. Its intent was to disperse troop formations yet still give them 
enough firepower to stop or attrite any attacking Soviet ground forces. Instituted in the 
late 1950s; by the early 1960s, the Army stopped its atomic transformation and shifted its 
emphasis to more conventional force structures.120 
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When faced with the decision to support allies with ground forces, Eisenhower 
declined. The preferred method for supporting America’s allies was with a nuclear 
umbrella. This position clearly came through when, as discussed earlier, Eisenhower 
encouraged Asian nations to supply conventional forces and allow the U.S. to provide the 
strategic assets. General Taylor’s position required the deployment of conventional 
ground forces to provide deterrence. The difference between the two leaders concerning 
their view of future conflicts was stark. 
 Winning small wars was a capability that General Taylor thought that the Army 
needed. In a speech to the Quantico Conference of Defense Leaders in July of 1955, he 
said that the ability to win such conflicts would prevent larger wars from occurring. His 
concept of warfare required the Army to have the ability to apply a range of force to a 
given problem, not just a massive retaliatory strike; this was a precursor to limited and 
flexible response that General Taylor would bring to prominence as Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff under President John Kennedy. General Taylor stressed that the U.S. 
had to “have the means to deter or to win the small wars.”121 
General Taylor advocated for a flexible and versatile Army ready to combat 
several different types of conflicts; his understanding of atomic era warfare did not 
correspond with the prevailing paradigm put forward in the New Look defense policy. 
The Army continued to receive far less funding than the Air Force despite the efforts of 
two Chiefs of Staff to address this situation. Edward Kolodziej in his work, The 
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Uncommon Defense and Congress, demonstrated that General Taylor’s position on 
limited war did not translate into an increased Army budget. In fiscal year 1958, the 
Army received 8.5 billion dollars out of a defense budget of 38 billion. In comparison, 
the Air Force’s budget was 16.5 billion dollars.122 
The Army continued to bear the burden of shrinking defense budgets in 
Eisenhower’s second administration. Although the Army required $14 billion to complete 
its modernization program, it received less than of half of what it needed. It did not have 
enough manpower to support its worldwide responsibilities and was, by its own 
projections, approximately 50,000 personnel short of its manning needs. Another area 
slighted in the Army’s budget was it missile program. It did not receive adequate funding 
for its surface-to-air missile program, the Nike Hercules. This project was part of the 
Army’s effort to combat the Soviet bomber threat to the continental United States. 
Finally, the Army did not receive enough funding for its research program for the Nike 
Zeus. This program tried to develop an anti-missile missile. However, these initiatives 
suffered because of the Army’s decreased funding.123 
The Army tried to improve its budgetary position by researching and developing 
new weapons systems, such as the Nike Zeus. However, the Army could not match the 
Air Force’s capability to conduct nuclear warfare in accordance with how Eisenhower 
understood it. These new weapons systems, in addition to the Pentomic experiment, 
exhibited the lengths that Army leaders went to in order to change their organization to fit 
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the new paradigm. These innovative programs also revealed how hard Army leaders tried 
to demonstrate their service’s ability to protect the nation from a Soviet nuclear attack. 
Eisenhower’s fiscal decisions demonstrated that these changes did not have the intended 
effect. 
 In contrast to Army leaders’ efforts to justify their service’s budget, Air Force 
leaders did not face the same struggle. Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General 
Thomas White described air power’s place in America’s security program in an article 
published in the Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1955. 
White’s article argued that air power, specifically nuclear weapons, were vital to 
protecting the U.S. in “an age of danger.”124 The General was not alone in thinking that 
the Air Force was the number one defense asset that the United States had. Over half of 
the respondents in a Gallup Public Opinion poll in 1952, believed that the Air Force 
should receive more funding.125 The Air Force, for many Americans, represented the new 
way to wage war. It was an atomic age force. As General White explained, the Air Force 
was the only branch of service that could “bring greater forces to bear on an enemy at 
less exposure of United States personnel than… any other military force available to the 
United States.” 126 
The fiscal implications of the decision to focus more resources on the Air Force 
initially seemed benign. In the 258th meeting of the NSC in September of 1955, the 
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Council discussed the anticipated cost of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Dr. 
John von Neumann, a professor of mathematics at the Institute for Advanced Studies at 
Princeton University, said that the cost of the weapons would be $1 million per missile. 
Secretary Humphrey replied that they would be “relatively cheap.”127  
Defense costs came up again a year later in the 280th meeting of the NSC in 
March of 1956. President Eisenhower discussed the implications of deploying U.S. 
ground forces to Europe. Initially, he stated that the deployment of these troops was 
temporary. He continued by observing that U.S. security came from its ability to deploy 
aircraft armed with nuclear weapons, instead of ground troops. Eisenhower criticized the 
military services for not working together to reduce the defense costs of securing the 
United States and its allies.128 
In the same NSC meeting President Eisenhower referred to a conversation he had 
with General Taylor concerning the size of the Army. General Taylor said that the Army 
needed 28 divisions.129 This would represent an increase of 8 divisions from its 1953 
strength of 20 divisions when Eisenhower entered office.130 In 1956, the Army had 19 
divisions; the President thought that the general’s request was outlandish.131 After 
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General Taylor’s suggestion, Eisenhower said, “he had nearly fainted.” This size Army 
was far too large for the type of war Eisenhower wanted to prepare for.132  
Although Eisenhower advocated cutting defense manpower in his budgets during 
the mid-1950s, he did not believe this decreased the efficacy of America’s security 
forces. Press Secretary James Hagerty noted in his diary that the decrease in manpower 
allowed for more concentrated focus on “nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and the Air 
Force.”133 Hagerty referenced a conversation with Eisenhower concerning World War II 
and the invasion of Europe. The President thought if Germany possessed the atomic 
bomb in World War II that it would have been impossible for the allies to invade 
Normandy. He thought that an atomic strike would have easily destroyed both the 
concentrated invasion forces on the beachhead and the naval vessels supporting the 
invasion.134 For Eisenhower, nuclear weapons changed warfare completely. Since large 
land forces were lucrative targets for atomic strikes, Eisenhower saw them as one of the 
more vulnerable assets of military on the battlefield. This was especially true when 
compared to the relative security of long-range missiles. 
Hagerty discussed how the President should present this decision to the American 
people. Hagerty, Robert Cutler, National Security Adviser from 1953 through 1955 and 
1957 through 1958, and Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, Staff Secretary and Defense 
Liaison, suggested that Eisenhower justify his decision to cut the defense budget by 
referencing his military experience. They told the President that he should tell the 
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American people that this decision was militarily sound and was not done for purely 
fiscal concerns.135 
In a conference with Eisenhower about a lack of unity between the Joint of Chiefs 
of Staff in March of 1956, discussing security issues the President clarified his position 
on the possible use of atomic weapons in a conflict. He thought that the force structure of 
the United States military predetermined the use of nuclear weapons in a large-scale 
conflict. He also discussed his view of shorter-range missiles. He viewed the 1500- and 
5000-mile range weapons as being in “the same class operationally.” President 
Eisenhower understood that his defense decisions took several options off the table; one 
of them was a large ground force commitment to a limited war. He also understood that, 
although smaller in payload and range, a nuclear missile was a weapon that would change 
the nature of a conflict.136 
One instance where this clash of conceptions of future war came to a head was the 
policy discussions concerning how the United States should deal with the uprising in 
Poland in 1956. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to take an active role and support any 
revolution with unconventional forces and military aid. However, Eisenhower did not 
think that this was a viable strategy. The uprising in Hungary, in the same year, gave the 
administration the chance to discuss how it would apply the New Look defense policy to 
a real-world situation.137 One proposition by the Central Intelligence Agency, represented 
by Robert Armory in the Policy Planning Board, was to use tactical nuclear weapons in 
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order to prevent the Soviets from using force to quell an uprising should it occur. 
However, during the Hungarian uprising, Eisenhower did not want to use tactical nuclear 
weapons because of the worry that it would escalate the conflict into a general war.138 
The use of a tactical nuclear weapon could escalate a limited conflict to a general 
war.  This was another problem that the Army could not overcome in its efforts to show 
its capabilities on the atomic battlefield. If a tactical nuclear engagement escalated into a 
general atomic war, then the Air Force would have to become involved. Even though the 
Army continued to develop tactical nuclear weapons, President Eisenhower was clearly 
skeptical of their ability to engage in a limited conflict without escalating it. 
As the role of the Air Force in national security matters increased, the roles of the 
Army and Navy shrank. In a discussion during the 277th meeting of the NSC, the 
President said that American ground forces would mainly secure order in the United 
States during an atomic war. They would work in the aftermath of a nuclear strike to 
ensure that society did not fall apart. Ground forces would also maintain the United 
States’ ability to continue the fight. He said, “God only knew what the Navy would be 
doing in a nuclear attack.”139  
President Eisenhower’s public addresses also revealed the influence of nuclear 
weapons on his defense policy and give insight into his vision of modern warfare. In his 
State of the Union message, given on 6 January 1955, he discussed the essential functions 
of government as well as defense issues. He stated that the essential function of 
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government was to “support freedom, justice and peace.”140 Secondary to this was the 
preservation of a sound economy. Eisenhower discussed how the United States could 
maintain peace with the Soviet Union in his address. He stated that America’s ability to 
respond to a Soviet attack quickly and forcefully would ensure that the Soviet Union 
would not start a nuclear war. He continued by saying that this would produce a “world 
stalemate.”  However, this condition, Eisenhower explained, provided opportunities for 
the free world to work for an ultimate peace.141   
Eisenhower, in his State of the Union message, also said it was important for the 
nation to maintain “balance and flexibility” in its weapons program. He stated that, 
“undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites 
an enemy to resort to another.”142 However, during this period the majority of funding 
went to the Air Force. Eisenhower advocated the necessity of a balanced military; 
however, his conception of balance was not equality. When he used these terms he was 
talking about a defense structure built on nuclear deterrence and a small land force, which 
would be responsible for domestic security in case of an attack. This is a product of 
Eisenhower’s conception of modern warfare. Eisenhower thought that nuclear war was 
the most dangerous threat, if not the most likely, he determined to protect the nation 
against this type of threat.  
The State of the Union message continued with a reference to research and 
development programs in the defense sector. Eisenhower stated that his budget for that 
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year would improve airpower in three services, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. 
The budget would also focus on developing weapons with greater “striking power.” He 
stated that this would ensure “the maintenance of effective, retaliatory forces as the 
principal deterrent to overt aggression.”143 The deterrent force Eisenhower referenced 
was the United States’ nuclear arsenal, which gave strength to the doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation. The retaliatory forces were those forces capable of inflicting a swift nuclear 
response to a Soviet attack. The only forces capable of doing so without being forwardly 
deployed were Air Force elements. Although Eisenhower discussed the necessity of 
balance and flexibility in the armed services, his actions showed his preference for a 
national security program based on nuclear weapons. 
Eisenhower then covered his success in decreasing the defense budget. He pointed 
out that “national security programs [consumed] two-thirds of the entire Federal budget.” 
He touted his success of cutting defense spending by “concentrating on essentials.”144 
Unsaid was the fact that these decreases came mainly from the Army and Navy budgets. 
Eisenhower’s words, interpreted through his actions as President, indicate how the 
assumption of nuclear supremacy shaped his view of defense matters.145 
Eisenhower described his defense budget as one that reflected the “realities of 
[his] time.” He said that he personally directed the areas of emphasis in the defense 
budget. Eisenhower believed that this budget gave the United States a defense program 
suited to the necessities of the world stage. He continued by stating that the focus on 
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nuclear weapons had to continue because of the Soviet stubbornness in refusing 
armament limitation agreements. As long as the Soviet Union continued their obstinacy, 
America had to continue to build and maintain a large nuclear arsenal capable of 
deterring and responding to a Soviet attack.146   
President Eisenhower spoke of the need to maintain balance in defense matters. 
He also discussed the need for America to maintain flexibility in its defense preparations. 
Taken out of context, these comments implied that Eisenhower focused on a wide 
spectrum of conflict, from limited or conventional battles to full-scale atomic wars. 
However, Eisenhower’s actions during this period show that his conception of balance 
and flexibility did not mean equality among the forces nor preparation for a wide 
spectrum of conflicts. He saw the need for America to prepare for future wars, which he 
believed would be atomic in nature. Eisenhower thought that large land formations would 
only draw an atomic strike, so building large ground forces would not help combat the 
Soviet threat. Only by responding with a nuclear strike could the United States hope to 
survive in the atomic age.  
The assumption of the supremacy of nuclear weapons was part of a framework 
that interpreted defense issues through a new conception of war in the atomic age. This 
framework influenced budgetary and strategic decisions. America’s defense program 
during the 1950s relied heavily on atomic weapons to cut the expense of ground and 
naval forces.  
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Although Eisenhower’s conception of modern warfare centered on atomic 
weapons, he did not think that this new level of destruction would shorten future 
conflicts. His diary entry for 11 January 1956 discussed the need for the United States to 
prepare for a long-term war. He did not think that the “theory of the thirty to sixty day 
war had anything to back it up.”147 Eisenhower wrote that wars were a product of the will 
of the people and until the people would accept an end to the conflict, a war could not 
stop. He also thought that preparation for long conflicts would allow America to survive 
the devastation of a nuclear attack.148 
Behind the discussion of general warfare and how to protect the United States in the Cold 
War was the knowledge that the Soviet Union was a quickly growing threat. NSC paper 5501, 
Basic National Security Policy, published in January 1955, outlined the advances of the Soviet 
Union relative to the United States. James Lay wrote that in five years the Soviet Union could 
deal a severe blow to the United States. Over the period discussed, the Soviet Union would be 
able to bring missiles with increasingly longer ranges into production, ending in 1963 with an 
operational ICBM. Lay explained that the United States missile program should plan to keep 
pace with that of the Soviet Union.149 
Massive Retaliation required that America’s nuclear deterrent was equal to or greater 
than the Soviet Union’s. Without the ability to counter a Soviet strike, America had little hope of 
deterring a general war. Lay, in NSC 5501, wrote that nuclear war was possible if the Soviet 
Union had a “technological break-through… leading them to believe they could destroy the U.S. 
                                                 
147 FRUS, 177 
148 FRUS, 177 
149 FRUS, 25-26. 
 92 
 
without effective retaliation.”150 This understanding of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union 
required the United States to maintain an atomic arsenal capable of delivering a comparable blow 
to the Soviet Union’s. If America’s ability to retaliate to an atomic attack became too inferior, 
relative to the Soviet Union, then it invited a nuclear strike. This demanded constant 
improvement in America’s nuclear arsenal, since general nuclear warfare was the predominant 
conflict that President Eisenhower thought the nation faced. 
This document focused on the technical improvements of the Soviet Union. Eisenhower’s 
conception of future warfare also focused on the technological advances of American’s weapons 
programs. Here the emphasis on maintaining technological equivalence with the Soviet Union 
exposed the importance of this metric in measuring America’s success in deterring a Soviet 
atomic attack. 
Atomic weapons dramatically changed the scope of warfare. For the first time in history, 
the President of the United States had the ability to destroy an enemy without deploying a 
massive ground forces. Also, America’s main enemy now had the capacity to deliver the same 
destruction in return. This increase in the possible destructive capability of warring nations 
placed an artificial limit on warfare. President Eisenhower did not want to be responsible for 
starting World War III, so he used the policy of Massive Retaliation to prevent a direct conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
In conjunction with this new focus on atomic weapons and nuclear deterrence came a 
shift in defense spending priorities. The United States Army and Navy lost in relation to the Air 
Force in the fight for defense dollars. The Army lost manpower as well as funding to modernize 
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its formations. Nuclear weapons were at the heart of this issue. Eisenhower’s conception of 
future warfare focused on the atomic battlefield as a way to prevent American involvement in 
limited and conventional wars.  
Eisenhower’s conception of modern warfare influenced the New Look defense policy. It 
shaped how he interpreted the problems of national security that the nation faced. It also affected 
how each service fared in budget decisions. The Air Force was the clear winner because it was 
the service that could prosecute the kind of war that hewed most closely to Eisenhower’s idea of 
future wars. The Army suffered under this paradigm because its capabilities could not conform 
to fit this new idea of what modern war was.  
President Eisenhower focused on the most dangerous threat to the United States, a 
nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. Developing missile technology was one of the important 
projects Eisenhower wanted to focus on during his administration. It would allow him to deter a 
nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. IRBMs were a part of this emphasis on missile 
technology and fit the paradigm of Massive Retaliation and Eisenhower’s understanding of the 
paradigm of warfare in the atomic era. They provided a way to limit the contribution of 
American ground forces while still providing security for America’s allies in Western Europe.  
Limited war in this context, while arguably a more likely threat, was not as dangerous. 
President Eisenhower did not seek to craft a defense policy that would create a force that could 
handle anything from a limited conventional attack to a full-scale nuclear conflict. The New 
Look defense policy consciously focused on general nuclear warfare as the paradigm to guide 
budget allocation and force structure decisions. IRBMs fit this policy well and became a focus 
for the administration.  
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In order to understand why IRBMs came to Western Europe it is important to know how 
guided missile technology developed in the United States. This will reveal the history of 
cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States in term of nuclear research. It 
will also explain why that cooperation came to an end in the post-World War II period. Finally, it 
will give demonstrate why the Army was unable to surmount the Air Force in the New Look era, 




















 Throughout the 1950s both the Army and the Air Force worked to garner a larger share of 
the public’s attention, defense budgets, and congressional support. The Army focused its efforts 
on public information. It opened offices in Los Angeles and New York in order to ensure that it 
could effectively tell its story to the American people. The Air Force, however, did not have to 
reach out to the American populace as vigorously as the Army. The Air Force concentrated most 
of its efforts on courting and supporting its defense contractors and their efforts to lobby 
Congress on the Air Force’s behalf. The fight for control over the IRBM programs was, in some 
sense, a proxy for the larger conflict over which service would control the direction of national 
security policy and defense budgets.151 
 One of the main points of contention between the Army and the Air Force was which 
service would direct the development of America’s long-range guided missile program. By the 
middle of the decade both the Army and the Air Force had long-range missile programs. In the 
early stages of these projects, Eisenhower decided to let both services continue to pursue their 
weapons. However, by the end of the decade the Air Force came out ahead and gained control of 
both its Thor IRBM and the Army’s Jupiter IRBM. Of course there were obvious reasons for the 
Air Force to be the service that would direct long-range missiles but that did not stop Army 
leaders such as Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor from trying to put their service 
at the forefront of these new weapons. 
 In many ways the Army was best suited for developing guided missiles. It had access to 
some of the best minds, such as the German scientist Werhner von Braun and it was able to 
capitalize on captured German missile designs, specifically the V-2. This rocket would become 
the basis for the Army’s Redstone missile. The Redstone then became the foundation for the 
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 Although von Braun’s presence gave the Army an initial lead in missile development, the 
structural design of the branch’s development process hindered progress. The Army used a series 
of arsenals across the United States, like the Red Stone Arsenal in Huntsville Alabama. While 
these facilities provided the Army with an in-house research and development team they cut out 
much of the defense contracting industry. The Army’s decreased use of defense contractors 
meant that it did not have a solid foundation of corporate support to protect its interests in 
Congress.153 
 The Air Force, in contrast to the Army, did not have as well-developed of a system of 
internal research and development. It relied on civilian contractors to help generate new aircraft 
and missile designs. Although the Army’s arsenals had support from their Congressional 
representatives, they could not compete with the public relations teams and lobbying money that 
private contractors provided to the Air Force and its missile programs. Senator Barry Goldwater 
made this point when he said, “The aircraft industry had probably done more to promote the Air 
Force than the Air Force had done itself.”154 
 The struggle over missile development between the two branches replaced the tensions 
over Universal Military Training (UMT) that occurred in the late 1940s. The Army’s position 
was that it was important for national security to train every American male when he came of 
fighting age. The Air Force, which did not support UMT, countered that a larger budget for its 
operations would alleviate the need for such a large and expensive training operation. Secretary 
of Defense James Forrestal, who served between 1947 and 1949, commented in his diary about 
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the tensions between the two services. He wrote that the debate shifted from “UMT vs. no-UMT” 
to one of “UMT vs. a seventy-group Air Force.” Forrestal continued that the Air Force convinced 
“the country that by a substantial increase in appropriations for Air, there would be no necessity 
for UMT.” As a result of its advocacy, Congress increased the Air Force’s budget by $822 
million and the UMT legislation never made it out of committee. 155  
This was one of the first examples of the Air Force’s seductive argument concerning its 
position in national defense during the Cold War. More money would provide a relatively 
painless increase in U.S. security. The Army’s position of training every male for possible 
combat meant that the Air Force could promise better defense with only money, while the Army 
demanded both money and the lives of the nation’s youth. Requiring both these meant that the 
Army faced an uphill battle against the Air Force concerning its position in national defense, 
regardless of the viability of the Air Force’s promises about wartime effectiveness or its 
deterrence capability. This debate would continue as IRBMs and ICBMs became viable weapons 
systems. 
Although both services argued that their approach to missiles was the right choice, one 
reason Eisenhower supported them was that he wanted to find a way to reduce the need for large 
ground forces. In pursuit of this, he would spend 1.3 billion dollars in both 1957 and 1958 to 
research IRBMs and ICBMs. This was almost eight percent of the total defense budget in 1958 
and is equivalent to 9.9 billion in 2011 dollars. Missiles were a significant part of Eisenhower’s 
fiscal and strategic planning for national defense.  
 The Air Force clearly had an institutional need for a long-range missile. However, the 
Army made serious gains in its own missile development. The irony was that, by the mid-1950s, 
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the Army’s program, although not institutionally necessary, was more successful than the Air 
Force’s. In 1955 von Braun’s team solved the inertial guidance problems that increased the 
accuracy of the Redstone missile. Another improvement that the Army capitalized on was 
General John Medaris’s success in building improved test stands at Cape Canaveral capable of 
withstanding a 500,000 pound-thrust blast-off, providing the ability to test larger missiles.156  
Both of these improvements allowed the Army to continue its early lead. However, 
neither could create a justification for America’s ground force to maintain an expensive long-
range guided missile program. This was the final nail in the coffin of the Army’s sojourn into 
IRBMs. When President Eisenhower had to determine which service would control America’s 
long-range missile development, the natural selection was the Air Force, regardless of any Army 
progress or arguments to the contrary. 
The competition between the Army and the Air Force made the U.S. IRBM program 
better. However, there was another element of missile development, allied participation, 
specifically that of Great Britain. America’s missile development coincided with the U.K.’s 
efforts in the 1950s. Both spent a significant amount of money to develop larger atomic weapons 
and to create viable guided missile defense forces. The United States, led by President 
Eisenhower focused America’s defense policy on atomic weapons. In the beginning of the 
decade, strategic bombers composed the nation’s primary force projection capability. However, 
by the end of the decade, the U.S. would have several squadrons of IRBMs deployed to Western 
Europe and the United Kingdom.  
 One important distinction concerning guided missile development during the 1950s was 
the difference between long-range missiles and IRBMs, of which IRBMs were a sub-set. Long-
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range missiles included the Redstone, with a range of 200 miles, as well as Inter Continental 
Ballistic Missiles with ranges of several thousand miles. Under this large umbrella of long-range 
missiles were several classifications, such as ICBM, IRBM, and tactical guided missiles. 
The struggle between the Army and Air Force about which service would control long-
range guided missiles provides insight into Eisenhower’s understanding of the role of IRBMs in 
national defense. Also the tensions between the U.S. and the U.K. over sharing atomic weapons 
information were indicative of how the President used these missiles to address domestic and 
allied security as well as redress problems in the Anglo-American alliance. This chapter outlines 
the development of IRBMs through the 1950s. It also covers the history of Anglo-American 
cooperative nuclear research. The resolution of these issues will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters.  
 The development of IRBMs in the United States began as two projects, one under Air 
Force control and the other under Army control. How these two forces approached the problem 
of creating such weapons heralded how each viewed their role in national defense. The Army 
focused on improving ground operations and sought to create a mobile missile system capable of 
moving with its formations in a ground war against the Soviet Union. The Air Force built a 
missile that relied on permanent launch facilities that would be obvious targets in the opening 
salvos of a war with the Soviet Union. The first generation IRBMs used liquid fuel and had a 
range of approximately 1500 miles. These missiles became operational in the United Kingdom 
and NATO nations in 1958 and 1959.157 
The United States’ missile program grew in capability as the nation’s nuclear warhead 
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development improved. In the early 1950s, there were no missiles capable of carrying a 
sufficiently large warhead to make long-range missiles a viable weapon. In March of 1956, 
Eisenhower explained that he saw guided missiles as simply another way of delivering the 
destructive power that America already possessed. It was not until the late 1950s that warheads 
of small enough size with sufficiently large yields arrived to make long-range guided missiles 
cost effective. Advances in missile technology changed the perception of these weapons in 
warfare. No longer were they only auxiliary options, they took on a more prominent role in the 
defense of the United States and NATO. The problems facing the development of U.S. missile 
capacities were primarily technological. However, the initial successes in missile development 
led to a missile force that quickly faced obsolescence. 158  
 Pushing the United States to develop its guided missile capability was the knowledge that 
the Soviet Union was becoming more and more successful with its program. By 1955, 
intelligence officials at the Pentagon understood that the Soviets had the capacity to reach 
European capitals with long-range nuclear missiles. In reaction to this information, President 
Eisenhower redoubled the research efforts of the Atlas and Titan ICBM projects.  In addition he 
also required that Brigadier General Shriever, head of the Western Development Division, the 
division responsible for the ICBM, and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson brief him monthly on 
missile progress.159  
Soviet advances spurred Eisenhower to focus more on America’s missile capability. The 
problem was that the ICBM was still years from completion. The Thor and Jupiter would provide 
the short-term solution because of their shorter range and relatively less complicated technical 
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problems. Development on these weapons would continue while the ICBM was still in the 
formative stages. This, Eisenhower hoped, would give the U.S. and its allies enough protection 
against the increasingly dangerous Soviet missile threat. 
Another nuclear weapons issue during the 1950s was the progress of America’s closest 
ally. Britain’s atomic program struggled in the post-war period. Although it benefitted greatly 
from its wartime cooperation with the United States, this ended after the conflict. The British 
view of the importance of atomic weapons was very similar to that of the United States. 
Although the two nations continued to collaborate in other arenas of defense, cooperation and 
information sharing concerning atomic weapons was impossible because of the legislative 
obstacles during most of the 1950s.160  
 The cooperation or the lack thereof, between the U.S. and Great Britain demonstrated the 
distance between these two nations in the post-war period concerning nuclear research. President 
Eisenhower did not have the political leverage necessary to alter the legislative restrictions 
concerning sharing of atomic information to allied nations early in his tenure in office. Many of 
these limitations came in response to the discovery that the Soviet Union’s intelligence stole 
much of the atomic research data used to build the Soviet atomic bomb. This reactionary fear of 
espionage would take time to ebb and ease fears about sharing atomic information. So the effort 
to research IRBMs, in the beginning, would be a purely American project  
 One of the first bodies that undertook an investigation of guided missiles and their 
viability was the Technological Capability Panel (TCP), chaired by James Killian. He served as 
the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and then as the Scientific Advisor to 
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President Eisenhower.161 Eisenhower’s use of the TCP and the nation’s top scientists in 
determining guided missile policy displayed his emphasis on technical solutions as opposed to 
manpower intensive remedies. The TCP, began in 1954, framed the problem of American 
capability in terms of technological advances. Using these achievements as a metric made it 
imperative that the United States maintain its lead in sophisticated strategic weapons systems. 
This panel was fundamental in getting Eisenhower to support guided missiles as a way to protect 
America in the nuclear age.162 
 In addition to guided missiles there were other efforts aimed at defending the United 
States from Soviet attack. One of the most long-lasting was the creation of the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in 1958. This was a joint operation between the United 
States and Canada and attempted to create a radar shield to warn of an impending Soviet attack. 
However, NORAD, unlike the IRBM program, did not center on weapons to provide protection. 
The TCP recommended the IRBM program as a short-term fix for the long-range solution of 
creating a viable ICBM program. This view of the IRBM as an interim option was similar to the 
Air Force’s point of view that looked at the ICBM as the paramount weapon. The Army, by 
contrast, looked to the IRBM as an end for specific operational needs, not a means to a larger 
goal.163 
 The TCP began by defining the threat that the Soviet Union would pose during the next 
10 years. They identified four different phases of danger during this time. The first period was 
one of American supremacy in atomic capability but vulnerability to surprise attack because of 
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the lack of an early warning system, this would last until 1956. From 1956 through the end of the 
1950s, the U.S. would continue to build upon its supremacy in the area of strategic bombers. It 
would also increase the destructive power of the atomic arsenal relative to the Soviet Union. This 
period, the panel reported, would see the largest disparity between the Soviets and the U.S, in 
terms of military power. The third period from the end of the 1950s until the middle of the 1960s 
the panel believed the Soviets would gain on America in striking capacity and atomic bomb 
yield. Although the panel argued that the U.S. would maintain its strategic superiority during this 
period it would continue to degrade until middle of the 1960s when the Soviet Union would 
possess similar striking power to the United States. The panel reported that when this happened it 
meant that each nation would have the capability to destroy the other in a nuclear war.164 
By the end of 1956, the Army had made significant progress in its missile program. The 
Army created the Army Ballistic Missile Agency headed by Major General Medaris. This agency 
would take control of Jupiter missile development. In September 1956, von Braun’s team 
launched a four-stage Jupiter missile. Although this missile had an inert fourth stage it still 
managed to reach a height of six hundred miles and a range of thirty-three hundred miles, equal 
to the altitude of Sputnik. General Medaris, worried that von Braun would take the opportunity to 
try to launch the nose cone into space with an active fourth stage ordered him not to try it. He 
told von Braun to “personally inspect that fourth stage to make sure it [was] not live.”165 
 Two months later Defense Secretary Wilson ordered the Huntsville team specifically and 
the Army in general to limit its missile programs to a range of two hundred miles. This was quite 
a blow to von Braun, who wanted to achieve orbit with his missiles and had already showed that 
it was possible to do so. However, this decision was not about the success of the Army in 
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developing a missile capable of launching a satellite, it was about which service would use the 
weapons on the battlefield. Undoubtedly, this would be the Air Force. Secretary Wilson’s order, 
although it seemed definitive at the time, would take another year to come into force. The Army 
did not accept this decision without a fight.166 
 Although President Eisenhower made the decision to support IRBM research and 
development early in his administration it was unknown what the fiscal implications of this 
decision would be. By 1957, the President realized that it made little budgetary sense to maintain 
two research and development programs aimed at creating the same capability. Eisenhower’s 
understanding of how he wanted to fight future wars influenced his decision about which project 
to keep and whether the Air Force or the Army would control the research. This decision also 
projected how the administration envisioned these weapons working in NATO and U.S. defense 
systems. 
 The Air Force approached the development of its IRBM in a different way from the 
Army. It believed that the problems posed by the ICBM and IRBM were similar. By researching 
the IRBM Air Force scientists and contractors believed they would solve the problems associated 
with the IRBM along the way, it would be a fall-out of this effort. The Army saw much success 
in researching its shorter range missiles. Its version of the IRBM actually came out of the Army's 
Redstone missile program.167 The Redstone missile, with a range of 200 miles, was smaller and 
had a mobile launch capability to support ground operations.168 
 The Army and the Air Force both looked to guided missiles to provide improved force 
projection capability.  These two projects approached the problem of guided missiles from two 
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different points of view. The Army-Navy program, Jupiter, which the Navy soon left to research 
its own missile system, started from the beginning to design a missile with the range of 1500 
nautical miles. The Air Force, with the Thor program, saw the IRBM as a capability that it would 
achieve along the road to the ICBM. The hope was that these two programs would make quicker 
progress apart than just one program researching the problem alone.169 
 Although the Army and Navy began developing the Jupiter missile together it soon 
became apparent that the program would not meet the Navy’s needs. Liquid fuel was too 
problematic for naval use, it cause too many problems with its demanding storage conditions. 
Liquid oxygen required extremely cold conditions making storage on a submarine dangerous. If 
the propellant spilled during fueling operations it would cause catastrophic damage to the 
submarine and crew. The Navy wanted to develop a solid fuel missile, Army leaders did not 
think that was possible in the short-term, so they did not try to stop the Navy from leaving the 
program.170 
 Lieutenant General James Gavin, head of the Army’s research and development, did not 
worry about losing naval support. He did not think it was wise for the Army to lose the progress 
it made on the liquid fuelled Jupiter in order to accommodate the Navy’s needs. Besides the 
Jupiter was a successful missile and was possibly the vehicle that would carry an American 
satellite. Gavin did not want to lose this opportunity for the Army to shine.171 
 The Navy however, would make good on its investment in research of solid-fuels. By 
going to corporations such as the Aerojet General Corporation and Lockheed’s Missile and Space 
                                                 
169Andrew Goodpaster. Memo of Conversation with the President 8 october 1957, DDE Library, White House 
Office, Office of Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Department of Defense subseries, box 1, Folder Department of 
Defense volume II (August-October 1957), 2. 
170 Roger Lanius and Dennis Jenkins, editors, To Reach the High Frontier: A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002),239. 
171 Armacost, 87-88. 
 107 
 
Division, the Navy found solutions to the barriers of solid-fuel missiles that were unforeseen by 
the Army research team. Capt. Levering Smith, commander of the Naval Ordinance Test Station, 
worked with the companies to develop a 50-foot solid propellant missile, “Big Stoop” in 1956. 
The two corporations, working with Capt. Smith, developed a solid-fuel version of the Jupiter, 
called Jupiter-S. The problem with the Jupiter-S was its size; it was 44-feet long and 10 feet 
across. This meant that a submarine could only carry four missiles. This was not enough for 
sustained naval operations. So the Navy abandoned the Jupiter but showed that the technical 
problems preventing the switch to solid-fuels were not insurmountable but required the proper 
help.172 
 The two-pronged approach to missile research between the Army and the Air Force, 
created as many problems as it solved. The two services did not agree with each other concerning 
how the missiles would operate on the battlefield. Eventually, Eisenhower had to decide which 
program best fit the nation’s needs. This would mean determining which branch would continue 
to receive funds to field this weapon. It also meant that the losing service would no longer have 
the ability to direct the progress of America’s long-range missile program. 
Losing missile research funds was only of part of the problem for the Army under the 
New Look defense policy; this was part of a larger bureaucratic struggle. Eisenhower’s emphasis 
on cost cutting meant decreasing the manpower of the United States military, as well as its 
overseas contingent. In a conversation with Eisenhower in August of 1957, Secretary of Defense 
Charles Wilson discussed how to achieve this. He suggested that the administration could 
remove approximately 35,000 troops from Europe. The President countered that the U.S. could 
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only do this if it kept this information secret.173 
Another aspect of the rationale for decreasing the United States' presence in Europe was 
that an improvement in its strategic weapons would provide the same defense capability as 
ground forces deployed to defend Western Europe. This made guided missiles an important part 
of the deterrent program. They would operate with a small American force deployed to operate 
them; they would not need large ground forces to deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western 
Europe. This was part of the New Look defense policy's focus on sophisticated weapons to 
replace expensive ground units that required intensive support in terms of manpower and 
logistics. 
 By this time von Braun’s team in Huntsville had achieved some measure of success on 
the Jupiter project. On 31 May 1957 the third test flight of the Jupiter was successful. The 
missile attained a range of 1400 nautical miles and an altitude of 350 nautical miles. This was 
just over half the altitude of Sputnik, which would reach just over 600 miles in altitude in 
October of that year. The Air Force’s program, Thor, headed by Colonel Edward Hall, an expert 
in propulsion had some difficulty.174 Of the three test flights all ended in failure. The second 
flight launched effectively but because of safety problems the missile self-destructed.175 
There were two major variations of the Jupiter missile, the Jupiter A and the Jupiter C. 
The A variation was the military version that would carry a warhead. The C variation was the 
model used to test reentry technologies; this was the missile that reached 600 miles in altitude in 
1956. In order to perfect ballistic missiles, both American programs had to determine how best to 
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get the warheads back into the lower atmosphere.  The Jupiter C nosecone had a fiberglass 
coating that would dissipate heat in reentry by burning off. It was also relatively blunt, compared 
to other designs. These innovations helped von Braun’s team resolve many of the problems 
ballistic missiles.176 
 By August of 1957, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson wrote to Secretary of the Army 
Brucker concerning the fate of the Army’s IRBM program. Secretary Wilson told Secretary 
Brucker that the Army should not dedicate any more funds to the Jupiter program. Although at 
this time the IRBM panel had not officially come to a conclusion concerning which missile 
would be the primary focus for the nation, Wilson’s memo made clear that the Army lost control 
of the its IRBM program. The Air Force would have the responsibility to integrate the IRBM into 
its force and bring them into an operational use.177 
 Both programs by 1957 had some measure of success. However, by this time President 
Eisenhower grew frustrated with the progress and cost of the duplicate programs. He said, in a 
conference concerning security issues in general, that he would create only one program, similar 
to the Manhattan Project, if he could go back in time and revisit the missile development 
decision. He wanted to consolidate the programs into one single project. This would decrease 
overhead cost and would lead to a single conception of what the weapon's role on the battlefield 
would be. Eisenhower understood that the decision about which service continued to develop its 
missiles meant more than just the budget allocations, this would impact the morale of both 
services.178 
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 Another factor in the struggle between the Army and the Air Force was the loss of face. If 
the Air Force carried the day and took over both IRBM programs it would solidify its position in 
the national security structure. If the Army won, it would represent that it was still important in 
defending the nation and determining the future of America’s atomic arsenal. This was not just a 
technical discussion but also a disagreement at a fundamental level concerning which service 
was primarily responsible for national security, the Army or the Air Force.  
 The Army faced an uphill battle concerning its justification of its missile program. 
Guided missiles would help the Army face the new realities of the atomic battlefield. However, 
convincing President Eisenhower that the right place for long-range missile development was the 
ground service would not be an easy task, especially considering the Air Force’s natural need of 
such a capability. Although the main concern between the two services was the range of their 
respective weapons systems. The fight was also about who would get more defense funding and 
which service would define how the U.S. would use the IRBM. 
 The Army in 1957, wanted to modernize its Redstone missile in order to increase its 
range as well as improve its fuel from liquid oxygen to solid propellant. This modernization 
would increase the range of the missile to 500 miles. It is important to look at this modernization 
program and how the Army justified it because the Redstone modernization program was 
indicative of how Army leaders understood how guided missiles impacted warfare. 
 Lieutenant General James Gavin, the Army's Chief for Research and Development in the 
late 1950s, wrote about the importance of this in his book, War and Peace in the Space Age. He 
argued that the German scientists understood that the German missile program failed in part 
because of the constant threat of allied bombing operations. He argued that American designs 
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should start from the ground up with the assumption that mobility was crucial to maintaining the 
security of a missile system. It would allow the missiles to move out of contentious areas and 
preclude the military from having to defend an area just because it had missile bases present.179 
 The discussion to switch to a solid fuel system revealed the serious problems that the 
liquid oxygen fuel had. The liquid fuel was corrosive and so the missiles could not remain fueled 
for a prolonged period of time without destroying the fuel system. This meant that the missiles 
required significant preparation time in order to fire. A solid propellant system did not have such 
issues. The solid propellant was stable and had the ability to withstand storage over a prolonged 
period. Missiles with solid propellant, such as the Army's proposed modernized Redstone and the 
Navy's Polaris were still years from realization. The first solid-fuel Polaris missile came into 
operation in 1960; its first successful test flight came in 1959.180 However, the Army did not 
design the first generation of Jupiter missiles with a solid fuel capability and this led to the quick 
obsolesce of the weapons system because General Gavin did not want to sacrifice the Army’s 
substantial progress with the liquid fuelled Jupiter.  
 Part of the reason that Army leaders advocated for a 500-mile range missile was that they 
wanted to ensure that the Army maintained its ability to conduct combat operations against the 
Soviet Union. Lieutenant Colonel Gutherie argued in a report on the Redstone modernization 
program that an Army Group required a 500-mile missile in order to counter the known doctrine 
and capabilities of the Soviet Union. He cited Army studies that investigated what the Army 
would require in order to fight Soviet ground forces. These studies concluded that the Army 
required a longer-range mobile missile.181 
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 On 2 August 1957, after much bureaucratic infighting, Defense Secretary Charles Wilson 
issued a memorandum concerning the Thor and Jupiter IRBM projects. He declared that the Air 
Force would be the service responsible for determining how to the use these weapons. The Army 
could continue studies to determine how it could use missiles or use IRBMs to a limited extent. 
However, it could not plan for using any missile with a range greater than 200 miles. This meant 
that the Air Force would take control of the Army’s IRBM project. Although the Army would 
continue to work on the project, it would be under the direction of the Air Force. This edict 
ended the two service effort to develop an operational IRBM both programs now fell under Air 
Force direction.182 
The Air Force continued to work on the Jupiter. In fact, this missile had the most success 
in terms of performance, irrespective of the guidance system or warhead. The Army had clearly 
made significant progress with its missile program. The problem was the Army could never 
overcome the basic fact that the Air Force’s justification for IRBMs was superior to that of the 
Army’s, no matter what arguments General Taylor or any other Army leader made.183 
  General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, spoke about his concern that the 
Army lacked a long-range missile. In a memo to the Secretary of Defense about the Army's 
Redstone modernization program, he wrote that the Army had a significant capability gap 
because its longest range missile was the 175-mile Redstone missile. The IRBM program 
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planned to introduce a missile with a range of 1500-miles. This left a significant gap in what 
targets the Army could engage. General Taylor wrote that if the Army had to engage these targets 
it would require the Air Force to execute these missions with “manned aircraft or air-supported 
missiles.” He continued by writing that he thought both of these systems faced obsolescence 
soon, leaving only the IRBM to fill the operational gap. General Taylor characterized the IRBM 
as too expensive, too cumbersome, and not accurate enough to provide proper support for Army 
missions. He believed that this meant that the Army had to have its own long-range missile 
capability in order to directly support its own operations.184 
 General Taylor characterized many Army leaders' fears about the lack of capability in 
relation to the Air Force and the Soviet Union. The Army required a missile capable of 
supporting what Army leaders thought was their operational requirements. However, the original 
Redstone did not meet this criteria and the Jupiter, although capable of reaching such targets was 
out of their control. Each branch developed missiles for their own purposes; however, in the case 
of IRBMs the service that designed the weapon did not directly reap the benefits of its research 
program. General Taylor’s vision of future wars that would require missiles was deeply flawed. 
These missiles would not play a significant role in any conflict from 1957 through the present.  
 The Air Force program, which fielded the Thor missile, operated parallel to the Army’s 
IRBM project. Thor was similar to the Jupiter missile; however, it came as a result of the Air 
Force’s research on the ICBM problem. The Thor was the first IRBM to become operational, 
although, as discussed previously, it was not the system with the best test record. The first 
deployment of these weapons was to Britain, 1959. Getting these weapons deployed was 
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problematic. In October 1957, the administration had to deal with the launch of Sputnik. One 
concern was the lack of an effective ICBM capability to counter the Soviet missile threat. The 
Thor provided a way to create a relatively effective ICBM quickly. The problem as outlined in a 
progress report concerning guided missiles written by Dr. Killian, the scientific advisor to the 
President, was that this solution was not without problems. If the administration chose to use the 
ICBM variant of the Thor, called the Thor-Able, it would delay operational readiness date of the 
Thor squadron in Britain. Also, the Thor-Able missile was not a panacea. Its technical failings 
would lead to its quick obsolescence.185    
 The problems with both the Thor and Jupiter were readily apparent even in 1956. The 
Scientific Advisory Committee recommended that a solid propellant IRBM receive top priority. 
Neither the Jupiter nor Thor first generation missiles had the capability to burn solid fuel. The 
advisory committee also recommended in 1956 that the research of a solid fuel variant be 
independent of the Jupiter. This gave the Navy the ability to develop the Polaris missile, a solid 
fuel submarine launched IRBM.186 
 One reason that the United States focused on the development of IRBMs was the slow 
pace of progress on the ICBM program. Although the program planned to create an operational 
ICBM by the middle of the 1960s, there was not a feasible way to increase production or 
research quickly to meet the growing Soviet threat. The only option was to make the Thor variant 
the emphasis of the ICBM program. This would provide the capability but at the cost of diverting 
resources from other programs. Killian characterized this option as something that would make 
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sense as an “emergency measure only.”187 
 Both the Army and Air Force’s IRBM programs had their problems. However, both 
offered a reasonable solution to the problem that the nation faced; its lack of a long-range 
ballistic missile. By the end of the 1950s, it was clear that these weapons would only serve as 
temporary solutions until more effective weapons could reach the battlefield. This lack of 
effectiveness did not eliminate the fact that the U.S. did not have an effective counter to the 
Soviet ICBM capability, at least in terms of its missile force. This was why the both IRBM 
programs were so important to President Eisenhower. 
The Jupiter missile system completed 5 test flights from 1956 through 1957. Of these 
flights, three were successful and attained ranges over 1,000 nautical miles. Also, the Jupiter 
project managed to launch a missile with a working guidance system. During this time, the 
Jupiter team also launched and recovered a small-scale nose cone after a successful test flight of 
1100 nautical miles. The Thor program did not have the same level of success. Although it was 
able to launch 8 test missiles during the same year-long period, only 2 were successful. One of 
these successful test flights attained a range of 2,300 nautical miles. By the end of the year, the 
Secretary of Defense limited the maximum production of Thors to 2 missiles a month and 
Jupiters to one missile a month, until President Eisenhower chose one land-based system to 
move to full production.188 
 It was not surprising that the Army’s missile project was so successful. German rocket 
scientist Wernher von Braun and his team worked for the Army in the immediate post war 
period. In 1956, Braun was the lead scientist in the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, built in 
Redstone Arsenal. His work for the Army in weapons research continued until the creation of the 
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Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama in July of 1960, when he started his work at 
the center a part of the year old National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).189 
 Although the Army and the Air Force each had projects that completed successful test 
flights during 1957, both still had problems. The guidance systems were not tested in a majority 
of the flights. Also, the Jupiter missile was the only one to test a version of its operational nose 
cone. There were more problems with the Thor, which continued to see performance issues 
through most of 1957. By the end of 1957 it was clear that these weapons still required much 
work to be viable. The following table illustrates the dates and results of the initial test flights of 
the Jupiter and Thor programs. 
 
Test flight information for Thor and Jupiter IRBM programs from 1956 through 1957190 
Date of Test Results of test 
11 February 1956 Scientific Advisory Committee recommended continuing 
both the Thor and the Jupiter IRBM programs 
18 October 1956 Air Force received the first Thor IRBM for testing 
25 January 1957  First Thor test, contaminated fuel caused the missile to 
explode in the early stages. 
1 March 1957 Jupiter missile first full-scale test. Launch was 
successful but it lost control due to heat build-up in the 
control fins. 
19 April 1957 Second test flight of Thor, problems with safety 
instruments cause early explosion of missile. 
26 April 1957 Second test flight of Jupiter. After 93 seconds of 
successful flight the movement of liquid oxygen caused 
the missile to lose control. 
21 May 1957 Third test of Thor, problems in fueling operations led to 
the destruction of the missile on the launch pad. 
31 May 1957 Third test of Jupiter. Attained a range of 1400 nautical 
miles and height of 350 nautical miles. Test was 100% 
successful. 
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8 August 1957 Jupiter nosecone tested on an 1100 nautical mile test 
flight. This was the first object recovered from space. 
The nosecone attained a height of 600 miles, equal to 
that of Sputnik. 
28 August 1957 Fourth flight of Jupiter was successful 
30 August 1957 Fourth test of Thor, launch was successful but a fire in 
mid-flight required the destruction of the missile. 
20 September 1957 Fifth test of Thor, this was the first successful test flight 
of the missile. 
3 October 1957 Sixth flight of Thor ended 30 seconds after launch due to 
engine malfunction. 
11 October 1957` Seventh flight of Thor was successful. 
22 October 1957 Fifth test of Jupiter, this was the first full-scale test of 
guidance system. 
24 October 1957 Eighth flight of Thor was successful, tested subsystems 
and fuel economy. 
 
 One reason for the emphasis on the IRBM program was the threat of a Soviet nuclear 
attack or an imbalance in Soviet capacity compared with that of the U.S. Secretary of Defense 
McElroy in a conference with Secretary Dulles in November of 1957, a month after the Soviet 
launch of Sputnik, reminded him that the nation only had intelligence estimates concerning 
Soviet advances. This meant that the information could be erroneous, either underestimating or 
overestimating Soviet capabilities. McElroy suggested that the best path was to continue to 
emphasize IRBM production as a hedge against Soviet missiles. Since the U.S. had no definitive 
knowledge of what the Soviets actually possessed, outside of Sputnik, continuing IRBM research 
and production would be a safe bet.191 
 In the same conversation, the Defense Secretary discussed how to pay for the increased 
production of IRBMs and what to do with them. He said that European states were not ready or 
willing to receive them. Their main concern was the ability of the U.S. to continue to provide an 
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effective deterrent to Soviet incursion. It did not matter whether this was through strategic 
bomber coverage or through newly deployed missiles. What mattered was the technical 
proficiency and the quality of American weapons protecting its European allies. The group 
wanting missile coverage was the American people. He said that U.S. citizens worried that they 
were under direct threat of an attack and missiles provided an effective counter to that threat. It is 
important to remember that until September of 1959, with the acceptance of the first U.S. ICBM, 
there was only one type of guided missile system that could effectively reach Soviet territory 
with a sufficiently large nuclear warhead, the IRBM. Both the Jupiter and Thor were similar in 
characteristics, although the Jupiter had more success.  Using the IRBM as a deterrent required 
the use of European bases since the missiles lacked the range to hit Soviet targets from North 
America.192 
 Secretary McElroy recommended producing both the Thor and Jupiter missile based on 
the political situation after Sputnik and to quiet the domestic concerns. This would allow the U.S. 
to produce more weapons in a shorter time frame. This decision had the support of President 
Eisenhower although McElroy and Dr. Killian had the authority to work out the specific details 
of the program. This process was separate from the decision to allow the Air Force to be the 
branch in charge of the IRBM development. When the Air Force got control of both missile 
programs, it did not have the authority to stop the development of the Army’s Jupiter missile. 
Only President Eisenhower could order the elimination of the Jupiter missile program.193 
 Dulles’s comments reveal that there were two different sets of priorities for security. One 
set dealt with how to secure European allies and the second on how to secure the United States 
directly. Missiles mainly catered to the concerns of American citizens. Sputnik, at least in 
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Dulles’s estimation, did not affect European citizens as much as it worried Americans. The 
Eisenhower administration had to contend with the reality and perception of security. This 
required him to act to create the conditions for the right perception of security in the minds of 
American citizens. In order to do this, President Eisenhower had to expend resources to produce 
weapons that, in reality, the United States did not need. So the push to produce a guided missile 
force answered security concerns of Americans, although it would directly impact European 
nations. This was Dulles’s problem with missiles; he had to find nations willing to allow these 
weapons within their boundaries. This problem was not easy to solve and would cause 
significant disruption within Europe and NATO. 
 Expediting missile research and production required about $200 million dispersed over 
the two to three years of increased production.194 This was in addition to the baseline costs of 
missile production.   Secretary McElroy discussed his perception of the production program; he 
did not think it was necessary to make a large number of weapons.  Instead, he wanted eight 
squadrons ready by the beginning of 1960. His main motive was “psychological” in order to 
“stiffen the confidence and allay the concern particularly of our own people.”195 
 The specifics of the reaction to the launch of Sputnik are outside the scope of this chapter, 
they will follow in a subsequent chapter. However, it is clear that with the launch of the Soviet 
man-made satellite, the U.S. missile program was important to national pride and national 
defense. The problem was that the missile program was still years away from an operational 
ICBM and lacked a clearly viable IRBM. Sputnik threw into relief the problems of American 
guided missile development.  
The United States was not the only nation researching sophisticated weapons during the 
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1950s. The United Kingdom also had a nuclear weapons program. The United States and the 
United Kingdom worked together on the Manhattan Project, which was the name of the project 
for the development of the atomic bomb in World War II. In the immediate post war period, the 
United States ended this cooperation and carefully guarded its atomic secrets from all its allies. 
Although no allied nation got complete disclosure of America's atomic secrets, the U.K. and 
Canadian governments did receive special exemptions from certain American security 
classifications.  Officials could disclose information classified through TOP SECRET to U.K. 
and Canadians officials with a need to know. This exemption included information concerning 
weapons systems and technical research information but not of an atomic nature.196 
 This openness demonstrated the special position of the United Kingdom and Canada. 
Both English speaking nations had clearance not afforded to any other NATO or Commonwealth 
nation. Although the U.S. did not work directly with the U.K. to develop its guided missiles, it 
ensured that the U.K. was up to date concerning American progress of its missile program. This 
information did not include specific technical data or warhead development. 
 The cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear issues 
had a troubled history. Prior to World War II, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States each 
had scientists aware of the possibility of nuclear fission. Much of this research took place at the 
academic level and did not primarily focus on the military applications of this new energy 
source. In the late 1930s, Great Britain’s nuclear research program was ahead of the United 
States’ research. The U.S. reached out to the U.K. and offered to cooperate on nuclear research. 
However, the U.K. rejected this offer because of the lack of progress from the American 
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program. Another reason for the British hesitancy was the perceived inability of the United 
States to safeguard its nuclear information or British nuclear information exchanged in any 
cooperative agreement.197 
 One of the reasons for the disparity between the United States and the United Kingdom in 
atomic weapons research was the difference in the focus of the nations’ research programs. In the 
late 1930s, British scientists spent much of their time researching the military applications of this 
new atomic field. In contrast, American scientists mainly focused on the industrial or energy 
generating possibilities of atomic power. Britain faced a direct threat from the growing power of 
Germany and this influenced its atomic research. British scientists understood that they needed 
weapons much more than they needed plentiful energy. The U.S. did not face such a threat and 
concentrated on using this technology mainly for economic purposes.198  
 The situation changed dramatically after World War II. During the war, the British and 
the Americans did cooperate on researching nuclear weapons. The framework between the two 
nations was the Quebec Agreement. This agreement, signed in 1943, included Canada in the 
cooperative research program. When the United States dedicated significant national resources 
toward the problem of making nuclear weapons it ensured that the U.S. would soon overtake the 
United Kingdom in terms of its research efforts.199 
 The Quebec Agreement also outlined how the three nations would and could use nuclear 
weapons. Specifically, no signatory state could use a nuclear weapon against any other signatory 
state. The research effort would be completely cooperative and would involve a free exchange of 
certain information between the nations in the accord. No nation in the pact would disclose any 
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of the information from the research to any other nation. The use of atomic weapons required the 
consent of other states in the agreement. Any industrial or commercial information that came out 
of the research would only go to the United Kingdom after the consent of the President of the 
United States due to the large amount of money and resources that the United States contributed 
to the project.200 
 Nuclear weapons research during World War II was a joint activity. It involved the U.K., 
Canada, and the U.S. Although it was an international project, the United States carried the bulk 
of the responsibility for funding the research. American scientists also made up the majority of 
those working on the project. This would have significant implications for the continued 
cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom after the war.  
 The United States quickly stopped cooperating with the United Kingdom and Canada in 
weapons research after World War II. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, known as the McMahon 
Act, ended the British and American cooperation established under the Quebec Agreement of 
1943. This act prevented United States agencies from disseminating atomic information to any 
other nation. The act specified that Congress could not pass any agreement authorizing the 
exchange of atomic information until there was a viable set of “international safeguards.” This 
restriction only related to research that would lead to “destructive” ends. The act specifically 
allowed and encouraged the exchange of nuclear information that aided atomic energy 
endeavors.201 
 The United States was now in the position of worrying about the ability of its allies, 
specifically the United Kingdom, to protect sensitive nuclear weapons information. This 
expressed not only the change in America’s technological growth during wartime; it also 
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demonstrated Britain’s decreased influence in the world. No longer was the U.K. dictating terms 
in its relationship with the United States as it did prior to World War II; now it was in the 
position of having to accept the termination of its nuclear cooperative agreement with the U.S.   
 The end of Anglo-American atomic cooperation made it more difficult for the United 
Kingdom to continue researching nuclear weapons. However, the fruits of the collaboration 
between the two nations continued to influence and aid the development of Britain’s nuclear 
weapons program. After the war, the U.K. did not have to start from scratch in its quest for 
nuclear weapons. It had significant leads in the theory and the technical knowledge necessary for 
building an atomic weapon. Creating a functioning weapon still required significant amounts of 
money and research. The British were far ahead of what was possible, had the United Kingdom 
pursued such an endeavor alone.202 
 The cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States was profitable for 
the UK. It provided the foundation for Britain’s postwar nuclear research and decreased the 
amount of time and resources necessary for the nation to acquire its own atomic weapon. 
Although its influence decreased after the war, the United Kingdom still saw a need to build a 
robust atomic capability in order to secure itself on the postwar international stage and maintain 
its position as a first-rate world power. 
 President Truman’s decision to stop cooperation between the U.K. and the U.S. on atomic 
weapons shaped Britain’s atomic program because it set the nation back to its 1943 position in 
terms of its progress. Another influence on its atomic program was the decision to keep most of 
the research under the auspices of the government and not allow private industry to conduct 
contract work on atomic research. This was a different approach from the American strategy, 
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which allowed significant contributions from the private sector in atomic exploration. The 
decision to maintain most research in the public sphere arose from economic concerns of the 
United Kingdom. It did not have the economic resources to pay for several different research 
contracts that would investigate similar problems. The British government had to come to terms 
with the economic reality of its situation; it could not afford to build a large nuclear arsenal 
without American support. One benefit of the beginning of an independent British nuclear 
program was the concentration of British scientists working in their homeland. During the war, 
most of the prominent British researchers worked in labs in the United States. After the end of 
wartime cooperation, they returned home and worked for the United Kingdom directly.203 
 Britain’s atomic program produced its first atomic weapon in 1952. Although it was an 
atomic power, its economic situation was not as powerful as its weapons arsenal. In a letter to 
Richard Austen Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, Minister of Defense 
from 1954 through 1955, discussed the economic implications of securing the United Kingdom. 
Although this letter does not specifically address the issues of atomic weapons, it does reveal the 
problems that the United Kingdom faced in the postwar world in terms of economic and defense 
predicaments. Macmillan did not see any way to decrease defense spending in the short-term. In 
fact, he thought that defense spending would increase as the Royal Air Force’s mission would 
continue to increase in its expense. The British government worried as much about defense 
expenditures as President Eisenhower did. However, both Eisenhower and Macmillan believed 
that spending money on atomic weapons was important. These similarities in thinking between 
Eisenhower and Macmillan would allow them to work well together when Macmillan became 
Prime Minister in 1957. Both thought that these weapons provided a solid foundation for 
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national security in the Cold War. 204 
 Early in the atomic age there was a breakthrough in the power of atomic weapons. This 
was the hydrogen bomb. It increased the yield from the kiloton range into the megaton range, a 
hundred-fold increase in power. These weapons used nuclear fusion and not nuclear fission for 
their power. The creation of fusion atomic weapons changed the paradigm of atomic warfare. 
These weapons were more powerful than any other atomic weapon. Using technological 
sophistication and bomb yield as a measure of effectiveness in the absence of an actual nuclear 
war meant that hydrogen weapons called into question an arsenal based only on atomic weapons. 
The dramatic increase in destruction raised the risk of one Soviet missile or bomber getting 
through America’s defenses. If one hydrogen bomb hit a U.S. city it meant the complete 
destruction of that city and, possibly, its surrounding areas as well. This was different that the 
previous generation of atomic weapons with yields in the kiloton range. A one-percent failure 
rate, in the hydrogen bomb age, meant the death of possibly millions of Americans.205 
In 1955, the British Ministry of Defense commissioned a study to discern the implications of a hydrogen bomb attack on the United 
Kingdom. This report, chaired by William Strath, described the horror of such an attack in great detail. It also disclosed the planning assumptions 
of the British military staff during the mid-1950s. Strath wrote that hydrogen bombs would be a part of any future war that the United Kingdom 
fought. He advocated that preparing for an atomic or conventional attack was not effective. He believed that the government should 
focus on planning for defense against hydrogen bomb attacks and this would allow it to save the money it spent on planning on conventional and 
atomic attacks.206 
 This report expressed the British government’s belief that atomic weapons, and later 
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hydrogen weapons, defined the postwar security paradigm. In a 1954 Cabinet, meeting Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill made his position clear concerning the importance of atomic 
weapons in protecting Great Britain. He said that Britain’s atomic capability would allow it to 
prevent war. This made it vitally important that the nation continue to research and develop the 
best atomic and hydrogen weapons. In this Cabinet meeting, Churchill announced that the nation 
would begin work on the hydrogen bomb and would continue to improve its atomic capability.207 
 Churchill’s decision to make the hydrogen bomb came about two years after the United 
States detonated its first fusion, or hydrogen bomb, in 1952 and one year after the Soviet Union 
detonated its first fusion weapon in 1953. Clearly, the quick progress of the United States and the 
Soviet Union spurred the United Kingdom into action. It demonstrated the difference between 
the two nations’ atomic research programs. During this period, there was no cooperation between 
the U.S. and the U.K. concerning atomic research. The American program produced significant 
results in short period of time. The British program took until 1957 to reach the thermonuclear or 
hydrogen bomb stage. 
 The British nuclear program was effective. However, the United Kingdom struggled to 
balance fiscal and defense issues during the 1950s. The United States faced similar concerns but 
did not face the problems of rebuilding an economy and society damaged by World War II. The 
United Kingdom wanted to cooperate with the United States in its atomic program. Churchill 
expressed optimism that this would happen soon in 1954. However, this cooperation did not 
move beyond the surface level until three years and several international crises later. The United 
States and Britain would only share physical data concerning atomic weapons and destruction 
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estimates of their weapons. They did not cooperate on a technical level or on a research level.208 
 Although there was not cooperation on atomic research, there was collaboration in other 
defense areas. In 1955, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense asked to purchase Corporal 
missiles in conjunction with a bulk purchase of the United States Army. Harold Macmillan, then 
the defense minister wrote the request along with the Secretary of State for War, Antony Head. 
They argued that the missile would allow the British Army to have a much needed short-range 
atomic capability. The Corporal missile had a maximum range of 75 miles. This cooperation was 
only for the missile and not for the warhead. The British government had to develop their own 
warhead to arm this missile.  
 There was a significant amount of cooperation between the two nations throughout the 
1950s in non-nuclear areas of defense. This collaboration expressed Eisenhower’s desire to work 
with the British on nuclear issues. The Anglo-American alliance in the post war period did go 
through some strain. However, this strain did not drive the nations completely apart. The United 
Kingdom and the United States each needed each other, although the balance changed through 
the decade. The United States continued to need access to the United Kingdom because of its 
proximity to the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom continued to need the U.S. to provide 
economic and military aid and support as it dealt with the implications of its decline on the 
international stage.  
 The progress of America’s IRBM program through the 1950s allowed the U.S. military to 
begin to change from using only strategic bombers to a combined force that relied on guided 
missiles as well as bombers to project force into Soviet territory. President Eisenhower’s decision 
to delegate the control of the IRBM program to the Air Force did not come from an assessment 
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of the technical progress of each program. If this were the case, then the clear leader was the 
Army’s Jupiter program. However, the Army faced an uphill battle because its national security 
mission did not require a long-range missile. Although General Taylor argued that it would 
support ground operations, this did not sway President Eisenhower. The Air Force carried the day 
because it was the force that had a missile program aligned with its operational needs. The Air 
Force’s missile program also meshed well with what the administration wanted from the weapon 
system, a way to de-emphasize ground operations and focus more on strategic nuclear war as a 
way to deter future conflicts with the Soviet Union.   
 The relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. concerning atomic research also revealed 
the problems that Eisenhower faced in building an effective relationship between America and 
Great Britain. Although the two nations did not cooperate in atomic research in the early Cold 
War period, it was obvious that both looked to nuclear weapons to secure their respective 
nations. However, in order for the U.S. to take full advantage of its IRBM force it would have to 
have European bases. This would require the consent of individual nations to agree to have 
American nuclear weapons deployed within their boundaries. If Great Britain, America’s closest 
ally in Western Europe, declined then it would be a loss of face for the President. 
 With the launch of Sputnik there was great concern in the United States about the ability 
of the Soviets to strike America with a long-range missile. Europeans did not share this concern. 
President Eisenhower needed some political leverage to convince European nations to agree to 
IRBM deployment to meet American concerns. This leverage, in the case of the United 
Kingdom, came from the disruption of the political relationship with America because of the 
Suez Crisis and the Bermuda Conference of 1958, which saw both nations seeking to repair the 
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 No one expected 26 July 1956 to be as dramatic as it was. Gamal Abdel Nasser was due 
to give a speech celebrating the revolution in Egypt that deposed King Farouk. This coup, led by 
the Free Officers, was part of the growing Arab Nationalism movement that started in North 
Africa and the Middle East in the 1950s. The officers, led by Muhammad Naguib and Nasser not 
only wanted to change the political structure in Egypt, they wanted to end British occupation. 
However, ending the British presence in Egypt would take several years.  
 When Nasser came to Alexandria to give his commemorative speech, the world expected 
him to discuss the importance of the revolution and to reveal a major policy proposal, as was 
customary at these events. He began his discussion by talking about Egypt’s history of 
oppression and exploitation. Nasser explained to the attentive crowd that they had suffered under 
both domestic and foreign oppressors. He wanted to give them something else.209 
 The crowd consisted of a quarter of a million people packed densely to hear their leader 
address them. They were there to celebrate the freedom of Egypt but Nasser had greater plans. 
As he continued to discuss Egypt’s oppressors he started to talk about the building of the Suez 
Canal. He reminded the crowd how Ferdinand de Lesseps imposed conditions upon Khedive 
Said. When Nasser said de Lesseps’ name, he signaled to his associates to start the takeover of 
the Suez Canal Company offices.210 
 As Nasser’s conspirators seized the offices, the President of Egypt continued to tell the 
people of his plans. He told them that he had previously signed a decree nationalizing the canal. 
This move would end the foreign ownership of the waterway and would allow Egypt to claim all 
of the canal’s revenue, instead of only getting a royalty. The implications of this decision would 
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lead to war with Great Britain, France, and Israel allied against Egypt. This conflict would force 
President Eisenhower into an uncomfortable position. He could support U.S. allies and by 
implication help reestablish colonialism in North Africa. Or he could choose to alienate 
America’s closest allies in order to salvage the U.S. position in the Middle East. These were not 
easy diplomatic waters to steer the ship of state through. Eisenhower’s adept handling of the 
crisis and its aftermath show how important averting war was to him and the rapprochement 
process between the U.S. and the U.K. showed the importance of the Anglo-American alliance to 
Eisenhower’s military and political strategy. 
 Nasser’s nationalization of the canal called into question the ability of the United 
Kingdom and France to use the canal to supply and support their colonial holdings as well as 
both of these states positions as first-rate powers. This was a direct threat to the national security 
and prestige of both the U.K. and France. This slight could not go unchallenged because if it did, 
it would quicken the dissolution of both empires. 
 This chapter focuses on the different perceptions of Nasser’s threat and how the three 
NATO members sought to address it. The intent is to show how these differences in perception 
contributed to the strain in relations between Eden and Eisenhower personally and the United 
Kingdom and the United States politically. This tension set the stage for the Bermuda 
Conference between Macmillan and Eisenhower in 1957. The conference was part of an effort to 
repair some of the damage done during the Suez Crisis. 
 President Eisenhower focused his defense policy on deterring war with the Soviet Union; 
this was a globally focused end state. Eden, in response to Nasser’s nationalization, made efforts 
to restore British influence in the Middle East, a regional objective, with global strategic 
implications for Britain. These two different focuses added to the tensions between the U.S. and 
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the U.K. Eisenhower did not want to sacrifice his global goal of avoiding a direct conflict with 
the Soviet Union in order to support the regional aspirations of the United Kingdom, even if it 
meant an uncontrolled slide into decolonization for America’s closest ally. 
 The diminishing role of Great Britain in world affairs was another complicating factor in 
the Suez Crisis. Although the United Kingdom was part of the successful coalition in World War 
II, after that conflict the U. K. faced significant challenges in rebuilding its economy and 
maintaining its empire. This tension between remaining economically solvent and keeping the 
vestiges of empire in a post-colonial world forced the U.K, and Anthony Eden specifically, to 
face some hard truths about its role in international affairs and its position relative to the United 
States. The British and French Empires were falling apart, as national aspirations influenced the 
people in all parts of the Earth.211 
 Eisenhower was not entirely sympathetic to the problems of decolonization. This lack of 
consonance contributed to the disagreement between the President and Anthony Eden about the 
threat that Nasser posed. Although Eisenhower understood the security risks that Britain and 
France faced if they lost prestige in the region; he would not support their duplicitous actions to 
reaffirm their control over their shrinking realms. 
 The Suez Crisis represented a turning point for Great Britain. After the conflict, British 
leaders would have to ensure their foreign policy closely aligned with the United Kingdom’s 
most powerful ally, the United States. The British invasion of Egypt represented Eden’s last 
attempt to act unilaterally to protect the British Empire from collapse. This last act was a failure. 
The reasons for its failure are beyond the scope of this chapter but the influence of the crisis and 
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the need for an Anglo-American rapprochement are vital to understanding how and why 
Eisenhower deployed IRBMs to Great Britain. 
 After World War II, alliances were a fundamental part of American foreign and military 
policy. On 2 February 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson drafted a memorandum 
explaining to President Eisenhower the state of America’s national defense structure and its 
relative advantage compared with the Soviet Union. This memo laid out the recent progress each 
of the branches made in terms of atomic capability. It also described how they were integrating 
these new weapons into their organizational structures. He further discussed how the U.S. should 
approach its allies in order to make it clear that the interests of the U.S. aligned with their own. 
He told the President that America’s allies had to understand that U.S. forces provided their 
security as well as that of the United States. However, the President should make it clear that 
American policy aimed at preventing warfare, which would benefit everyone.212 
 Eisenhower did not want to fight the Soviet Union or any other nation. His national 
defense policies specifically tried to calm tensions between the two nations. This also required 
that America’s allies hue to a similar line. The Suez Crisis of 1956 uncovered the problems 
inherent in this strategy. The United States was subject to the actions of its allies in the Middle 
East and did not have complete control of the situation. One reason for the lack of influence in 
the region was that parts of the Middle East were in the peripheral zones, not clearly in the U.S. 
or Soviet sphere of influence. The Suez Crisis strained the special relationship between the 
United States and Great Britain.  
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 Another point covered by Secretary Wilson in his memo to Eisenhower was the key to 
making this cooperative strategy successful was ensuring that America’s allies understood the 
mutually beneficial aspects of an alliance with the U.S. This, according to Wilson, would ensure 
that U.S. allies knew that their needs mattered to American leaders and that they were not simply 
helping the U.S. fights its own conflicts, at the expense of their own security. Of course, when 
the interests of allies conflicted with those of the U.S. it did cause significant disruptions in 
relations between America and its associates. The Suez Crisis was one episode that showcased 
the problems that occur when nations’ interests diverged.213 
 Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided an indication of the 
tense security situation that the U.S. faced in the middle of the 1950s. In a memorandum to the 
Secretary of Defense written in March of 1956, he aired the defense concerns of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. Although the Chiefs all understood the importance of reducing security spending 
because of its deleterious effect on the economy, they could not recommend any defense 
reductions at that time. The primary reason the Chiefs could not countenance any decrease in 
defense spending was because of the persistent threat of conflict with the Soviet Union.214 
 Throughout the Cold War, the threat of a future conflict with the Soviet Union pervaded 
any discussion of America’s national defense strategy. Any action that precipitated a potential 
conflict with the Soviet Union was antithetical to U.S. policy. The Suez Crisis would put this 
aspect of Cold War doctrine under considerable strain. If the British, French, and Israelis pushed 
the issue too far and made Egypt seek support from the Soviet Union it would possibly create a 
situation where American allies faced a Soviet sponsored enemy. This would set the stage for 
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either the Americans or the Soviets entering the conflict and greatly expanding the scope of the 
war.  
 As discussed earlier, American defense planners expected any conflict with the Soviet 
Union to be nuclear in nature. Although the Suez Canal Crisis began as a limited conflict, if the 
Soviet Union intervened it had the possibility to destroy any artificial limitations on the use of 
military power. Eisenhower was hesitant to act too forcefully to change Nasser’s position 
because of the threat of Soviet involvement combined with the express purpose of U.S. policy of 
averting war. For the President the main threat was always the Soviet Union, he did not want to 
take any risks in provoking a war over anything that was not an existential threat to the U.S. For 
the British and French, Nasser, and his nationalization of the canal, represented an existential 
threat to their own national interests. Both Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet saw this 
threat as one that approached that of the Soviet Union because of what it would communicate 
about the crumbling power of each of their empires. The canal crisis forced these two 
interpretations of security issues into stark relief. Eisenhower would face the decision of 
supporting American allies at the cost of potentially engaging the Soviet Union. 
 Nasser’s takeover of the Suez Canal was part of his effort to regain Egyptian sovereignty 
over its territory, sovereignty the British and French had long ago taken. His decision to 
nationalize the canal came after American efforts to improve its image in the nation. Prior to the 
nationalization decision, the United States offered to support Abdel Nasser in his desire to 
improve the infrastructure of Egypt as a way to keep Egypt out of the communist orbit. The most 
high profile project of this effort was the promise aid to build the Aswan Dam. However, 
President Eisenhower decided to withdraw American aid for the project due to Nasser’s addition 
of several conditions on the Aswan Dam project. Nasser also began to receive weapons from the 
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Soviet Union, through Czechoslovakia, furthering alienating his American supporters. This, in 
Eisenhower’s estimation, made the deal more trouble than it was worth.215 
 The Aswan Dam project came up for discussion in the 289th meeting of the National 
Security Council held in June 1956. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
told the council that the Soviet Union agreed to help Nasser build the dam. This aid would 
consist of a no interest loan of $400 million with a 60-year term. In addition to this loan, the 
Soviets agreed to forgive all of Egypt’s debt for the Soviet arms purchased prior to the 
agreement. The Soviet Union also promised to buy the nation’s entire cotton crop and build a 
steel mill. The discussion then turned to the impact that Soviet aid would have on America’s 
influence in the region. Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey did not think that it was problematic 
that the Soviet Union wanted to help Egypt. He did not see it as a loss for the U.S. but he 
believed “it was the best possible thing” for the United States because of the second and third 
order effects of the agreement.216 
 Secretary of State John Dulles agreed, he added that while the near-term impact would be 
negative, for the long-term the United States actually dodged a bullet for its image in the region. 
He told the council that any nation that decided to help Egypt build this dam would become the 
object of scorn by the Egyptians. The construction project, even though it was supported with 
significant financial aid, would eventually require the Egyptian people to sacrifice to pay for it. 
Once the people experienced the fiscal impacts of this project through reduced government 
spending on public programs and other hardships they would first blame their own government. 
However, they would also look to the foreign power that loaned the money to Egypt and now 
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wanted repayment. Dulles believed that it was a good thing that the Soviet Union would have to 
be the one to call the Egyptian government to task if it didn’t pay its obligations; this would 
allow the U.S. to side-step the problem in the future as well as remove itself from any further 
economic entanglements with Egypt. 217 
 Eisenhower’s ambivalent attitude towards Nasser and Egypt shown through in this 
discussion, he did not see it as a necessity for the United States to rush to support Egypt. While 
he did not want Nasser to fall completely in with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower did not think 
Soviet involvement in the Arab state was an urgent problem. As Secretary of State Dulles made 
clear there were some significant complications that Soviet support would cause between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union as a result of their financial support of Nasser.  
 Eisenhower made his thoughts on the matter more clear in his diary entry on 8 August 
1956. In this entry, he discussed Nasser’s nationalization decision as well as America’s efforts to 
help him build the Aswan Dam. Eisenhower wrote that Nasser decided to nationalize the Canal 
as a result of the American decision to withdraw funding for the dam project. Eisenhower 
continued that Nasser said he expected to receive approximately $100 million in profit in the first 
year of nationalization. This required a steep increase in the tolls charged by the canal company. 
The Suez Canal Company, according to Eisenhower, only netted $35 million and that was after 
the rental of $17 million paid to Egypt. As a consequence of nationalization the company would 
not pay rent on the canal to Egypt. Under the rate structure prior to nationalization, the company 
would only profit approximately $52 million a year. In order for Nasser to reach his goal of $100 
million he would have to double the tolls charged by the canal. This estimation assumed no drop 
in traffic because of Nasser’s actions. Another problem the Egyptian President faced was the 
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need to improve the canal in order to accept larger ships. This would require about $750 million 
in the short-term, according to Eisenhower.218 
 In addition to laying out the problems of nationalization Eisenhower also articulated what 
Nasser would have to do in order to see the profits he hoped for. In his entry, Eisenhower did not 
reveal any animosity concerning the Nasser’s decision. Rather, the tone is calm and the President 
simply provides an accounting of the problems of this decision in financial terms. Nasser’s 
actions, while Eisenhower did not think them prudent, were not a cause for panic for the United 
States.  
 Eisenhower’s diary entry also contained his version of the Aswan Dam decision. The 
project was going to involve the British and Americans in a combined effort. After the initial 
investment of these two nations, the World Bank would provide the aid required for Nasser to 
finish the dam. Eisenhower wrote that he thought the project was feasible but would be very 
expensive for Egypt and would consume almost all of its domestic spending. According to 
Eisenhower, Nasser then sent a list of conditions that the Americans and British had to meet in 
order for him to agree to the project. Next, Eisenhower wrote, that Nasser began a military 
improvement program that would detract from the funds required to build the dam. Eisenhower 
did not think that Egypt would have the necessary resources to complete its military 
improvement program and pay its share for the dam so he withdrew American support from the 
project.219 
 Once again, Eisenhower’s tone was not angry. He related these events in a matter of fact 
manner. He simply wrote that he had “lost interest and said nothing more about the matter.” It 
was not a dramatic decision for Eisenhower; it was simply a potential investment where the costs 
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became too onerous for American support. When Nasser replied in July of 1956 that he withdrew 
any conditions for Egyptian participation, Eisenhower wrote that the United States considered 
the project dead and did not have any interests in reviving it.220 
 When describing the nationalization crisis, Eisenhower did not convey any serious 
concern for American national security. He seemed to understand this problem as something that 
Nasser brought on himself. The U.S, in Eisenhower’s view, offered to help Egypt but then 
Nasser placed conditions on this aid and Eisenhower decided it wasn’t worth it. The 
nationalization crisis would not put America in dire straits. However, this was not the view of the 
United Kingdom.  
 In a letter to Prime Minister Anthony Eden, written on 2 September 1956, 
Eisenhower advised him that the best option for the United Kingdom was to ensure a successful 
outcome of the discussion with Nasser concerning the future access to the canal. Eisenhower 
brought up the possibility of taking the issue to the United Nations. He wrote that the problem 
should not go to the United Nations until the discussion talks that the British government was 
participating in fell through. Eisenhower cautioned Eden that the most important thing was 
maintaining a united diplomatic front. If the British, the Americans, and the other nations in the 
Suez Committee of Five user nations of the canal stayed together, there was a greater chance of 
Nasser backing away from his nationalization policy. Eisenhower did not think that there was 
any need to resort to force at that time and he wanted the diplomatic process to have the full 
participation of all those concerned.221  
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 Eisenhower treated this problem as a diplomatic conflict. It was not something that 
required the use of military force. He believed that the nations involved should be able to bring it 
to a close without any violence. He saw certain British actions, such as evacuating its civilian 
personnel, as provocative and thought it would precipitate a military response that would only 
serve to strengthen Nasser's appeal. Eisenhower told Eden that this crisis was improving Nasser's 
position in several areas where previously he was unpopular. The President felt that this was 
where the British and American positions started to diverge from each other. The British thought 
that force was the proper tool, given that Nasser was not bowing to their desire. However, 
Eisenhower wrote to Eden that neither he nor the American people thought that resorting to force 
was the proper way to resolve this problem.222 
 The letter to the Prime Minister continued by stating that Eisenhower did not see a 
possibility that using force would bring a positive result. If the dispute spurred military action, 
Eisenhower told Eden that Europe would not survive long without access to Middle Eastern oil 
imports. Any military conflict would, according to Eisenhower, bring together many of the 
neutral nations in Africa and Asia in opposition to the Free World. It would make Nasser a 
rallying point for anti-Western sentiment, which Eisenhower thought could last for decades. He 
ended this section of the letter by writing that only when there was a consensus among nations 
that their key interests required military action would he support such a decision.223 
 The differences between the United Kingdom and the United States concerning the Suez 
Canal Crisis were stark. Eden believed that the United Kingdom had to act in order to protect its 
interests in the region. However, these were not just issues of a financial nature. Egypt, for Eden 
and Britain, represented empire. If Nasser’s ploy succeeded it would show Britain’s weakness in 





projecting power to its colonial holdings and could possibly quicken other nascent independence 
movements. Eden, and Great Britain, wanted to manage the decolonization process. If he were 
unable to stop Nasser, then it might become impossible to create the commonwealth of former 
colonies that the Prime Minister hoped would be Britain’s post-colonial legacy.224 
 The post war British Empire was a shell of its Victorian apogee. Following World War II, 
many British colonies sought independence, chief among them was India. In the late 1940s and 
1950s maintaining its colonial presence was expensive. Although giving colonies independence 
allowed the British government to recoup some costs of maintaining large colonial police forces 
it also dealt a severe blow to the perception of Britain as a world power. The immediate post war 
period for Britain was one of compromise. The first task was to rebuild after years of conflict; 
the second task was to find a way to keep its relevance and position as a world power. Both 
would prove very difficult. 
 France also struggled in the post war period. The spread of nationalism through North 
Africa undermined French rule in the region. In Indochina, present day Vietnam, a communist 
movement led by Ho Chi Minh fought to separate that colony from Paris. Similarly to Britain, 
France had to rebuild from the destruction imposed on it from Nazi Germany. French leaders 
also wanted to remain relevant to world events and maintain France’s prewar position as a world 
power. Overcoming the malaise of defeat in World War II and decolonization would push 
French leaders, particularly de Gaulle, to demand recognition of France as a senior member of 
NATO. 
  For Eisenhower the nationalization crisis was not as big of a threat. He thought that an 
overreaction would only bring more problems and could possibly upset the balance of power in 
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the region in favor of the Soviet Union, which would have significant consequence in the global 
Cold War. The differences between the two interpretations of the ramifications of the 
nationalization crisis would become more pronounced as tensions increased between Britain, 
France, and Egypt.  
 Anthony Eden replied to Eisenhower's letter on 6 September 1956. In it, Eden restated his 
support for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. He stressed that the United Kingdom did see the 
diplomatic approach as the primary avenue to settle this dispute. Eden told Eisenhower that any 
preparations taken came from his experience in the anti-British riots in 1952 that killed a little 
more than a dozen British citizens. He replied to Eisenhower that he found any concern that the 
President had about the evacuation of civilians from the region unsettling. However, the letter 
changed in character when he discussed his view of the threat that Nasser posed in Egypt.225  
 In discussing Nasser’s threat to the United Kingdom, Eden recounted the concessions that 
the European community gave to Hitler in the 1930s. He compared Nasser's goals with those of 
Hitler, by claiming that Nasser’s move was analogous to the gradual expansion of Germany in 
the 1930s. Eden reminded Eisenhower that no European power resisted these moves in the 
interwar period because no one thought it proper to question what Hitler did inside his own 
territory or in those territories that acquiesced to his control.226 
 Comparing Nasser to Hitler was evidence of the dramatic difference in opinion of the 
threat posed by the nationalization of the Suez Canal. For Eden this was an issue that went far 
beyond access to the canal. It threatened the British ability to control the transformation of its 
empire into a commonwealth. If Eden failed, British colonial holdings could revolt and drag the 
United Kingdom further away from being a world power. Eden saw this as a test case for 





decolonization. If Eden and the United Kingdom were unable to stop Nasser it would prove to 
British colonies that the Empire was hollow. If the U.K. were successful, perhaps colonies or 
newly independent former colonies would still look to the commonwealth for direction. This 
would make Britain powerful on the international stage as the leader of a small-scale United 
Nations. If it failed and the Empire fractured into disassociated states, Britain would only have 
its own strength to leverage for international prestige. In the 1950s, with Britain still hurting 
from the social and economic costs of WWII as well as the psychological damages from the war, 
the crisis represented a way for the British imperialism to stem the tide of waning power. For 
Eisenhower, the crisis risked possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. The potential for 
trouble far outweighed any potential benefit for a controlled British imperial transformation. 
 Although Eisenhower hoped that the talks with Nasser would provide an acceptable 
solution for the British, this was not the case. In October of 1956, the British and French 
governments supported a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council that supported 
their positions and would authorize international control over the canal. This would put an end to 
Nasser’s hopes to nationalize the waterway. The British and French submitted this draft 
resolution for consideration to the United Nations Security Council. The hope was that if the 
Security Council authorized international control of the Suez, then it would make it more 
difficult for Nasser to get international support.227 
 John Foster Dulles met with the British and French foreign ministers about this proposed 
resolution on 5 October 1956. Dulles said that he wanted to make sure that he understood their 
position and they understood the U.S. position. He told the ministers that the American people 
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did not know what to make of French and British actions. He continued that he found it 
surprising that the two nations had submitted a draft to the United Nations in such a short time. 
Dulles told the ministers that when he left London only a few days before, he felt sure that 
neither Britain nor France would go to the U.N. Now there was a draft resolution prepared for 
the Security Council.228 
 The change in British and French diplomatic stances caught Dulles by surprise. The 
primary reason for this was the lack of communication between the British, French, and 
American governments concerning the Suez Crisis. As covered earlier, Prime Minister Eden 
believed that Nasser posed a significant threat to the future of the United Kingdom regarding its 
ability to transition its colonies into commonwealth member states. Eden’s regionally focused 
approach to the problem clashed with the global scope that Eisenhower used to interpret the 
crisis. This divergence made miscommunication and misunderstanding almost inevitable. 
Eisenhower made it clear in his correspondence to the Prime Minister that the preferable, and 
primary, solution was the multilateral conference of Suez Canal user nations. Only after that 
avenue failed would the United States support going to the United Nations. 
 The meeting between Dulles and the foreign ministers then turned to the motivation 
behind the potential Security Council resolution. The Secretary of State suggested that the intent 
behind the resolution was to offer cover for a future military strike that would force the issue of 
who controlled the Suez Canal. Dulles wanted to know why the French and British wanted to go 
to the Security Council so that the American government, specifically President Eisenhower, 
would at least understand why they submitted the resolution. He cautioned the two ministers that 
the U.S. and any other nation would not follow without knowing where the British and French 
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intended to lead them. The stakes were too high in this situation to allow for any unintended 
consequences.229 
 On 29 October 1956, Israel invaded the Suez Canal Zone. The Israelis invaded the Sinai 
in order to open the Straits of Tiran and stop Egypt’s blockade of Israeli shipping in the region. 
This military maneuver advanced to within 25 miles of the Suez Canal in the first day. 
Eisenhower’s initial reaction was to honor America’s commitment to prevent aggression in the 
region. He thought that “the United States was pledged to support the victim of an aggression in 
the Middle East. The only honorable course was to carry out that pledge.”230 Anthony Eden 
sent a letter to President Eisenhower on 30 October 1956, discussing the Suez conflict. Eden 
explained to Eisenhower that the Israeli invasion was in response to the Nasser's actions 
concerning the Suez and his belligerent attitude towards Israel. He told Eisenhower that when the 
British government received word of the movement of Israeli troops, Eden had cautioned Israel 
to ensure it did not move against Jordan. The Prime Minister wrote that this would infringe upon 
the British treaty with Jordan and Britain would have to support its treaty obligations. Eden 
implied that he did not know that Israel planned a military incursion into Egypt. However, he 
opened his letter saying that he did not hide his feelings that Britain had every right to defend its 
“vital interests” against Nasser's encroachment.231   
 Eisenhower responded to Eden on the same day. He related to Eden that the U.S. sent its 
ambassador to the U.N. to meet with the British representative in order hammer out a policy to 
mitigate Israel’s military action. However, the American ambassador did not receive a warm 
reception to this invitation of cooperation. Instead the British ambassador said his government 
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would not support any attempt to restrain Israel. Eisenhower told Eden that he did not know why 
the British government took such a stance and that this was quite a departure from what he 
expected from such a close ally.232 
 The letter to Anthony Eden continued with Eisenhower telling the British Prime Minister 
about the possible implications of the British support for Israeli military activities. If the French 
and British involved themselves in a regional war and the Egyptian government asked for help 
from the Soviet Union, it would put the United States in a very awkward position. If the United 
Nations determined Israel to be the aggressor and the Soviet Union intervened, the U.S. would 
then face the stark choice of abandoning its European and Israeli allies to a Soviet proxy war. 
Otherwise, Eisenhower would have to aid them in what would be a long conflict. If the Soviets 
became directly involved, Eisenhower wrote that the United States would be “confronted with a 
de facto situation that would make all our present troubles look puny indeed.”233 
  None of these scenarios boded well for the U.S. Engaging in a proxy war or a protracted 
limited war required the repudiation of the doctrine of Massive Retaliation and fighting a war 
similar to the Korean conflict. Fighting the Soviet Union directly would put Massive Retaliation 
to the ultimate test and would disclose whether or not America’s nuclear arsenal could stop a 
Soviet attack. Choosing any of these alternatives would force Eisenhower to abandon his hope of 
providing national security at an affordable price. Abandoning the British and French to a Soviet 
sponsored conflict, if that happened, would likewise further split the Western European alliance 
making it difficult for the U.S. to use NATO to defend against Soviet European incursion.  
 In a conversation on 30 October with Secretary Dulles, President Eisenhower voiced his 
frustrations with British actions. The Secretary of State told Eisenhower that he believed that 
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Eden was trying to force the United States to support them by “confront[ing] us with a de facto 
situation.” Dulles continued that although the British may recognize that their actions were 
“rash” they “would say that the U.S. could not sit by and let them go under economically.” 
Eisenhower replied that, “he did not see much value in an unworthy and unreliable ally and that 
the necessity to support them might not be as great as they believed.”234 
 In the conference, colonialism was also a topic of discussion. The President said that he 
thought that neither the French nor the British had proper “cause for war.” For Eisenhower, this 
was not a conflict about the Suez Canal. For the French, as Eisenhower interpreted the situation, 
it was about Algeria and for the British it was about their prestige in the Middle East. Dulles told 
Eisenhower that “he had been greatly worried for two or three years over our identification with 
countries pursuing colonial policies not compatible with our own.” The Secretary said that he 
recently told British and French officials as much and they did not respond well to his comments. 
Dulles cautioned the President about the possible expansion of the conflict. He reminded 
Eisenhower that the United States got involved in the previous World Wars, in some sense, in 
order to support its allies. The Secretary did not want this to happen with this conflict because 
America’s allies “might well be considered the aggressors in the eyes of the world.” 
Eisenhower’s main focus during the crisis was how to maintain the balance of power between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. Backing the U.K. and France, in a bid to secure their 
imperial holdings in the Middle East, did not further that goal.235 
 The military phase of the Suez Canal Crisis revealed the depth of the divergence between 
the U.S. and the U.K. concerning the need to take action against Nasser. Britain supported, and 
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secretly helped plan, the Israeli military operation. On 31 October, British and French airplanes 
launched air raids against Egyptian targets in the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal Zone. 
Eisenhower did not know that the British and French worked with Israel to plan and conduct a 
military campaign.236 
 Although the President was unsure of exactly what his allies were doing, he was 
suspicious. Secretary Dulles, in a telegram to the U.S. Ambassador in Paris on 29 October, 
related what Eisenhower’s reaction would be if the crisis became violent. He told Douglas 
Dillon, the U.S. ambassador, that military action would be a tremendous setback for European 
relations with the Middle East. This would allow the Soviet Union to increase its influence in the 
region. He also reminded the ambassador that the United States would not come to the aid of its 
allies in this situation, because they would be the instigators. Secretary Dulles’ remarks revealed 
Eisenhower’s laser-like focus on the global implications of the crisis. Britain’s regional or 
imperial concerns were not part of Eisenhower’s strategic calculus. This difference of perception 
made it very difficult for the two allies to share any common ground.  
 On 30 October 1956, the British and French governments issued a 12-hour ultimatum to 
Nasser and David Ben-Gurion. Both nations, according to the ultimatum, had to withdraw their 
forces from the Canal Zone and cease military actions. Of course, this would require the 
Egyptians to forfeit control of the Canal Zone to European occupation. This was unacceptable 
for Nasser and the ultimatum was only a pretense for the British and French to involve their 
forces in the war.237  
 In a phone conversation with John Foster Dulles on 30 October Eisenhower vented his 
frustrations about the British and French actions in the crisis. He said he could not believe that 
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the America’s allies expected the U.S. to offer some form of assistance. He continued, “They are 
our friends and allies, and suddenly they put us in a hole & expect us to rescue them.” 
Eisenhower told Dulles that he had no intention of considering military action to aid the military 
maneuvers against Egypt and was also cool to the idea of financial support for the operation.238  
 In a subsequent phone conversation between the Secretary of State and the President, 
Eisenhower and Dulles discussed the text of a public message about the invasion. The President 
said he wanted to express his distaste for the ultimatum that the French and British issued. 
Although Eisenhower felt that the U.S. had to issue the declaration to communicate that the 
nation did not support the ultimatum, he understood that neither the British nor the French would 
change their actions as a result. The declaration, Eisenhower knew, would also influence the 
perception of the Arab states. It would publicize the fact that the United States was not a part of 
the invasion.239 
 Eisenhower’s worried that if he did not communicate his lack of support for Britain and 
France then America’s image in the Middle East would suffer. If this damage occurred it meant 
that the U.S. would be surrendering ground to the Soviet Union in the region. He wanted to make 
it obvious that the United States did not condone Nasser’s action. The President, although he 
didn’t believe Nasser’s tactics were productive, saw no reason to forcefully impose the will of 
nations that were, until recently, imperial masters over the canal. 
 The Suez Crisis was not the only international conundrum Eisenhower faced in October 
of 1956. Adding to the international tensions, on 19 October, the Central Committee of the 
Polish United Workers’ Party ousted the Soviet supported Deputy Chairman of the Council of 
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Ministers Konstantin Rokossovsky. Rokossovky, a Marshal of the Soviet Union and a Marshal 
of Poland, was also the Polish defense minister. Although he was Polish by birth, many Poles 
considered him a Russian and looked at his leadership as proof of Soviet oppression. Nikita 
Khrushchev flew to Warsaw on 20 October to force Rokossovsky on the Polish people; they 
refused and maintained their support for Wladyslaw Gomulka, a Polish Communist leader. This 
unrest soon spread to other Eastern European satellites, notably Hungary.240 
 When news reached Hungary about the Polish uprising, many Hungarians took to the 
streets. They called for the removal of Soviet forces and the right to elect their own communist 
leaders. With the unrest continuing to grow, the Hungarian government invited Soviet forces into 
the nation in order provide security. However, this supposed security came with a heavy price. 
Days after the Soviet intervention there were reportedly over 5,000 dead. Eisenhower issued a 
statement on 25 October, decrying the Soviet action. He also said that the Hungarian people 
desired freedom and that Soviet actions only demonstrated the oppressive nature of the Soviet 
alliance.241  
 The Hungarian problem gave Eisenhower a quiver full of arrows to target Soviet 
imperialism and draw attention to the dangers of nations becoming too close to the socialist 
alliance. Making the most of this situation would allow the President to hopefully sway neutral 
nations away from Soviet influence and increase American prestige at the same time. However, 
the Suez Canal Crisis, especially the military action of Israel, France, and Britain, made it 
difficult to demonize Soviet actions too much when American allies were committing similar, 
although not as deadly, acts in the Middle East. Secretary Dulles relayed the President’s 
frustration in a phone call with Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson 
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on 30 October. Dulles told Pearson that the Hungarian situation was forcing the Soviet Union 
into “losing all credit;” however, due to the actions of U.S. allies the Secretary said “we [came] 
along with action as bad or worse.”242 Not only did the Suez Crisis clash with the global focus of 
Eisenhower’s strategic framework, it also detracted from his ability to make gains at the expense 
of the Soviet Union. 
 As the conflict continued Eisenhower again tried to influence the British and French 
Prime Ministers. On 30 October, in response to the ultimatum issued by both nations, President 
Eisenhower wrote to Eden and Mollet stating, “I feel I must urgently express to you my deep 
concern at the prospect of this drastic action even at the very time when the matter is under 
consideration as it is today by the United Nations Security Council. It is my sincere belief that 
peaceful processes can and should prevail to secure a solution which will restore the armistice 
condition as between Israel and Egypt and also justly settle the controversy with Egypt about the 
Suez Canal.”243 
 Eisenhower’s main concern was in keeping the conflict from expanding in scope. He also 
saw America’s credibility in the region at stake. Eisenhower intended to keep his commitment to 
protect any Middle Eastern nation from aggression. However, with America’s allies now the 
aggressors in the region; maintaining fidelity to this promise would stress the ties between 
Eisenhower, Eden, and Mollet. 
 Neither the Egyptian nor Israeli forces abided by the ultimatum; as a result, the British 
and French moved to reoccupy the canal. On 1 November, the British and French forces began 
bombing Egyptian targets in order to prepare for an invasion. By 3 November, the bombing 
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campaign destroyed the Egyptian air force. The destruction of the air assets allowed the ground 
phase of the operation to start sooner than planned. By 5 November, elements of the invasion 
force were on the ground in Egypt and had secured El Gamil airfield.  
 Eisenhower, though frustrated with the British action, still understood that eventually the 
Anglo-American alliance would return to good relations. In a letter written on 3 November to 
Lew Douglas, a personal friend, he discussed his understanding of the British actions. He told 
Mr. Douglas that he had “no intention of using the British Government as a whipping boy.” The 
President believed that their actions were “stupid” and that Eden and the British allowed their 
“distrust and hatred of Nasser to blind their judgment.” Eisenhower claimed that the British 
chose an inappropriate method to handle their problem. Eisenhower’s understanding of the long-
term value of the Anglo-American relationship was clear even in the middle of the military phase 
of the crisis. The President’s high regard for the U.S.-U.K. alliance, though strained through the 
crisis, would help repair the relationship after the conflict died down.244 
 Two days later, in a letter to Dr. Eli Ginzberg, a professor Eisenhower became acquainted 
with while President of Columbia University, the President connected the Suez Canal Crisis and 
the Hungarian rebellion. He told Dr. Ginzberg that he recently received a telegram from a 
Hungarian national who claimed that the uprising was going well until the Suez Crisis. 
Eisenhower’s Hungarian contact argued that the British, French, and Israeli actions “encouraged 
the Russians to come in and batter down the insurgents.” Eisenhower told Dr. Ginzberg that no 
international issue was “ever confined to the exact area in which it [was] physically located.” 
Eden focused on the Nasser’s impact on Britain’s immediate imperial transformation and its 
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long-term position on the international stage. Eisenhower looked to how this crisis, and its 
potential for expansion, affected the U.S. strategy of deterring war with the Soviet Union.245  
 The situation deteriorated further when the Soviet Union unsurprisingly chose to support 
Nasser. On 5 November, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin issued a statement that said that the 
Soviet Union would return peace to the region even if it required Soviet military intervention. 
This increased the morale of the Egyptian military and gave them renewed enthusiasm for the 
conflict. Bulganin also contacted President Eisenhower and recommended that the Soviet Union 
and the United States join forces to bring peace back to the region.246 
 The military action ended quickly after the Soviet offer to join with U.S. forces or, failing 
that, to intervene unilaterally. Eisenhower, on 5 November, worried that the Soviets were 
desperate and could possibly act as recklessly as Hitler did in the closing stages of World War 
II.247 The following day, 6 November Admiral Radford commented that Soviet intervention 
would likely come in form of air strikes, as the Soviet Union did not have much capability to 
deploy its forces so far away from its bases. Radford thought that this made any serious 
intervention by the Soviets improbable. However, a brief look at the geographic proximity of the 
USSR indicates that it was possible for the Soviets to intervene with ground forces. The map 
below shows how close the Soviet Union was to the battlefield.248 
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  249 
 On the date of the 1956 Presidential election, 6 November, the belligerents in the Suez 
Crisis agreed to a cease-fire. One of the first problems Eisenhower faced after the crisis was 
repairing the relations between the U.S. and its allies. Eisenhower told James Hagerty, his Press 
Secretary, and Admiral Radford that it was “very important to find a way of bringing about a 
rapprochement with the British.” Herbert Hoover Jr., Under Secretary of State, asked if the 
President wanted to contact the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet as well. Eisenhower declined 
to call the French premier instead he decided to send a cable. The President only decided to 
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contact Mollet after Hoover suggested that Eisenhower contact him because Mollet was certain 
to hear of the President’s phone call to Eden.250 
 In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Eisenhower first wanted to repair relation with 
Britain, France came as an afterthought. This was the likely path for events to take because of the 
close ties between the United Kingdom and the United States. Although Eisenhower did not 
agree with the Eden’s actions, the President understood that he could not sacrifice America’s 
closest alliance over the Suez Crisis. The fact that France did not receive the same focus on 
repairing its relations with America would have second and third order effects as Eisenhower 
brought the Anglo-American alliance back to its pre-Suez state. 
 While French and British actions were problematic in the Middle East, their participation 
in the defense of Western Europe was extremely important. Repairing the Anglo-American 
alliance would come much easier than those with France. Part of the process to repair U.S.-U.K. 
relationship was the Bermuda Conference held in March of 1957. This summit meeting gave 
President Eisenhower and the new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan a chance to ease the 
tensions between their two nations. One significant outcome of the discussion was the formation 
of an agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. concerning the transfer of IRBMs to Britain. 
Eisenhower believed the IRBMs to be of “signal importance to the defense of the Free World for 
the next several years.” He also described the conference as “by far the most successful 
international conference” since the meetings at the end of World War II.”251 
 This process did not start at the Bermuda Conference; there was discussion about the 
implications of this decision prior to the meeting. The talks concerning the transfer of IRBMs 
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began in early of 1957 and stirred up misgivings in the State Department. In a meeting between 
Defense Secretary Wilson and British Minister of Defense Sandys on 28 January 1957, the pair 
discussed guided missiles and decreased military expenditures. Both of these topics paralleled 
President Eisenhower’s plans for the American military forces deployed to protect West 
Germany. According to Sandys, Britain needed to relieve the fiscal pressures of keeping large 
forces in Germany. In order to achieve this reduction, it would need to remove approximately 
80,000 men from the British contingent. In addition to this, the British government proposed 
cutting its Second Tactical Air Force by almost 200 aircraft, from 466 to 220. Sandys finished 
the discussion by turning to the subject of guided missile cooperation between the U.S. and the 
U.K. He said that this area was an example of effective collaboration. He wanted to continue this 
beneficial relationship between the two governments and improve upon them.252 
 The following day, 29 January, Dulles and Sandys discussed the IRBM transfer 
agreement in more detail. Sandys told Dulles that the outlines of the potential agreement would 
give the British control over 4 squadrons of IRBMs with the nuclear warheads to remain in U.S. 
custody.  He continued by saying that the structure of the agreement was like the one concerning 
V bombers and nuclear warheads. The British owned and operated the delivery vehicle but did 
not have possession of the atomic weapons. However, if the British developed their own nuclear 
warheads they would retain ownership of the IRBMs, giving them a fully functioning nuclear 
ballistic missile weapon system.253 
 In reaction to the potential IRBM agreement between Britain and the U.S, Edwin Martin, 
the Alternate Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (the primary political 
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body in NATO), wrote a memorandum raising important questions about the implications of 
such an agreement. Martin wrote that the Defense Department representative, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development Richard Horner, did not wait for State 
Department approval before agreeing with the British memorandum outlining the potential 
agreement. Martin’s concern centered on the possible complications with giving the British such 
a powerful weapon system in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Canal Crisis. He cautioned 
that the agreement put forward would give them a free hand with the missiles.254 
 Martin also saw the early finalization of an IRBM agreement as giving up too much too 
soon in the rapprochement with the British. He advocated, in his memo, that agreeing prior to the 
Bermuda Conference prevented the U.S. from having the ability to communicate its policies at 
the highest levels and use these weapons for leverage with the British. He called the agreement 
to transfer the IRBMs to Britain key to the repairing of relations between the two nations. 
However, this meant that the U.S. should make the most of this opportunity and not squander it 
by agreeing to any proposal before it could garner the most successful terms.255 
 It was in the interests of both nations to improve their relationship. The question was how 
best to achieve this objective. The transfer of IRBMs would allow the British to have a 
sophisticated, although still not proven, guided missile capability. This was something that they 
currently lacked and did not want to commit financial resources to achieve.  
 President Eisenhower resolved the question of how to use the IRBMs in the Anglo-
American relationship when he declined to approve the British proposal concerning the 
agreement. Eisenhower did not think it appropriate to make a decision with American policy still 
at an early stage of development. Giving IRBMs to Britain was not an approved policy; it was 
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only a National Security Council proposal. Eisenhower did not want his deputies making 
commitments before he made the decision to endorse such a program. He wanted to be ready to 
discuss the matter at the Bermuda Conference in March and until then, he would not agree to any 
position concerning the transfer of IRBMs to Britain.256 
 During the Bermuda Conference President Eisenhower discussed the IRBM agreement 
with Macmillan. The transfer proposal and the discussions between Macmillan and Eisenhower 
provide insight into how these weapons worked to improve the nature of the Anglo-American 
alliance. The President formally introduced the agreement in the early stages of the conference to 
the Prime Minister and by the end of the summit meeting they had announced the acceptance of 
the framework. In the coming months, American and British diplomats would work together to 
hammer out the specifics of the agreement and start to put it into action.  
 One of the reservations President Eisenhower had about the agreement was the possibility 
that the accord would commit the U.S. to missile production before it was ready. In a 
conversation in the opening stages of the Bermuda Conference the President spoke with his 
advisors about the state of American IRBM technology. Secretary of the Air Force Donald 
Quarles told Eisenhower that the agreement would only commit America to produce missiles 
when both the U.S. and U.K. agreed that they had a viable weapon. After that decision, the U.S. 
controlled the scale and timeline of production, not Britain.257 
 On 22 March 1957 in Bermuda, Eisenhower made the official offer of guided missiles, 
IRBMs, to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The President told the Prime Minister that much of 
the specifics of the agreement would come later but he wanted to make the offer formally. 
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Eisenhower continued by stating that the weapons were still in development and perhaps the 
missiles given would not be IRBMs but something of the same capability but different name.258 
 Eisenhower told Macmillan that the four squadrons of missiles would be deployed under 
this agreement. Two of the squadrons would be under U.S. control, while the other two would be 
under British control. As part of the agreement, the United States could change the missiles in 
the future for improved versions; if it became necessary. Eisenhower did not want anything 
specifically said about the IRBMs at the time, he would only allow a general reference to guided 
missiles in the communiqué issued after the Conference. Eisenhower did not intend this program 
to become wide-spread when discussed at the Bermuda Conference. The agreement also made 
clear that the British would own two squadrons of missiles, although they would not own the 
warheads.259  
 Harold Macmillan asked the President when the missiles would be ready. Eisenhower 
replied that he could only give estimates. His best information, he told Macmillan, was that the 
first missiles would arrive in July 1958, the first squadron in June 1958, and the four squadrons 
would be operational by July 1960. Macmillan stated that this information would help the U.K. 
determine whether or not to continue its own research program for a long-range guided missile. 
If the missiles provided by the U.S. would fit British defense needs then the U.K. could put more 
emphasis on other defense assets. Macmillan would not have made such comments if he were 
not confident about his ability to control the use of these weapons for British needs. If the Prime 
Minister thought that the weapons deployed by the U.S. would only serve American interests, 
there would be no incentive to give up on researching a British missile. However, the promise of 
                                                 
258 United States Delegation to the Bermuda Conference, Memorandum of Conversation 22 March 1957, DDE 
Library, DDE Papers as President, Box 3, 2.(Hereafter Bermuda Conference 22 Mar 57 Meeting) 
259 Bermuda Conference Meeting 22 Mar 57, 3. 
160 
 
ownership of half of the planned IRBMs provided a strong guarantee that these weapons would 
serve British ends.260 
 The discussion of IRBMs shifted to limiting nuclear testing as a method of preventing 
nuclear proliferation. Macmillan told Eisenhower that he thought that the test ban was important 
to prevent other nations from getting nuclear weapons. Eisenhower agreed and said that the 
expansion of atomic weapons was problematic. Stopping the proliferation of these assets was 
something that both the Prime Minister and the President supported as an effort to ensure the 
nuclear club did not expand its membership. Of course, this meant excluding another important 
European ally, France.261 
 In the afternoon session on 22 March, the Prime Minister brought up the issue of the 
Western European Union (WEU) and the research and development of advanced weapons. The 
WEU was a group of seven European nations, including Britain and France that were also 
members of NATO. The WEU was a defense union, similar to NATO, but much more regionally 
focused. British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd assured Eisenhower that the WEU weapons 
development program would not involve nuclear matters. President Eisenhower agreed and said 
he wanted to “maintain the special relationship now existing between the U.S., Canada, and 
Britain” concerning nuclear technology.262 
 On the next day, 23 March 1957, the British Foreign Minister Lloyd and U.S. Secretary 
of State Dulles had a conversation about nuclear proliferation. The two diplomats discussed the 
French effort to manufacture nuclear weapons. If successful, it would make France the fourth 
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nation to have an atomic capability. Both ministers agreed that neither the British nor American 
governments should openly or discreetly support the French effort. However, they also could not 
openly condemn such an effort, since France was an ally.263 
 The U.S. accepted and supported improving an independent British nuclear capability, as 
displayed by the offer of IRBMs. The possibility that France would join the nuclear group of 
nations presented an opportunity to deploy guided missiles even closer to the Soviet Union. This 
benefit did not seem to outweigh the potential problems associated with an independent French 
nuclear deterrent.  
 The exclusion of France from the group of nuclear nations would cause problems in the 
European alliance in the near future. France didn’t detonate its own nuclear weapon until 1960. 
Its weapons program was independent of the United States and the United Kingdom. The 
agreement to limit the expansion of nuclear weapons excluded France from gaining a very 
important national security asset and prestige weapon, an independent nuclear deterrent.  
 Much of the problems between the United Kingdom and the United States concerning the 
Suez Crisis stemmed from the different strategic frameworks used by Eisenhower and Eden. The 
President measured the events, as well as the potential expansion, in terms of the global Cold 
War. Since his primary policy goal was avoiding a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, 
the nationalization of the Suez Canal was hardly worth fighting a nuclear war to reverse. This 
focus on the global context made it difficult for Eisenhower to support Eden and the British 
position concerning the canal.  
 Similarly, Prime Minister Anthony Eden did not approach the nationalization crisis from 
the same point of view as Eisenhower. Eden wanted to maintain control of the British 
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decolonization process; this required stopping Nasser from thumbing his nose in the face of 
British authority. Either, Eden stopped Nasser or he believed that the British Empire faced a 
rapid and uncontrolled collapse. While Eden did not want war, in the initial stages of the conflict, 
he did not feel that there were many other options that would affirm British prestige and power 
in the region as much as a show of force. The regionally focused concentration of his assessment 
meant that Eisenhower and Eden would have little common ground when discussing the threat 
posed by Nasser because each focused on different sets of ramifications of the Egyptian leader’s 
actions. However, the British well understood the potential threat of the Soviet Union and Soviet 
power. Their actions indicate that Eden did not believe that the Soviets would intervene, but it 
was a risk.  
 Although Eisenhower’s global concentration on the Cold War was part of the reason for 
the tensions between the two nations concerning the Suez Crisis, it would also be a large part of 
the rapprochement in the Anglo-American alliance. Even during the crisis, Eisenhower knew that 
he would have to work to reaffirm the U.S.-U.K. relationship because of its importance to 
defending Western Europe. His understanding of the Cold War was a doubled-edged sword for 
the United Kingdom; it could be detrimental in the short-term if the two nations approached an 
issue with divergent policies but in the long-term it would ensure that the relationship with 
America endured. This would not be the same case with France, especially with the rise of 
Charles de Gualle and his nationalistic aspirations for returning France to prominence both in the 
alliance and the world. 
 At the conclusion of the Bermuda Conference there was still much left to do to make the 
IRBM agreement a reality. The accord made clear that the alliance between the U.S. and the 
U.K. was improving. Eisenhower’s hesitation to support an independent French nuclear weapons 
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program expressed his concerns about the Franco-American alliance, especially when compared 
with the Anglo-American reaffirmed friendship. The work between American and British 
diplomats to make the IRBM deployment a reality manifested the improved relationship between 
the two nations. Similarly, the actions of President Eisenhower and his advisors concerning 
France, combined with the resistance of Charles De Gaulle, revealed that the relationship 










Chapter  5: A European Solution to an American Problem: 





On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite into orbit. 
While the United States had a space program at the time, it was not yet capable of launching a 
satellite. This was a technological as well as a propaganda victory for the Soviet Union. The 
long-term impact of the Sputnik launch provided the impetus for the creation of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as well as other federal programs to advance 
science and technology; however, the short-term impact was less dramatic. In the months after 
Sputnik, President Eisenhower evaluated the military and political impact of the Soviet 
accomplishment. He initially showed some concern about the military implications but the 
political ramifications soon became paramount. The Soviet satellite launch further reinforced the 
importance of the decision made early in 1957 to deploy IRBMs to Great Britain. This was a 
solution that answered domestic, not European, security concerns. 
 The United States satellite program at the time, Project Vanguard, did not plan for a 
payload as large as that of the Soviet Sputnik. Dr. Joseph Kaplan, head of the United States 
program for the International Geophysical Year, described the weight of the Soviet launch as 
incredible. Its 184 pound weight was over seven times as heavy as the projected 21 ½ pound 
American satellite. The American program lagged behind the Soviet program in terms of 
capability and results.264 
 Project Vanguard was not the only missile program capable of launching a satellite. The 
Army’s Jupiter program already showed that it was possible to use that launch vehicle and put a 
satellite into orbit but von Braun could not continue his research because of the bureaucratic 
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restrictions placed upon him by President Eisenhower’s decision to put control of the IRBM 
program in the hands of the Air Force.265 
 Another hurdle von Braun encountered was the resistance of the Vanguard project lead, 
John Hagen, to understand the urgency of the situation. Von Braun told astronomer John 
O’Keefe, who worked for the Army Engineer Corps, that von Braun was willing to “paint 
‘Vanguard’ right up the side of my rocket.” O’Keefe replied that the he did not think that Hagen 
worried much about getting into space first and this led to the lack urgency of the Vanguard 
program. Von Braun responded, “If that’s what he really thinks, will he for Christ’s sake get out 
of the way of the people who think it makes a hell of a lot of difference!”266 
 Von Braun did not speak out of hubris; his missile was indeed ready for launching a 
satellite. By the end of 1956, he had already achieved a height of six hundred miles; this was 
comparable to Sputnik’s orbit of five-hundred and fifty-nine miles above the earth.267 Von Braun 
again succeeded in achieving this altitude on 8 August 1957 when his team used a Jupiter C 
missile to test a redesigned nose cone. Von Braun had the ability to beat the Soviets but he did 
not have the blessing of the Air Force, which now controlled his missile program.  
 Eisenhower’s understanding of the importance of getting to space first resembled 
Hagen’s initially. Although he became frustrated when he realized that the United States had the 
capability to launch a satellite much earlier if it concentrated its resources on other rockets, prior 
to Sputnik, he did not want to risk involving military technology in order to assure a quick 
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launch. Eisenhower would change his mind in the wake of Sputnik, but it would take the 
realization that the American people worried about Sputnik much more than Eisenhower initially 
did.  
 The irony of the Sputnik situation was that it showed how advanced the Jupiter program 
was. After the Vanguard rocket failed to successfully launch a satellite, President Eisenhower 
gave his permission to use the Army’s Jupiter C to launch America’s first satellite, Juno I. The 
only change was the addition of a fourth active stage. Although von Braun and his Jupiter team 
clearly produced a superior missile, Eisenhower’s decision to give authority over IRBM 
production to the Air Force, the Jupiter was a first-rate program with second-class status. 
Another influence was Eisenhower’s resolution that the U.S. satellite program be free of military 
technology. This restriction was short-lived after the drama of the Soviet launch of Sputnik. 
 American scientists expected the Soviets to launch a satellite. They were unsure of when 
the U.S.S.R. would do so, but had little doubt that Soviet scientists were working on the same 
project as American scientists. One reason for the lack of American urgency was the different 
point of view of those in charge of the Vanguard program. Rear Admiral Rawson Bennet, who 
worked for the Office of Naval Research, the organization in charge of America’s satellite 
program, said he did not think that his program was in competition with the Soviet Union. He 
believed that the Vanguard Project would not change its schedule to have an earlier launch 
date.268 
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 President Eisenhower’s reaction to the launch at first was unimpressive. He and his senior 
administration officials did not understand the importance of the Soviet accomplishment. 
Eisenhower did not see it as a security risk, at least initially. Of course he had the benefit of U2 
photo reconnaissance to prove to himself that the launch of the satellite and a Soviet ICBM were 
unrelated. The problem was that he could not communicate this intelligence to the American 
people without divulging how he attained it.269 
 Although Eisenhower did not put much stock in the Soviet achievement, the American 
people did. In a Gallop poll taken in in the week following Sputnik, the majority of respondents 
said that they believed that the Soviet Union was ahead of the U.S. in the development of 
missiles and long distance rockets. 270 Also, in November of 1957, fifty-three percent of the 
respondents said that they believed that defense policies should change.271 The majority 
American people did not agree with the initial interpretation of Eisenhower and his 
administration, they wanted action and saw this as a security issue. Many Americans did not 
agree with Eisenhower when he said that there was nothing “significant in that development 
[Sputnik] as far as security is concerned.”272 
 Eisenhower would change his initial reaction to the Soviet launch and by the end of the 
year; he would call for the expansion of the deployment of IRBMs to Western European. He 
intended this deployment to answer both the domestic security concerns as a result of Sputnik 
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and an attempt to change the nature of America’s security commitment to its NATO allies. This 
plan would have significant ramifications with U.S. allies particularly Britain and France.  
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, William Holaday, commented on his 
understanding of the successful Soviet satellite launch. He believed that the Soviets spent an 
abundance of time and resources in order to beat the U.S. into space. He did not think that 
Vanguard, which he termed an open project, was such a rushed program. His comments implied 
that the American scientific community did not think that the Sputnik launch was a remarkable 
scientific advancement. They felt that it was something they were capable of doing but just did 
not have the same timeline as the Soviet program.273 
 However, the American scientists’ reaction was not the only response to the Soviet 
launch. President Eisenhower understood that the U.S. government had to react to this as well. 
Eisenhower asked, in one of the first discussions of the launch on 8 October 1957, what the 
capabilities of the satellite were. He wondered if it had the ability to communicate any 
information in its signal. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles said that the satellite 
could transmit its location according to what the Soviets said publicly about the satellite. 
However, Dr. Alan Waterman, director of the National Science Foundation, said that the Sputnik 
signal did have some modulation. However, he could not say whether this was by accident or 
was some attempt to code the communication from the satellite.274 
 Eisenhower did have some initial concerns about the satellite and what its capabilities 
were. The scientific achievement of launching a satellite into space was not his first worry. 
                                                 
273 Special to the New York Times, 1-2 
274 Andrew Goodpaster, “Memo of Conference with President on 8 October 1957”,  DDE Library, DDE Diary 
Series, Box 27, Folder Staff Notes Oct 57 (2)hereafter (Memo of conference with the President 8 OCT 57), 2. 
170 
 
Rather, it was the fact that the Soviets had a body orbiting above the U.S. and it was 
continuously sending a signal to the world that gave him pause. Eisenhower questioned what the 
Soviets could do with their new satellite. 
 Eisenhower did not want to make any drastic changes in reaction to the Soviet success for 
fear of giving the Soviets too much credit. In the conference about the launch on 8 October, the 
talk turned to whether or not the United States should reorganize or speed up its launch program 
in order to get some surveillance vehicle quickly into orbit. Sherman Adams, Eisenhower’s Chief 
of Staff, said that, in his opinion, the administration should not approach this project in a rushed 
manner. He said that the U.S. “had never though of this as a crash program, as the Russians 
apparently did.” Adams characterized it as a project intended to “develop and transmit scientific 
knowledge.” Adams stated that the Soviets conducted their program in a hurried way with the 
goal of beating the United States. Eisenhower asked those present to think ahead five years and 
tell him what the U.S. would have in terms of surveillance capacity. Secretary Donald Quarles 
said that that Air Force had a research program with this as the end state.275 
 Sherman Adams’ statements about the desire to altruistically transmit knowledge did not 
tell the entire story. Of course, there were issues of prestige involved, even if President 
Eisenhower did not see this as a serious problem, for the American people the Soviets proved 
their superiority in guided missiles. This would continue to affect Eisenhower’s handling of the 
fallout of the launch through the rest of the 1957. 
 Eisenhower’s questions, in his conversation with his Chief of Staff and other 
administration officials on 8 October, relayed his concerns about the Soviet capacity to make 
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some military use of their space program. However, he did not want to take dramatic action. Any 
quick changes in policies or programs from the United States would suggest that the Americans 
felt some threat from the new Soviet capability. Eisenhower did not want to give this impression 
and so chose not to discuss any radical alterations in the direction of America’s research 
programs at that time. 
 The Sputnik launch was not all bad news. President Eisenhower believed that the Soviets 
had in fact contributed to the freedom of orbital space with their satellite. He called this launch a 
“good turn” because the satellite was in “orbital space… which the missile is making an 
inoffensive passage.” Eisenhower felt that Sputnik orbited in international space and so no nation 
could take action against it. He continued that this was an unintentional benefit of the Sputnik 
launch.276   
 The conversation then turned to what the United States had at that time that could launch 
a satellite into orbit. Secretary Quarles said that the Army’s Redstone missile, which was 
undergoing a modernization program, was capable of launching a satellite. The Secretary stated 
“there was no doubt that the Redstone, had it been used, could have orbited a satellite a year or 
more ago.” The Redstone missile, which was a tactical missile, had a range of 200 miles. The 
Jupiter missile was part of the Redstone family.  However, it was capable of space flight, with 
some modifications. NASA combined a Jupiter missile for the first stage of the booster. The first 
sub-orbital flights by NASA used Mercury-Redstone boosters.277 
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However, the U.S. did not take advantage of its military missile programs because the 
Scientific Advisory Council, chaired by Dr. James Killian, recommended that the U.S. not mix 
military and civilian research programs. Secretary Quarles continued that the council thought 
that this would make the peaceful intentions of the American program clear to the international 
community. Also, since the project involved international scientists, any military technology 
used posed greater security risks and would inhibit the cooperative spirit of the program. 
President Eisenhower cautioned that members of Congress would wonder why the U.S. did not 
try to launch a satellite sooner, since it clearly had the capability. He then stated that he did not 
think that the date of launching a satellite was as important as ensuring that international 
scientists had the opportunity to gain from the American program.278 
 The Soviet launch did not interrupt Eisenhower’s efforts to rein in spending. In a Cabinet 
meeting on 11 October 1957, the Cabinet talked about how to cut the defense budget from the 
fiscal year 1957 high of $43 billion. Secretary Quarles presented information about the personnel 
reductions planned for the fiscal year 1958, which began in October of 1957. He said that the 
first quarter reductions accomplished 20 percent of the yearly goal.279 
 Eisenhower, in the immediate aftermath of the Sputnik launch, did not radically change 
his perception of the security situation. It did not invalidate America’s strategic manned bomber 
force nor did it require a quick change of emphasis to replace manned aircraft with guided 
missiles. Following the discussion of personnel cuts the Cabinet then talked about Congressional 
cuts in defense spending. The President said that the legislature appropriations were below what 
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the administration asked for. Eisenhower stated that the Defense department had to continue to 
pursue missiles as well as maintain manned aircraft. He still thought that the goals he entered 
office with in 1952, decreasing defense spending with new technology, were still viable and 
worth striving for.280  
 Eisenhower pushed the Cabinet to focus on the long-term economic viability of the 
nation. He did not want to sacrifice the strength of the U.S. economy to the U.S.S.R., although 
there were significant defense issues that the nation had to face. Ideally, Eisenhower said, he 
wanted to have a surplus in the budget in order to reduce taxes in the event of an economic 
slump in the coming year. If he were able to do this, he thought it would have a “psychological 
value.”281 
 President Eisenhower actually thought he would have to resist pressure from Congress to 
increase defense spending in the coming year. He told his Cabinet that the administration had to 
ensure that it defused new legislative initiatives to increase defense spending in light of Sputnik. 
Eisenhower recommended to his Cabinet officers that the administration submit a budget that 
contained “the costs of those programs which the Administration wished to carry and excluded 
those it was forced by Congress to carry.” This would show what Eisenhower wanted to focus 
his fiscal resources on and make clear to the legislators how the administration intended to 
proceed. If Congress increased defense spending it would make it difficult for him to maintain 
the defense spending ceiling of $38 billion he wanted.282  
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If Eisenhower saw Sputnik as an immediate threat to the nation it did not come through in 
his plans to resist the predicted reactionary Congressional demands he thought would be a 
product of the Soviet launch. This is not to say that he did not think that the United States should 
not have some reaction to the launch. Eisenhower simply did not see as much as a security threat 
in the period immediately following Sputnik.  
 Another reason for Eisenhower’s relative calm after the launch was the U-2 spy plane. 
This aircraft had the ability to fly over Soviet territory and take photos of missile sites. The 
program became operational in 1956. Eisenhower understood more about Soviet capabilities than 
he could publicly disclose. If he let the American people know what the U-2 program uncovered 
then the Soviets would know what U.S. intelligence capabilities were.283 
 Eisenhower had access to information about the Soviet missile capability. He understood, 
although not with perfect clarity, that the Soviet capability was not far superior to that of the 
United States and in many cases was equal or inferior to America’s capabilities. This 
information, however, was still classified. This was one of the reasons why Eisenhower’s 
reaction to the Sputnik launch seemed so out of touch with the general public’s reaction. He did 
not see it as much of a security concern because he had a more accurate assessment of what the 
Soviets were capable of, most Americans did not. This disconnect would soon force 
Eisenhower’s hand into expediting the deployment of IRBMs to Western Europe.284 
                                                 
283 Dwight D. Eisenhower. The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1955-1961.  (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 
483. 
284 “CIA Collection Activities against the Soviet Guided Missile Program” 
[Includes Attachment], Top Secret Chess; Eider, Memorandum, Excised Copy, January 16, 1958, 3 pp. From the 
Digital National Security Archives, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CHN01009 (accessed 28 Jun 12). 
175 
 
 In a meeting outside of the Cabinet meeting on the same day, 11 October, the President 
discussed missile research with Secretary of Defense McElroy. Eisenhower wanted to make sure 
that the first priority of the IRBM program was to have an effective missile test. He wanted a 
missile that hit its intended target and reached the prescribed range. Concerns such as how to 
deploy the missile or which service it would eventually fall under were of lesser importance to 
him. The President also suggested that there should be a fourth service, apart from the Army, Air 
Force, or Navy that would control missile functions. He thought that this would prevent many of 
the service rivalries that he said detracted from the important work being done on guided 
missiles.285 
 Eisenhower’s suggestion about creating a fourth service never materialized. However, it 
did make clear how serious he was about maintaining a focus on guided missiles. He thought that 
having individual services control such important weapons programs divided both the branches 
of the military and their resources. In the aftermath of Sputnik, guided missiles were still 
important and the IRBM program represented one of the more successful programs. Although 
the IRBM project, both the Jupiter and Thor variants, had successful test launches they had yet to 
have full-scale test flights that checked their guidance systems and the ability of the missile to 
transport a payload to the proper range.  
 Sputnik caused several discussions immediately following the launch; however, there 
were other issues that Eisenhower faced. One problem was the relationship between the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In preparation for a visit from the British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, the President and the Secretary of State talked about what to bring up during the 
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visit. Although Sputnik was not part of the conversation, nuclear issues were a topic of 
conversation. The influence of the Sputnik launch came through in the discussion about the close 
relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. Specifically, the IRBM issue, which would be a 
central part of the planned meeting.  
 Secretary of State Dulles discussed the diplomatic problems that faced the United States 
in its policies in Western Europe and NATO. He said that the changing character of warfare in 
the nuclear age made America’s allies want atomic weapons. Dulles told Eisenhower that since 
the U.S. was clearly telling its allies that these types of weapons were increasingly becoming part 
of the conventional spectrum of available military weapons, it would be more difficult to prevent 
or discourage U.S. allies from attaining them. Dulles wanted to close the agreement concerning 
the deployment of IRBMs to the U.K. and then work on extending it to other nations. He thought 
that the U.S. presented its allies with an unacceptable situation, that nuclear weapons, 
specifically IRBMs, were going to be a major part of the defense plan for Western Europe yet 
they could not have these weapons for their own defense.286 
 The influence of Sputnik made the deployment of IRBMs for the defense of Western 
Europe even more important. These missiles, although already planned to deploy to Britain in 
1959, took on a new urgency after the launch of the Soviet satellite. They represented the only 
American long-range missile capable of targeting that Soviet Union with a sufficiently large 
warhead but they required European bases for this plan to work.  
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 During the discussion, Eisenhower voiced his hopes that the U.S. and U.K. could work 
more closely together on defense issues. He also stressed the fact that the Americans and the 
British were the only nations in the alliance with nuclear weapons. Eisenhower said that this was 
one reason why the two nations should collaborate, in order to help the whole alliance. Dulles 
cautioned the President about making close cooperation between the two nations too prominent 
at the risk of alienating America’s other NATO alliances. This tension between the Anglo-
American relationship and its affect on the NATO alliance as a whole continued to be a problem 
as the deployment of IRBMs came to fruition. 287 
 Secretary Dulles proceeded to discuss what he felt were the British intentions for this 
visit. He said that the Prime Minister hoped to solidify the relationship between the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Dulles thought that this was potentially problematic; since such 
an affirmation could upset relations with some of America’s other European allies, if Eisenhower 
made it obvious how unique the relationship between the two nations were. The President, in 
contrast, hoped to communicate to the American people the importance of IRBMs in the nation’s 
security as well as in the security of its allies. He also wanted to make it clear to the American 
public that the U.S. would not be able to continue to deny these weapons to its allies in 
NATO.288 
 Eisenhower wanted to use the British deployment and subsequent European deployments 
of IRBMs to reassure the American public of its safety in the missile age. The Soviets 
demonstrated with Sputnik that they had the ability to launch a missile that could reach the U.S. 
Eisenhower knew that the U.S. did not have such a capability but IRBMs offered the same 
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capacity with bases in Western Europe. This fit with the emphasis of the New Look defense 
policy’s focus on decreasing defense spending by concentrating resources on technologically 
sophisticated but less manpower intensive solutions to defense issues. It also fit with President 
Eisenhower’s understanding of warfare in the atomic age; these weapons provided the strategic 
deterrent that would prevent Soviet military incursions into Western Europe. 
 The next day, 23 October, Eisenhower received a memo from Bernard Baruch, a close 
personal friend and advisor to the President, concerning the domestic impact of the Sputnik 
launch. Baruch wrote that the American people worried about the security implications of the 
Soviet satellite. However, he also thought that this would put the American people in a position 
to support defense measures intended to restore the balance between American and Soviet 
military capabilities. Baruch told Eisenhower that he must make sure that Secretary of Defense 
McElroy drove the missile program ferociously. He compared the need for dedication in missile 
research to the need for rubber in World War II. He wrote that if it were necessary the 
“impossible” had to become possible with this program.289 
 The press release that followed the Bermuda Conference in 1957 stated that the United 
States would give guided missiles to Great Britain. It did not specify exactly what type of missile 
would be a part of this agreement. Although the IRBMs were not clearly described in the 
agreement it was no secret that they would become part of the deal when the missiles became 
operational.290  
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 President Eisenhower said with enthusiasm that he felt that the American position should 
not get too bogged down in legal niceties. He said that one of the important aspects of an alliance 
was the confidence each nation had in the other. If the U.S. did not engage in a “liberal 
exchange” of information then he did not think they were living up to the spirit of the alliance. 
He hoped that the new agreement would resemble the Quebec Agreement that defined the 
Anglo-American cooperation in nuclear matters during World War II. Specifically, he said that 
each side “should be able to expect to receive whatever the other has.”291 
 This meeting did not set any specific policy. However, Eisenhower made his views on the 
matter clear. If the U.S. worried too much about the legal minutia of such an agreement it would 
destroy the very thing that such an agreement was supposed to create, a healthy spirit of 
cooperation between the two nations. The relationship with the British was clearly important to 
Eisenhower. Although Secretary Dulles previously counseled against becoming too close to the 
British because of the risk of alienation of the other NATO allies, Eisenhower still felt that there 
was much benefit in renewing a special relationship with the United Kingdom. This close 
alliance would include significant sharing of atomic information, if Eisenhower got his way.  
 The British alliance was not the only important issue discussed in the wake of Sputnik. In 
a conference concerning NATO, on 26 October, the former U.S. representative to the 
organization Ambassador George Perkins conveyed the member nations’ concerns about the 
security of Western Europe. Perkins said that many European nations worried about the 
decreasing presence of American soldiers. They believed that this was a sign of America’s lack 
of commitment to the alliance. They feared that as the U.S. and the Soviet Union approached an 
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atomic stalemate the U.S. would be less willing to engage the Soviets in combat. Eisenhower 
countered that the U.S. forces in Europe at the time were more powerful than before. He said that 
he entered office with the idea of using smaller but more powerful military formations. This 
increased firepower would come from innovations like the IRBM and other tactical nuclear 
weapons. The President referenced the new pentomic divisions deployed to Europe that, while 
smaller, had more striking power than a traditional division. Eisenhower then vented his 
frustrations with the U.S. budgetary process. He said it was troubling that military forces 
manifested themselves only in terms of manpower and not in actual strength. American divisions 
did not decrease but the new formations had less men assigned.292 
 This consternation about how to measure military power was something that Eisenhower 
faced throughout his implementation of the New Look defense policy. He believed that military 
formations under his administration were more effective because of their ability to rely on atomic 
weapons. Eisenhower also worried, as shown above, that many would only concentrated on the 
total number of soldiers in a military unit and then use that figure alone to calculate the fighting 
power on the battlefield. Eisenhower preferred to relate military power “on the basis of units and 
their combat power.”293 This was indicative of a fundamental problem of how to measure 
combat power. A missile unit was much more powerful than the sum of its individual soldiers. 
The President did not see his policy as weakening any military formation. Rather, his New Look 
program provided these formations the ability to defeat Soviet forces for less cost. This would 
prove a hard sell to the New Look’s critics both at home and abroad. 
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 The discussion then turned to atomic weapons and their role in future conflicts between 
the Soviets and the NATO alliance. Ambassador Perkins said that the European nations worried 
about the staying power of American forces in Europe. Eisenhower said “we never agreed to 
station ground forces permanently in Europe.” However, he also understood that the U.S. had a 
commitment to provide a guarantee that it would act to protect NATO from Soviet advances, 
which he would honor as long he was in office. He continued by saying that the atomic 
capability of American forces was part of that guarantee. Eisenhower wanted “no doubt as long 
as he [held] his present responsibilities. Atomic weapons would be used in case of attack.” 
American forces represented the U.S. guarantee to protect Europe, no matter how small the 
actual number of troops present.294 
 NATO integration also came up in the discussion. Eisenhower did not think it was 
profitable for each nation to work for a self-contained force. Instead, NATO should operate as a 
consolidated whole. This approach allowed for greater efficiency in using resources and would 
stop the waste of each nation duplicating efforts in fielding similar forces.295 
 The problem with this idea was that it asked NATO nations to do something that the 
American and British governments were unwilling to do, stop pursuing advanced weapons, 
particularly atomic weapons. The view that NATO nations should accept the American and 
British atomic monopoly as beneficial was problematic. It also demonstrated that the special 
relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. interfered with NATO relations as a whole. The U.S. 
wanted to offer an atomic umbrella to protect NATO. However, this protection would come at 
the cost of abandoning an independent atomic program, unless that nation was the United 
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Kingdom. There were clearly two levels of membership in NATO, atomic members and those 
nations not part of the atomic club. 
 Sputnik, while not directly discussed in this conversation, was still important. The 
American public worried about the security implications of the Soviet launch. However, for 
European nations the main concern was the presence of American troops and the promise that 
they represented. Western European nations lived under the threat of Soviet missile, bomber, and 
ground forces assault, so Sputnik did not radically alter their perception of security. Getting more 
nuclear weapons to Western Europe was part of Eisenhower’s response to NATO member states 
worries but it did not directly address their primary concern, American ground forces continued 
presence in the region. Deploying nuclear capable guided missiles targeted the domestic security 
concerns of American citizens. Unfortunately, this did not alleviate the main concern of 
America’s NATO allies who lived under the threat of a Soviet invasion. Sputnik sent two 
different messages one to the American people and another to the Western European public.  
 The subject of force cuts came up again two days later, 28 October 1957, in a discussion 
concerning NATO. Eisenhower understood that the U.S. could not drastically reduce its 
manpower in Western Europe. It had to slowly and cautiously reduce troop strength and ensure 
that its allies agreed, or at least didn’t object to, these cuts. The President said that the cuts would 
not decrease the 5 divisions and 4 regiments currently stationed in theater. However, the cuts 
would reduce headquarters units. Also, with the addition of missiles, much of the American 
tactical air units could redeploy to the United States. These cuts would not decrease the fighting 
power of its forces in NATO, according to Eisenhower. He also understood the importance of 
allowing General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to determine where these 
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cuts would come from. The Defense Department would give him the details of the cuts but he 
would make these cuts a reality.296 
 On 29 October, the President discussed the possibility of a Soviet ICBM with Dr. Isidor 
Rabi, a Noble Laureate and professor of physics at Columbia University, where President 
Eisenhower previously served as president. Dr. Rabi said that the Soviets would have an ICBM 
soon, as well as a warhead for such a weapon. The conversation also covered whether or not the 
U.S. should push to halt nuclear testing. Dr. Rabi said that the time to stop testing was prior to 
the Soviet Union’s detonation of its thermonuclear device; however, this occurred in 1953. He 
said that if the U.S. continued to test new weapons and allowed the Soviet Union to do so also it 
meant that the U.S. would improve its nuclear arsenal as well as the Soviets.297 
 Eisenhower faced two problems, how to keep American defense costs down and how to 
ensure American superiority in weapons technology. These would prove to be two contradictory 
goals that would pull him in competing directions. The Soviet Union would continue to make 
advances as long as the U.S. continued to test nuclear weapons. However, if Eisenhower 
abandoned nuclear weapons testing it would not allow him to base an increasingly large part of 
America’s defense on a nuclear arsenal that was equivalent to the Soviet Union’s. Conventional 
forces would then have to take on a more important role in defending the nation and its allies, 
this meant increasing ground forces and spending more money. Alternatively, Eisenhower could 
choose to assume more risk and not increase conventional forces and assume that the Soviets 
would not attack.  
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Although European security was important, it was one of many competing interests that 
the President dealt with in the immediate aftermath of Sputnik. The subject of America launching 
a satellite came up again on 30 October, 1957. Eisenhower expressed frustration at the 
suggestion of adding the Jupiter rocket to the Vanguard program in order to launch a satellite 
sooner than the Vanguard program would be able to do alone. Although the President agreed 
with the recommendation, he reminded the Secretary of Defense that he had suggested the same 
thing 18 months prior. However, at that time, the Department of Defense, then under Charles 
Wilson, counseled against such a combination of civilian and military programs. The current 
Secretary, Neil McElroy, agreed that combining the programs meant that it would transform the 
nature of Vanguard; it would no longer be a purely civilian program.298  
 This represented a change not only in schedule of an American satellite launch but also a 
change in the necessity to keep such a program purely civilian and open. The Soviet advance, 
although not publicly admitted, did have an influence on the decision to accelerate the American 
satellite program. Secretary McElroy saw a way to prevent such a jarring change in the public 
sphere by announcing the addition of Jupiter as a secondary option for launching an American 
satellite. However, this secondary option would become the launch vehicle for the first American 
satellite on 31 January 1958.299 
 The American military response to Sputnik relied on IRBMs, principally the Army’s 
Jupiter program. This weapon system was capable of carrying a satellite into orbit before the 
civilian booster was ready. This proved the success of the Army’s rocket development, which 
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was largely a result of its service’s capitalization of German scientists such as Wernher von 
Braun. Although the launch of an American satellite did not directly influence the Western 
European security situation, it did announce to the American public that the Soviet Union’s lead 
in the space race was not insurmountable. 
 One issue that the Soviet success brought closer to home was the damage of a nuclear 
attack. President Eisenhower and his administration already started planning for such an event 
prior to October of 1957 but Sputnik gave such efforts more relevance. In a conference on 4 
November 1957 the members of the Gaither Committee presented their findings to the President. 
Formed in April of 1957, this committee had the task of assessing the destruction of a Soviet 
atomic strike in terms of nuclear fallout and blast damage. Several members of the advisory 
panel came to the conference to discuss their findings with the President; these members were 
retired military officers, elite businessmen, and university faculty. 
 The conversation also included the committee’s estimates of how the Soviet threat would 
develop in the future and what they thought the nation should do to stop it. The group said to the 
President that they believed that the nature of the Soviet threat came from the growing military 
might of the Soviet Union, in terms of their technology. They advocated that “the peril to the 
United States must be measured in mega-tonnage in the years ahead.” This view meshed well 
with Eisenhower’s perception of modern warfare. It also downplayed the ability of the Soviet 
Union to call up much larger number of soldiers than the United States. While putting the threat 
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purely in terms of atomic yield made it more dramatic, it also framed the problem in terms of a 
conflict that the United States could win, at least in the mid-1950s.300 
 Unstated in this discussion was what the U.S. would actually win if it were victorious in a 
general atomic war with the Soviet Union. After a large nuclear barrage, especially one that 
contained hydrogen bombs, there would be massive destruction in both human lives and social 
infrastructure. Depending on the number of missiles and bombers unleashed there would be 
catastrophic damage to major population centers on both sides and those who did not die in the 
initial attack would have to struggle with the radioactive fallout and reconstruction. Such a 
victory could well be pyrrhic.  
Sputnik, in Eisenhower’s view, did not immediately upset the strategic balance of power 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said, in the conference with the Gaither Committee 
members, that strategic bombers would still be the key to America’s nuclear superiority over the 
Soviets. However, after five years, this would change and, without significant effort, America 
would fall behind the Soviet Union. The President saw his main duty in the next five years as 
convincing the American people of the importance of continuing to make the required effort to 
stay ahead of the Soviets. This education had to focus on the specific technological and scientific 
necessities to defeat or, at least, stay ahead of the Soviet Union.301 
 Throughout his time as President, Eisenhower continued to focus on the long-term 
security problems of the United States. His understanding of how to fight war in the atomic age 
required establishing a far reaching program of innovation and advances in order to reform 
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America’s military into a force ready to fight on the nuclear battlefield. The launch of Sputnik 
did not alter his thinking concerning the importance of advanced weapons and strategic force 
projection in America’s defenses. If anything, it actually made these elements more important 
since Americans saw this as a direct threat to the continental United States.  
 The committee told Eisenhower that they expected casualties of close to 50% in a Soviet 
ICBM strike on the U.S. They did not think that the American deterrent force was adequate to 
prevent a Soviet ICBM attack. The committee recommended deploying IRBM in 1959 in order 
to have some type of deterrent to the expected Soviet ICBM threat that would come online that 
year.302 
 The President replied that he thought that group overstated the U.S. vulnerabilities in 
some areas. He felt that the Soviet Union was at a disadvantage because of its central position, in 
relation to the United States and the free world. The free world, Eisenhower said, held the 
peripheral positions and this allowed it to disperse its strategic weapons yet concentrate them on 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not have the same advantage. Eisenhower said he still 
thought that the policy of Massive Retaliation should be the basis of U.S. and NATO defense 
strategy.303 
 Although Sputnik exposed the Soviet Union’s recent advances in its ability to project 
power strategically. This new capability did not cause the President to question his policy of 
Massive Retaliation to deter Soviet aggression. Although the Gaither Committee reported that 
the U.S. could fall behind the Soviet Union and was still vulnerable in many aspects, Eisenhower 
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maintained his conviction that America’s defense forces continued to pose a significant threat, at 
least for the time being, to the Soviet Union. Sputnik demonstrated the U.S. deficiencies in its 
missile program. From the beginning of his administration, Eisenhower wanted to focus on 
missile development. Sputnik did put more focus on the IRBM program in two ways. First, by 
developing a viable weapons system the U.S. would relieve the necessity for large ground units. 
This would help Eisenhower in reducing defense costs. Secondly, a successful IRBM program, 
Eisenhower hoped, would also instill confidence in the American people about the ability of their 
military to prevent or counter an attack by Soviet missiles. This second issue was a concern that 
Eisenhower’s advisers told him existed but did not have much real evidence to back up the claim 
that the American public cared much about the progress of their nation’s guided missile program. 
 The successes and failures of the American missile program were not secret. Several days 
after Sputnik, The New York Times ran an article discussing recent advances that the U.S. missile 
projects made. It also discussed the reason why the Secretary of Defense still wanted two 
different missiles fielded and researched. Although the specifics of each program remained 
classified, successful test firing and range estimation did not receive the same secrecy.304  
 In a meeting on 6 November, the President met with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the Secretary of Defense. Eisenhower said that his three previous conferences that day 
convinced him that the U.S. citizens had great concern about their security because of the rivalry 
between the services. Eisenhower said he thought “that out people now believe the services are 
more interested in the struggle with each other than against an outside foe. He said the people in 
Defense must give their heart to national interests and welfare.” The President thought that the 
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security problems facing the U.S. were also part of the problem not only the inter service rivalry. 
He cautioned that the correct response to Sputnik was a measured one, neither too strong nor too 
weak. Eisenhower reminded the chiefs that their main consideration should be on a joint national 
defense against the Soviet Union, not in ensuring the best conditions for their particular 
service.305 
 Although Eisenhower said that he worried about the concerns that the American public 
had about inter-service rivalry the only evidence he had of such a problem was from those within 
the administration. There is little evidence that the American public worried about the struggles 
between the military services. However, Eisenhower’s overall concern was that this inter-service 
rivalry would prevent the services from effectively cooperating to provide the national defense. 
The doubts he had about the unity of America’s military affected his relationship with service 
Chiefs of Staff, especially those who were not sufficiently supportive of the President’s agenda 
such as the Army Chief of Staff General Taylor.  
 The nature of America’s retaliatory forces, and by implication, the ability of the U.S. 
military to protect it was the subject of a conference following a National Security Council 
meeting on 7 November 1957. This conference dealt with the ability of the U.S. Air Force’s 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) to adequately scramble its planes in response to an early warning 
of an impending Soviet attack. Robert Sprague, advisor to the NSC on continental defense 
issues, gave the findings of the report to the President and select members of the NSC as well as 
the leadership from the Air Force. Sprague said he calculated that the Soviet Union needed 
approximately 240 aircraft to hit all of America’s 60 counter-attack positions. He said that the 
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Soviets had more than enough aircraft available for this type of operation. The problem with 
America’s response forces was the concentration of Soviet air-defense assets at the proposed 
Soviet targets. He said that the U.S. could launch up to 150 counterstrike weapons. However, due 
to the integrated and effective nature of Soviet air-defenses this meant that the Air Force could 
not guarantee the effectiveness of an American counter-strike.306 
 Sprague continued that SAC’s other major problem was the inability to quickly get its 
aircraft in the air. He said that during a surprise inspection he found that SAC could not get any 
of its planes in the air within 6 hours, excluding those already in the air for testing purposes. Of 
course, any aircraft in flight at the time of an attack would not necessarily have the required 
weapons loaded or fuel capacity to be part of an effective counter-attack.307 
Another concern Sprague had was the lack of overseas deployment of American strategic 
assets. He said that his information did not reveal any significant presence of American strategic 
bombers outside the continental U.S. Any overseas base was only a post-strike base, meaning 
that after the planes launched their initial counterattack, they would use these bases to land, refit 
and refuel. However, while on the ground at these bases, American planes would be vulnerable 
due to a lack of effective radar facilities to detect a Soviet attack on overseas bases.308 
 As Sprague made clear, there were significant problems with the U.S. ability to launch a 
counter-attack from American soil. The IRBM program, with its focus on European deployment, 
would alleviate some of these issues. IRBMs deployed to Europe would provide a relatively 
quick and ready response force to a Soviet attack. Such a deployment would answer both the 
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domestic and international security concerns raised as a result of the Sputnik launch. IRBMs 
would provide a remedy for the inability of the U.S. military to adequately deter a Soviet attack 
on the continental United States as well as address the significant amount of money that the 
nation spent defending its Western European allies.  
 Eisenhower, in a letter to his close friend Swede Hazlett, written on 18 November 1957, 
commented on the fears he felt the American people held concerning Sputnik and the Soviet 
Union. He wrote that Americans worried about the supposed superiority of the Soviet Union. 
One problem Eisenhower identified in the letter was his inability to publicly speak about many 
of the things that would reduce Americans concerns.309 
 Eisenhower did not want to publicly discuss many of the coming advances in American 
military technology. Although this would give him some political relief from charges of his 
inaction in the wake of Sputnik, he did not think it was prudent to tip his hand to the Soviets. 
That was the burden of the Commander-in-Chief, he knew many secrets but if he used them for 
his short-term political gain he could endanger the future security of the United States. 
Eisenhower, of course, had the benefit of this crisis coming during his second term, so he did not 
have to face the problem of running on his record. However, this does not discount the fact that 
he showed great restraint in keeping intelligence secrets that would have made it easier to 
counter his critics who claimed he did not act forcefully enough to defend the United States. 
 This concern for public perception came up again during a phone call with Secretary of 
Defense Secretary McElroy concerning funding for guided missiles and the anti-missile weapon 
                                                 




system. Eisenhower thought the new figures were too high. He thought that the American people 
would infer that previous efforts were not enough, if the programs required such a dramatic 
increase in funding in the wake Soviet advances. The President also said that his science advisors 
related to him that the problem was not merely money and that significantly more money would 
not necessarily solve the technical problems facing these programs. The Defense Secretary 
countered that if the U.S. intended to deploy these weapons to its European allies, as well to the 
British, the budgets for missiles would have to increase dramatically.310 This increased pressure 
for missiles in Europe came again the next day during a conversation with the Secretary of State. 
The President said that he had several people telling him that both the State and Defense 
Departments wanted to put missiles in Europe more quickly. Dulles agreed with the President 
that there was a need to speed up the planned deployment of guided missiles to Europe.311 
 IRBMs and ICBMs, at their inception, represented a way to reduce expenditures on 
costly ground forces. However, as the Secretary McElroy’s concerns revealed, this was not true 
by the end of the decade. These weapons required significant outlays in defense spending and the 
administration was unable to fully realize its reductions in ground forces because of the political 
reasons discussed earlier. By 1957, the United States spent $11.8 billion on military missile 
research and production, at a time when the entire defense budget was $45 billion. This would be 
the equivalent of 90 billion in 2010 inflation adjusted dollars.312However, Eisenhower could not 
change the paradigm of the New Look national security strategy because he spent too much 
political effort defining America’s position in terms of technological advances relative to the 
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Soviet Union. It would also go against his understanding of what the U.S. needed to do in order 
to succeed in preventing war and, if necessary, fighting a successful war in the atomic age. 
 The President presented more formal plans for advancing the deployment of IRBMs to 
Europe in a bi-partisan Congressional meeting on 3 December 1957, held at the White House. 
Secretary Dulles outlined 4 important points that the administration would present at the next 
NATO meeting. The first was an atomic stockpile that would be under the control of Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), an American four-star general. No nuclear warheads 
would change hands but it would require the transfer of some nuclear capable weapons for 
training NATO forces. Dulles did not think that this required a change in the McMahon Act and 
he referenced a JCS report that outlined their justification for the program and why it fell in line 
with the current legislation.313 
 The second issue that Dulles spoke about was the expanded program to offer IRBMs to 
all NATO nations that wanted them. This program, Dulles explained, was in accord with what 
the administration agreed to with the British at the Bermuda Conference earlier in the summer. It 
would require that the nations that wanted IRBMs to make the preparations, mainly to build the 
infrastructure to support the missiles, in order for the U.S. to agree to deploy them. The third 
issue brought up was the scientific research program, which would make a cooperative research 
initiative in order to make the most of the physical and intellectual resources in Europe for 
atomic research. This research would benefit every NATO member state and would be open to 
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all of them. However, this nuclear research would not transfer any nuclear weapons technology; 
its intent was peaceful research and not to expand the number of nations with atomic weapons.314 
 The final program discussed intended to improve the NATO nation’s ability to 
manufacture “advanced weapons.” This would not include the nuclear warheads of the weapons 
but just the actual delivery system or other conventional component of the weapon system. 
NATO nations would still rely on the U.S. for providing and authorizing the use of nuclear 
warheads, since by law the U.S. could not allow other nations to control American nuclear 
weapons.315 
 These programs focused on NATO as a whole. However, the superior position of Britain 
became clear later in the discussion concerning nuclear weapons cooperation. Director of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss, told the Congressional delegation that the U.S. 
would not give away its most secret atomic designs. However, he did say that the administration 
may seek to change the legislation to allow this in some specific issues. One issue he wanted 
dealt with under an amendment was the acquisition of plutonium for France. This would allow 
President Eisenhower to offer some assistance to René Coty, the President of France, without 
giving the French concrete support in building a nuclear weapon. More importantly, Strauss said 
that the administration would seek an amendment to allow for more collaboration between the 
U.S, U.K, and Canada. This change would not apply to any other nations. This demonstrated that 
the effect of the Bermuda Conference on the strained relationship between the United States and 
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the United Kingdom. The special alliance continued and it influenced atomic cooperation 
between the two nations.316 
 Strauss explained why Eisenhower wanted to improve the atomic cooperation between 
the British and the Americans. He told the legislators that the two nations’ combined atomic 
stockpile greatly exceeded that of the Soviet Union. However, the lack of formal cooperation 
meant that both nations duplicated certain efforts. In order to make this relationship more 
effective and make the combined stockpile more efficient, the administration needed some 
legislative changes.317  
 One of the final issues discussed was the influence of Sputnik on the defense budget. 
Secretary McElroy said that the launch did cause the administration to reassess the nature of its 
budget allocations. He continued that although the actual expenditures increased, in order to 
accommodate increased research and production of missiles. These increases would allow an 
eventual reduction in ground forces. He reminded the delegation that they should not think of the 
power of America’s military only in terms of the number of soldiers. Rather, increased 
sophistication and striking power provided by new weapons would provide the same defense 
capability as older force structures.318  
 At the end of the 1957, in the wake of Sputnik, Eisenhower still favored atomic weapons 
and that the paradigm of nuclear warfare as the dominant form of future wars was still foremost 
in the President’s security plans. In light of Sputnik, defense spending increased but, as Secretary 
McElroy explained, Eisenhower continued to believe that this would allow future decreases in 
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defense spending. In the wake of the Soviet launch America’s allies became more important. The 
IRBM program expanded to include any willing NATO nation and not just the U.K. However, 
the program extended to NATO nations would place the missiles inside European nations 
without the concessions concerning the control of the missiles that the British government 
received. This would answer the domestic security concerns that Sputnik raised as well as 
provide an opportunity for the President to restructure America’s defense commitment to 
Western Europe.  
 President Eisenhower, in the aftermath of Sputnik, did not take dramatic action. He 
realized that many Americans perceived the Soviet advances as proof in the inadequacy of the 
U.S. in the technology and military power. However, he did not act rashly. Rather, Eisenhower 
chose to advance the only viable atomic weapons program that fit his understanding of what 
modern warfare would be, the IRBM. It was the only missile system the U.S. had available that 
had some hope of being ready relatively soon. It also had the range to attack targets deep inside 
the Soviet Union. The problem would be getting these weapons ready for deployment and in 





















  In October of 1957, General Norstad went to the United Kingdom to play golf. This was 
not just a pleasure trip, he had a serious mission to accomplish while there. He needed to meet 
with the British minister of Defense, Duncan Sandys, to discuss the reduction of British NATO 
forces. The United Kingdom in the late 1950s wanted to reduce its foot print in Europe in order 
to save on defense costs. Norstad, who had been fighting the British ground force decrease since 
its inception a year earlier, came prepared to negotiate. He offered to work out a 3-year deal 
between Britain and West Germany to defray some of the costs of the British presence in 
Germany.319 
 Unfortunately, Norstad’s combined golf and diplomatic trip did not bear fruit. On the 
same day he traveled to the UK to discuss stopping the force cuts, the British Permanent 
Representative to the North Atlantic Council met with Henri Spaak, the Secretary General 
Designate of NATO, to talk about the withdrawal of more forces from NATO. This phase of the 
reduction would compromise 13,500 British troops. The British representative made it clear that 
the United Kingdom was not going to “contemplate any Deutschemark funds after March 31, 
1958 for maintenance” of British forces based in Germany. Norstad’s mission was dead in the 
water; he failed before he ever left.320 
 Britain, after World War II, had to find a way to balance its fiscal constraints and its 
defense capabilities. This problem continued to plague the United Kingdom throughout the 
1950s. The British government wanted to develop a larger nuclear deterrent but could not do so 
if it had to maintain a large ground force. Also, with the dissolution of the empire, the economic 
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situation of the British government continued to decline, making it more difficult to reconcile the 
competing interest of supporting NATO forces in Europe and providing a nuclear deterrent.  
 However, Britain had made some progress in its attempt to create a viable nuclear 
deterrent. Harold Macmillan secured the agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. to deploy 
Thor IRBMs to Britain. This would allow Macmillan to stop duplicating efforts in researching 
and creating a long-range ballistic missile that the United States already developed.  
 According the press releases in the United States and Britain, the first Thor arrived in 
Britain on 29 August 1958 and four months later the first of the four IRBM bases in Britain was 
operational. This was optimistic assessment of the IRBM program and British facilities. When 
the U.S.-U.K. command announced that the facility was ready to launch they did not admit that 
this process would require Douglas engineers to participate because of the lack of trained and 
ready airmen. Also the announcement did not disclose that the chances of a warhead hitting its 
intended target were little better than 50 percent. Defense Secretary McElroy demanded that the 
Thor be ready by the end of 1958 and he was successful, although not as much as the public 
announcement implied.321  
 Getting the missiles to Britain was just as problematic as getting them ready to launch. 
The pilots transporting the missiles had to alter their descent in order to control the expansion of 
the Thor’s fuel tanks due to the pressure changes. Also the inertial guidance system were so 
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sensitive that technicians had to fly with them to monitor the temperature and power supply to 
the units to ensure that the flight did not damage them.322  
 Once on the ground the problems did not stop. Moving missiles through the United 
Kingdom was not an easy task. Trying to do it covertly was even more problematic. Although 
the specific sites of the future bases were secret, other information leaked out. Flight magazine 
released drawings of the facilities and equipment used to launch the missiles. In order to curtail 
espionage, the U.K. restricted the movement of Soviet diplomats but not those of other Eastern 
European nations. In addition to the concern of ground espionage, aerial reconnaissance was 
another weakness. Although far from conclusive, there were more coincidental navigation errors 
by Soviet airliners flying over the launch sites during construction.323 
 Project Emily, the name of the operation to deploy Thor IRBMs to Britain, had two major 
objectives, to affect a rapprochement between the U.S. and the U.K. and to redress the security 
imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the wake of the launch of Sputnik. 
Deploying IRBMs to Britain required Eisenhower and his administration to resolve serious 
problems concerning national sovereignty, control of nuclear warheads, and how to authorize the 
use of such weapons. Unfortunately, few of these solutions would be relevant when Eisenhower 
decided to expand the scope of the deployment beyond Britain to include all willing NATO 
member states. 
After the Suez Crisis, the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom 
suffered strains. Also put under stress during the crisis was the alliance between France and the 
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U.S. The Bermuda Conference in 1957 did much to restore the relationship between the U.S. and 
the U.K. However, notably absent from the conference was France.  
 During the conference, President Eisenhower made an offer to deploy IRBMs to Britain. 
Under this agreement the British would own two squadrons each equipped with 15 missiles but 
the U.S. would maintain ownership of the warheads. Also offered was an expansion of Anglo-
American cooperation in field of nuclear weapons research.  
In response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik, President Eisenhower offered IRBMs to 
NATO as a whole. However, the character of the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the 
U.K. was fundamentally different from the subsequent NATO agreement offered to the alliance. 
The Anglo-American agreement was outside of the NATO framework; it was purely a joint 
agreement between two nations each with independent nuclear arsenals. The other NATO 
agreements proposed by the U.S. were bilateral but still fell under NATO authority. 
 Two reasons for Eisenhower’s offer of IRBMs to Britain revealed the differences 
between nations in the NATO alliance. One was that Britain already had its own nuclear 
weapons program. The other was the affinity that Eisenhower had for the British and the Anglo-
American alliance. These two issues allowed Britain to become first among equals in the NATO 
alliance, relative to the other European nations. 
 Of course the Anglo-American alliance in World War II had a significant impact on 
Eisenhower’s appreciation of the importance of the United Kingdom. However, the Suez Canal 
Crisis, while it did not threaten to end the two nations’ cooperation, put the relationship between 
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the two under a great deal of stress. The offer of IRBMs was part of the process to repair the 
tension that the canal crisis created.  
Britain, as the only other nation in NATO to have its own nuclear capability, saw the 
New Look defense policy framework as a viable path forward for balancing its security and 
fiscal needs. As Britain continued to define security in terms of nuclear power it sought to 
separate itself and the U.S. into the top tier of the NATO alliance. The unique bilateral 
agreement concerning IRBMs that the British and Americans agreed to supported this position. 
Eisenhower’s conception of warfare in the atomic age and the New Look defense policy 
influenced Macmillan’s defense policy and his government’s white papers outlining British 
defense programs. 
 The Anglo-American IRBM agreement was one factor in the reconciliation between the 
U.S. and U.K. after the Suez Crisis, but it also created a two-tier alliance inside of NATO. The 
two nations with independent nuclear weapons occupied the first-tier of member states. Those 
nations without an independent nuclear capacity found themselves relegated to the bottom tier of 
the alliance. They had to accept the offer of IRBMs under NATO or not receive any IRBMs in 
their nation at all, which for some nations was not a problem. 
 In order to understand why Britain agreed to accept Eisenhower’s offer of long-range 
guided missiles in 1957 it is important to know how nuclear weapons fit in the British national 
defense plan. In April of 1957, a month after the Bermuda conference, the British government 
published a white paper discussing how it intended to use these weapons. One of the key 
concerns in the white paper was limiting the British contribution to European defense. British 
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leaders, as outlined in the paper, understood that the security of the United Kingdom and 
Western Europe required cooperation.324 
 The white paper laid out the close association between Britain and its allies; it also 
discussed how Britain intended to fulfill its commitments to defending Western Europe. In the 
paper, the British would reduce their troop commitments by approximately 10,000 soldiers. 
Nuclear artillery provided to the remaining units would make up for this reduced combat power. 
The British implied that though they were withdrawing some fighting units they were not 
withdrawing any real combat power. Nuclear weapons would balance any reductions in 
manpower levels. This argument was similar to one that President Eisenhower made concerning 
his New Look security policy.325 
 According to the British policy paper, the United States protected Western Europe and 
other American allies through its nuclear deterrent. Britain, at the time, was unable to match the 
U.S. in quantity or quality of nuclear weapons. However, the white paper declared that it was 
important to the British government that it maintain an independent nuclear deterrent, although a 
considerably smaller one than that of the U.S. In the near future, according to the paper, the 
British would test their first thermonuclear weapon and so join the U.S. and the Soviet Union as 
the only nations in the world with that capability. Britain made good on this promise and tested 
its first thermonuclear weapon in May of 1957, declaring it was a first-rate atomic power.326 
 This focus on nuclear weapons was similar to that of the New Look defense policy. 
President Eisenhower’s defense program put the brunt of the burden of national defense on 
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nuclear weapons. So when Eisenhower offered IRBMs to Prime Minister Macmillan it meshed 
easily with the British need for a robust nuclear deterrent. The independence of Britain’s nuclear 
force was unique in Western Europe. Eisenhower’s offer of IRBMs did not challenge this 
independence. In fact, it would strengthen Britain’s position by allowing it to own the missiles 
and possibly fit their own warheads to them in the future. This would cause significant problems 
with expanding the IRBM program to the rest of NATO because of the different terms offered to 
other member states.  
 One of the final sections of the white paper discusses cooperation with the United States 
on weapons programs, specifically guided missiles. It referenced an agreement signed in 1953 as 
the framework for this cooperation. However, this agreement was not as generous as the one 
codified in 1959 between the U.S. and the U.K.327 This later agreement implied that there were 
two-tiers to NATO membership, nations with nuclear weapons and those without them. The 
deployment of IRBMs to Britain, initially, and to Western Europe, later on, brought tension 
between the Anglo-American part of the alliance and France.328 
 In December of 1957, in conjunction with the NATO heads of government meeting, the 
U.S. created a working paper to determine its position on a joint decision making process for 
using nuclear weapons. The staff group stated that the U.S. position concerning the use of 
nuclear weapons was that they were a vital part of NATO’s defense plans. In their paper, the 
group wrote that a nuclear attack would not always allow for a timely discussion of how to 
respond. If there were time to coordinate a response to such an event, the U.S, according to the 
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group, would collaborate with other NATO nations prior to any action. If this were not possible, 
the U.S. would then make its decision unilaterally and convey it to its allies at the soonest 
possible time after the retaliation occurred.329 
 From the opening of the working group paper it was clear that the U.S. did not intend to 
sacrifice the initiative in a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. If time did not permit for 
communication with its allies, the U.S. would act first and then seek approval after the fact. 
America’s nuclear arsenal gave it the ability to dictate such stark terms to its allies. Member 
nations in NATO, especially those without their own nuclear deterrent, had little ability to deny 
the protection of America’s atomic umbrella. They had to accept the terms that the U.S. offered 
because the cost, in both fiscal and political terms, of creating an independent nuclear arsenal 
was prohibitive and the majority of nations in the alliance could not afford to embark on such an 
expensive adventure, nor did the U.S. want them to develop independent programs. 
 One aspect of having joint possession of nuclear weapons, as the IRBM agreement would 
create, was having a joint decision making process in their use. One issue that the paper brought 
up was the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. The closeness of this relationship 
was not a secret in NATO.  However, the U.S. did not have a similarly intimate relationship with 
any other nation in NATO at the time.330  
 Expanding the relationship between the British and the Americans to include other 
NATO nations would make using nuclear weapons problematic. A nuclear attack launched from 
a joint base or using a jointly owned weapon required the approval of both member nations. If 
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this type of agreement expanded to include all NATO nations, the working group argued that it 
would be impossible to launch an atomic attack in a timely fashion. Under such an arrangement, 
one veto could derail a quick response. The working group advocated that the U.S. adopt a 
position that would cement individual agreements between nations in NATO. This would avoid 
the problem of having one nation using a veto to prevent a retaliatory response launched from 
another nation. Each of these individual agreements would still fall under NATO and 
SACEUR.331 
 A proposal discussed at the heads of government meeting that December was the concept 
of a NATO atomic stockpile. The stockpile would put atomic weapons in Western Europe under 
NATO control. However, the decision to release warheads for military action would come solely 
from the United States, since it would provide the atomic weapons to the stockpile. This meant 
that U.S. General Lauris Norstad, NATO Supreme Command, would be in control of the entire 
NATO nuclear arsenal. President Eisenhower, as Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
military, would have the authority to withhold such weapons, even if the other member nations 
disagreed. The working group stated that Eisenhower should make clear America’s willingness 
to use atomic weapons and its trustworthiness to be the sole provider of NATO’s atomic 
retaliatory capability.332 
 The exception to this would be the United Kingdom. Since the British maintained their 
own nuclear arsenal, the U.S. had no ability to stop them from using it as they saw fit. However, 
if the United Kingdom used nuclear weapons without American approval it would doubtless pay 
a heavy political price. This exception to unilateral use did not include any joint weapons 
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systems, such as the proposed IRBMs. At this time the U.K. had a fleet of strategic bombers and 
a newly tested thermonuclear warhead; it was a first-class atomic power in quality, although not 
quantity. 
 Nuclear testing was another area of tension within the alliance and the world during this 
period. The deployment of IRBMs was one way that President Eisenhower sought to reduce the 
Soviet threat to the United States. Suspending nuclear testing would provide another avenue to 
stop the arms race and at least maintain a manageable status quo in the Cold War, in term of 
atomic capacity. Prime Minister MacMillan expressed his doubts about the efficacy of such a 
course of action in January of 1958. 
 He wrote to Eisenhower in January of 1958 to make his case against such a plan. He 
explained that such a ban would not serve British interests. The British could only support such a 
course of action if the United States were willing to alter its legislation to allow for the transfer 
of knowledge to the United Kingdom. Macmillan’s concern for supporting a test ban was to limit 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations. Only if the U.S. offered its knowledge, 
would the sacrifice of improving British weapons be worth knowing that other nations would be 
unable to attain such devices. Proliferation continued to be a major concern for the Prime 
Minister and his government concerning American nuclear policy.333 
 Another problem that Macmillan had with the test ban treaty was the possibility that it 
could lead to a ban on nuclear weapons entirely. He did not think that this was a viable solution. 
Macmillan reminded Eisenhower that the Soviet Union had a large surplus of manpower 
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compared to the nations of Western Europe and the U.S. The Prime Minister wrote, “I would 
frankly fear a situation in which the Russians kept great armies and a huge submarine fleet easily 
mobilized and the West was deprived of our ready defense, the nuclear deterrent. You know as 
well as I do that neither the new world, nor the old, could permanently keep arms of a 
conventional kind to meet this kind of attack.”334 
 Although the combined manpower of the NATO alliance was comparable to the Soviet 
Union the perception by Western leaders, as evidenced by Macmillan and Eisenhower, was that 
it would be ruinous to try to match the Soviets in conventional weapons. This perception 
reinforced the need to rely on nuclear weapons to correct the assumed disparity between the 
West and the Soviet Union military power. One problem with this was that it put nuclear 
weapons on a pedestal and made them prestige weapons. They were not only one aspect of 
national defense; they were the weapon that allowed the West to avoid complete militarization of 
society in order to maintain parity with the Soviet Union. Of course, there were some who did 
not ascribe to this theory; General Maxwell Taylor did not think that the overreliance on nuclear 
weapons was the right policy choice. However, he was unable to have much influence over 
national defense policy until President Kennedy brought him in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.  
 As a report to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan later that year 
explained, the decision to launch jointly held atomic weapons would be between the two nations 
exclusively. In this report there was no mention of any NATO control for atomic weapons jointly 
controlled by the two nations. The President and Prime Minister would have to personally speak 




to each other in order to authorize a nuclear attack. This report did not include any weapons held 
by the U.S. outside the United Kingdom. It only included Royal Air Force medium bombers 
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, R.A.F. IRBMs under the bilateral agreement, and any 
American Strategic Air Command forces in the U.K.335 
 Expanding the IRBM deployment to all willing NATO nations would increase the force 
projection of the United States and improve the deterrence to Soviet attacks targeting Western 
Europe. One problem with the evolution of the program to include other nations was the 
relatively primitive nature of the Thor and Jupiter missiles offered. In a telegram from Armory 
Houghton, the American ambassador to France, he expressed several doubts that General 
Norstad had concerning the current state of IRBM development. Houghton wrote that new 
developments in the missile field would soon make the current IRBM systems obsolete. 
According to him, Norstad did not recommend increasing the scope of the deployment of first 
generation IRBMs too broadly because of the technological advances planned in the near 
future.336 
 First generation IRBMs suffered from accuracy problems and took a relatively long time 
to prepare for launch. If the warheads were not already fixed to the missile bodies the required 
for launch increased dramatically. If the warheads were on the weapons, the missiles still had 
quite a lengthy process to prepare for firing. It included rolling back the shelter, raising the 
missile, starting the guidance system, loading target data, fuelling the missile, transition 
electronics to missile power source, and finally authenticating the launch codes. In order to fully 
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prepare a missile for action the entire process took approximately one to two days. Several 
missiles remained on a 30-minute readiness status for emergencies. The complete launch 
sequence, not counting previous preparation to bring the missile to its ready state took fifteen 
minutes.337 
 These complications did not stop the British from accepting the offer of these weapons. 
The proposed deployment of IRBMs to Britain also came with the offer of technical cooperation 
in the field of guided missiles as well as atomic weapons research. This would take longer to 
cement because of the legislative hurdles but it made the IRBMs problems, such as its liquid 
fuelled engines and long readiness time, less of an issue. Other NATO nations would not receive 
assurances of future cooperation in weapons research, primarily because of nonproliferation 
concerns. The two-tier NATO alliance determined which nations benefitted the most from the 
expansion of the American nuclear umbrella in Western Europe. It would make Britain more 
powerful, in relation to other non nuclear member states. 
 The United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), 
Frank Roberts, discussed the agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. concerning IRBMs in his 
statement about the upcoming British defense white paper to be published in February of 1958. 
The NAC was the senior political body inside of NATO. He told the council that the agreement 
between the two nations would be complete soon. He then alluded to the possibility that Britain 
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would develop its own IRBM system. This demonstrated the importance of American 
cooperation in the field of missile development.338 
 The promise of IRBMs, although they were of the liquid fuelled type, provided some 
breathing room for the British government. Having the missile under British control would also 
provide their scientists the ability to research and learn from them. Ambassador Roberts 
communicated to the council the British desire to maintain proficiency in the nuclear field. 
Eisenhower’s New Look defense policy influenced British planning for national defense, as the 
white paper of April 1957, “Defence: An Outline for Future Policy”, implied by putting more 
emphasis on atomic weapons and deemphasizing the importance of ground troops. 
Roberts attempted to defuse some the criticism about Britain’s withdrawal of soldiers 
from NATO defense forces by stating that the majority of the United Kingdom’s defense 
allocations still supported conventional forces. However, Roberts told the council that strategic 
deterrent forces were the “decisive factor” in stopping a war with the Soviet Union. Although the 
British still supported conventional forces, if strategic weapons were the critical element in 
preventing a global war, it detracted from the assurances about the importance of the 
conventional forces.339  
One reason Roberts gave for the necessity of nuclear weapons was the overwhelming 
superiority of Soviet manpower in relation to that of NATO. Conventional forces, according to 
Roberts, could only hold the line until a nuclear retaliatory strike stopped a Soviet advance. 
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Without a large nuclear arsenal, there was little hope for the U.K. and its allies to defeat the 
Soviet Union in a future force-on-force conflict.340 
 Again, this undercut Roberts’ assertion of the importance of ground forces in the defense 
of Western Europe. If the role of conventional troops was simply to hold the line until nuclear 
weapons stopped the Soviet horde in its tracks, then it would be increasingly distasteful for the 
British to commit their ground forces to such a mission. If Britain had the ability to substitute 
nuclear armed units, with fewer soldiers, in lieu of large conventional ground forces, there was 
little reason not to. Indeed, that was the rational for the substitutions and withdrawals outlined in 
the previous white paper of April 1957. 
 Although Roberts tried to dampen concerns about the British withdrawals, the white 
paper he referenced did little to allay such fears. The white paper discussed the British view of 
the proper alignment of responsibility in manning the defenses of Western Europe. According to 
the United Kingdom each nation should contribute its most effective assets to the consolidated 
defense of NATO. Instead of trying to have each member nation contribute similar forces and 
then create a unified force out of the disparate units. The U.K, in the white paper, proposed 
assigning specific areas of contribution to each nation according to its capability. This would 
provide a more efficient way to create a defense force for Western Europe, according to the 
British.341 
 Of course, if the British proposal became NATO policy it would allow the British to shift 
the burden of providing conventional forces to other member states. This would further cement 
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the two-tier element of the alliance. This would mean that the two nuclear powers in the alliance 
could dictate to the rest of the alliance their contributions to the defense of Western Europe. It 
would also put the United Kingdom in the same position as the United States. After the Suez 
Crisis, Britain’s role on the international stage was diminishing. Redefining its contribution to 
NATO to focus on strategic weapons would increase the prestige of the United Kingdom and 
allow it to decrease defense spending as well. 
The effect of the Soviet launch of its artificial satellite, Sputnik, also received mention in 
the white paper of February 1958. It referenced the satellite but stated that its advent did not 
upset the status quo. The white paper cited the guided missile capability of the United States as 
well as its strategic bomber force in deterring a Soviet attack. The benefit of missile attacks, 
according to the white paper, was that no effective counter to stop such an assault existed. The 
white paper implied that the most important part of the defense of NATO came from nuclear 
weapons, supplied mainly from the United States.342 
In fact the white paper endorsed the use of nuclear weapons for preventative purposes. It 
stated that such a nuclear deterrent could continue for the foreseeable future, since the nuclear 
deterrent was such an effective way to control war. No political end was worth going to war 
when a nuclear conflict was a certainty. This was the similar to Eisenhower’s reasoning in 
justifying the policy of Massive Retaliation that was the foundation of the New Look defense 
policy.343 
                                                 
342 Report on Defence: Britain’s Contribution to Peace and Security, 1. 
343 Report on Defence: Britain’s Contribution to Peace and Security, 1. 
214 
 
Soviet power was also part of the discussion, not just the development of Sputnik. The 
Soviet Union had 200 active divisions, according to British estimates. This was an astounding 
sum when the British recently had to make the case to NATO to reduce its troop commitment by 
10,000 because of financial constraints. The Soviet Union’s superiority in soldiers, as interpreted 
by the Western allies, put the alliance in dire straits and made any conventional battle out of the 
question.344 
Since the defense of NATO, at least in the perception of the United Kingdom, relied on 
the United States and its nuclear arsenal, it was important to organize the other member nations 
efficiently to balance with conventional assets the U.S. nuclear contribution. The paper stated 
that the alliance had to form a closer network of individual states. This would require Britain to 
balance its NATO obligations with its requirements for securing its empire. Maintaining 
equilibrium would require Britain to prioritize its commitments.345 
While seeming to make the case for increased cooperation in security matters, the white 
paper also laid the foundation for a move away from intense coordination as well. Several pages 
later the white paper stated that Britain needed to work with the United States closely to use its 
independent nuclear force most effectively. This was a departure from the need to work together 
with NATO nations.  The Prime Minister and his government wanted to move the U.K. from a 
dependent nation that relied on the U.S. to a partner nuclear power that coordinated with the 
United States. In reality, as noted earlier, Britain had no other option. The Soviet nuclear 
capability was too large for Britain to deter war alone.346  
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In relation to the growing nuclear capability of the United Kingdom, the white paper 
continued by stating recent advances in British atomic weapons. It cited the increasingly large 
number of kiloton warheads that Britain owned. The Royal Air Force also started making 
megaton, or thermonuclear, bombs the after successful testing at Christmas Island. The United 
Kingdom, as described in the white paper, was a nuclear power similar in type to the United 
States.347  
Frank Roberts, in explaining the recently released white paper, told the North Atlantic 
Council that Britain would continue to reassess its defense contributions. He referred generally to 
new technological developments and said that this would allow the British government to take a 
“fresh appreciation and a new approach” to its defense policy. Roberts emphasized that these 
changes were not new. He reminded the council that the white paper released the previous year 
set the stage for these changes.348 
This again revealed the influence of Eisenhower’s interpretation of war in the nuclear age 
and the New Look defense policy on the British defense strategy. The white paper released in 
April of 1957, communicated the ground forces cuts but promised to reinforce smaller units with 
larger atomic weapons. This would mitigate or eliminate any supposed weakness of the smaller 
units. Arming smaller units with more powerful weapons was similar to U.S. Army experiments 
with the Pentomic division in the late 1950s.349 
Although the white paper was optimistic about nuclear cooperation between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, there were some issues concerning the IRBMs that remained 
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unresolved. Prime Minister Macmillan sent a letter to the President on 16 February 1958, 
concerning the IRBM agreement between the two nations. He wrote that he thought the 
agreement would become final in the next week. However, Macmillan did have some 
reservations about the agreement. He worried about the possibility that American personnel 
would operate the missiles instead of Royal Air Force personnel. He cautioned Eisenhower that 
if that were the case, the British people might not be enthusiastic about the deployment of the 
weapons. Neither leader brought up how these stipulations would translate to other European 
nations, such as France.350 
In order to clear up any confusion about who would crew the missiles, the Prime Minister 
proposed the following text for the agreement, “The missiles would be manned and operated by 
the United Kingdom personnel, who will be trained by the United States Government for the 
purposes of this project at the earliest feasible date.” This proposed change, Macmillan thought, 
would make it unmistakable that the United Kingdom personnel would be in charge of the 
missiles.351 
Another concern Macmillan had concerned that of launch of the missiles in the event of 
an attack on a NATO ally. He worried that the current wording could mean that the weapons 
would be part of a retaliatory attack with no input by the British government. Macmillan’s 
proposed wording specifically stated that the United States and the United Kingdom alone would 
determine when and how to use the IRBMs covered under the agreement. He included references 
to Article V of the NATO treaty. This article covered any attack on a member nation. It stated 
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that any member nation would consider an attack on an alliance state as an attack on itself.352 
However, Macmillan’s proposed text stated that the U.S. and U.K. would interpret their joint 
decision in light of the requirements of Article V and did not say that the IRBMs would 
automatically be a part of any retaliatory attack. Again, neither Eisenhower nor Macmillan 
discussed how this interpretation of the role of IRBMs in defense of Western Europe would 
translate to the other nations in NATO.353 
Until there was an operational squadron deployed, much of the concern about additional 
nuclear forces in NATO, and the IRBMs specifically, was speculative. In February of 1958, 
Secretary of State Dulles sent a proposed response to President Eisenhower answering questions 
that Prime Minister Macmillan raised about the IRBM agreement. Dulles had concerns about the 
political ramifications if U.S. Air Force personnel manned the missiles initially. Although the 
agreement fleshed out at the Bermuda Conference stated that Royal Air Force personnel would 
crew the missiles, they did not have the proper training and resolving their deficiencies push 
back any operational date. Dulles proposed telling the Prime Minister that the U.S. would tamp 
down any speculation that this was the case.354  
 Dulles continued his proposed response to the Prime Minister by stressing the need to get 
the missiles ready as soon as possible. He wanted the President to stress to Macmillan that both 
of their governments shared the desire to speed up the operational employment as much as 
possible. He continued that if this meant having U.S. personnel crew them temporarily it would 
not change the terms of the agreement concerning their use. Dulles referenced previous 
                                                 
352 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 21 JAN 2012) 
353 LaFantasie, 803. 
354 John Foster Dulles, “Proposed Response to Prime Minister MacMillan 21 FEB 1958,” DDE Library, Dulles 
Herter Series, Box 10, Folder February 1958 (1), Dulles Proposed Response to MacMillan 1. 
218 
 
agreements between the U.S. and the U.K. concerning Strategic Air Command bases. He 
suggested reminding the Prime Minister that the U.S. could not unilaterally launch the missiles 
even if U.S. personnel, not R.A.F, personnel manned them.355 
 The following day the President sent a reply to Macmillan. He agreed to the Prime 
Minister’s proposed changes to the IRBM agreement. He reminded Macmillan that the U.S. and 
the U.K. maintained joint control over the weapons, as they did over Strategic Air Command 
bombers in the United Kingdom.356 
 Prime Minister Macmillan wanted no confusion about who controlled the IRBMs in 
Britain, this was he worried about British citizens’ reaction to the temporary manning of IRBMs 
by American personnel. If U.S. personnel manned the missiles it would call into question the 
authority that the British exercised over the use of the missiles. However, if British personnel 
operated them from the beginning, even if the U.S. controlled the warheads, no launch could 
occur without British agreement. 
 Prime Minister Macmillan came to the United States for a meeting with President 
Eisenhower in June of 1958. Eisenhower expressed to Macmillan the importance of the Anglo-
American relationship. He said that the two nations should work as closely together as was 
possible. Eisenhower told the Prime Minister that it was not always best that this cooperation be 
public. In fact, Eisenhower told him that, in some cases, the U.S. might have to take an opposing 
position publicly but that this did not indicate any real separation between the two nations.357 
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 Eisenhower, Dulles, and Macmillan discussed how the U.S. and U.K. should deal with 
France and General de Gaulle on 21 February 1958. Secretary Dulles summarized the position of 
the President and Prime Minister by saying that the two nations would deal with France in a 
three-party forum where there was precedent for this. In other areas, where there was no 
precedent, the U.S. and U.K. would deal with France through NATO with bilateral accords.358  
 This would have significant implications as France pursued nuclear weapons and the U.S. 
expanded the IRBM offer to other NATO nations. It meant that France would have to agree to 
NATO authority over any nuclear weapons agreement. Unlike similar accords with the British 
that fell outside of NATO authority. This put France in the second-tier of the alliance, mainly 
because it did not have an independent nuclear capability and neither the U.S. nor the British 
were keen that de Gaulle should realize his atomic aspirations.  
 The McMahon Act came up later in the afternoon. Secretary Dulles gave a report to the 
President and the Prime Minister concerning amendments to the legislation that would allow 
sharing of nuclear weapons research information. Dulles communicated that such joint action in 
atomic weapons research was critical to the United States. He said that the Joint Congressional 
Committee was able to secure adequate changes to the legislation, although not everything that 
the administration hoped for. Dulles encouraged the President and Prime Minister that the two 
nations should not wait for legislation to officially become law before linking British and 
American scientists together so they could start work as soon as possible.359 
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 In August of 1958, prior to the deployment of IRBMs to Britain but after Eisenhower’s 
offer of them to the U.K, Macmillan proposed the purchase of Thor missiles. These missiles 
would have British warheads and would provide a completely independent IRBM asset to the 
United Kingdom. Ray Thurston, the political advisor to General Norstad, wrote to Robert 
McBride, the State Department European Affairs Specialist, concerning the sale of Thor missiles 
to Britain. Thurston communicated to McBride that Norstad was uneasy about the purchase 
because it violated the spirit of the NATO IRBM program his command tried to begin in 
December of 1957.360 
 Although Eisenhower’s offer of IRBMs to Britain meant that the U.K. did in fact own the 
missiles themselves, the warheads used on these particular missiles would be American. This 
meant that the U.S. would have a veto over whether or not the British fired the missiles and vice 
versa. However, the new proposal for the United Kingdom to buy Thor missiles was dramatically 
different. It would give the British an independent guided missile with no American control over 
its use. These weapons would not fall under any bilateral agreement concerning the employment 
of nuclear weapons that applied to restrictions of such weapons. The British would have to notify 
the U.S, in some cases, about the potential use of such weapons but that would be out of a 
courtesy and would not delay the actual firing of any British nuclear weapons.  
 General Norstad’s doubted that the benefits of such a sale would be worth the costs of  
giving the United Kingdom such a capability with no America ability to check its use. The 
addition of guided missiles under independent British control was contradictory to Norstad’s 
proposal to bring IRBMs deployed in Europe under NATO control. This was one of the 
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differences between the Anglo-American agreement covering IRBMs and other bilateral 
agreements that Eisenhower offered to other NATO nations for IRBMs. The bilateral agreement 
between the U.S. and U.K. did not include NATO controls over the missiles. Other NATO 
agreements, although still in formative stages, would have some connection to NATO as a 
whole, even if this connection were only through their association with SHAPE headquarters.  
 General Norstad not only objected to the sale of Thor missiles to Britain, he also objected 
to the sale of Corporal missile warheads to the British. B.E.L. Timmons, the Director of the 
Office of European Regional Affairs, discussed this sale in a memo to Major General John 
Guthrie, Director of the European Regional section of the International Security Affairs in the 
Department of Defense. According to Timmons, Norstad’s concern about the sale was that it 
would be bilateral and not involve NATO. General Norstad wanted to freeze the correspondence 
between the two nations about this issue until the U.S. had a final position on the sale. He did not 
think that sale fit Norstad’s vision of a NATO atomic stockpile.361 
 The U.S. delegation to NATO sent its assessment of the proposal to the U.S. State 
Department.  Joseph Wolf, U.S. representative to NATO, wrote the communiqué. He first 
described U.S. policy concerning atomic weapons in Europe. He wrote that the position of the 
United States was to increase nuclear capability under Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), who was General Norstad. This, according to Wolf, prevented any uncoordinated 
use of these weapons.362 
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 Wolf continued to criticize the British proposal by discussing the problematic strategic 
implications. He wrote that if the U.K. attained these missiles it would create an independent 
thermonuclear capability. The fact that the British did not yet support the broader NATO 
program of researching a solid fuelled IRBM was an indication of its lack of commitment to the 
NATO atomic stockpile.363 
 The problem with Britain setting itself above other European NATO states because of its 
nuclear status is clear in this memorandum. Other European nations, in Wolf’s words, would feel 
that they were “second class citizens” if the U.S. supported the sale of missiles to Britain. The 
NATO IRBM project needed to be the top priority, selling Britain its own fleet of IRBMs would 
imply that this was not the case.364 
 The IRBM agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. received specific mention in the 
memo. Wolf said that this agreement did not represent a viable model for broadening the scope 
of the IRBM deployment to other NATO nations. Citing the Anglo-American agreement about 
IRBMs exposed that the two-tier character of the organization, although informal, was already 
causing tensions in the alliance. The British possession of nuclear weapons was a large part of its 
status in the alliance. No other NATO nation would receive the unique type of bilateral 
agreement offered to Britain. It is important to understand that the agreement only offered the 
missiles, the warheads would remain in U.S. custody until firing. This was similar in structure to 
other NATO agreements offered later. However, these subsequent agreements would always 
come under NATO control.365 
                                                 
363 Memo Concerning U.K. Proposal to Purchase Thors, 1. 
364 Memo Concerning U.K. Proposal to Purchase Thors, 1. 
365 Memo Concerning U.K. Proposal to Purchase Thors, 1. 
223 
 
 The communication also referenced the decrease in British contributions to NATO shield 
forces, the name for conventional ground forces used to deter Soviet attack. The British white 
paper of April 1957, explained the need to withdraw some troops from the shield forces for 
financial reasons. However, the British continued to increase the amount of money dedicated to 
strategic weapons, more than required under SHAPE agreements. Wolf argued that Britain’s 
reluctance to contribute to the shield forces in favor of the strategic forces would inhibit other 
nations from meeting their requirements.366 
 In the 1950s, as well as today, nuclear weapons were prestige weapons. They bestowed 
great power status on any nation that possessed them. Hence, the pursuit of these weapons was 
not always logical or cost effective.  Nuclear weapons, in some sense, made Britain less secure 
because the U.S.S.R. had to target these weapons once they knew of them. However, this did not 
detract from the prestige being one of the few nations in the world to have them. 
 Britain’s focus on strategic weapons did have an impact on the larger questions of 
European security. However, from the British perspective, focusing on strategic weapons was 
what nuclear powers did. President Eisenhower made that clear through his New Look defense 
policy and his reliance on Massive Retaliation.  President Eisenhower’s policies demonstrated 
that nuclear weapons provided a more efficient way to defend the interests of a nation. Britain 
was the only other independent nuclear power in NATO, it was only reasonable that it followed 
the lead of the most powerful atomic nation in the alliance and not other non-nuclear states. 
Continuing down this path would increase tensions in the alliance, particularly between France, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom, as it became clear that nuclear weapons offered a 
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nation admission to the upper-tier of the NATO alliance. This made it appear that the British and 
Americans were denying France and de Gaulle great power status, this was intolerable.  
  There were other problems with the sale of Thor missiles to Britain that gave American 
policy makers pause. Wolf worried about the precedent that such a purchase would set. He called 
attention to other agreements in early stages with the governments of France, Greece, and Italy. 
Each of these agreements did not include bilateral controls over the IRBMs; these offers fell 
under NATO authority. If the British bought IRBMs, it would exacerbate any complications with 
other nations agreeing to the deployment of these missiles. Wolf brought up the French case 
specifically. He wrote that the French government sought an independent nuclear capability and 
the French could see the Anglo-American agreement and the sale of missiles as a model for 
future discussions. Allowing Britain more freedom by selling it missiles would encourage the 
French to demand similar concessions in its agreement concerning IRBMs, which as he already 
explained in the memorandum, the Anglo-American accord was not an acceptable framework for 
other European nations, including France.367  
 Wolf ended his memo with a warning about the overall effect on the entire NATO 
stockpile. He advocated that selling the British IRBMs for their independent use would inspire 
more emphasis on independent possession of atomic weapons in Europe. This would remove 
much of the enthusiasm for the stockpile idea. If this happened tensions in the alliance would 
increase.368 
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 Eisenhower and General Norstad intended the NATO stockpile to give European nations 
some control over the use of atomic weapons on the continent. Building an atomic arsenal was 
an expensive proposition, which only a few nations could hope to afford. If the situation in 
Europe devolved to an assembly of independent nuclear arsenals it would remove much of the 
resources that went to funding NATO shield forces. This devolution would fracture 
Eisenhower’s attempts to build a unified European defense alliance. It would also set up a series 
of competing nuclear weapons programs by those few nations that could afford it. Those that 
could not afford an independent program would have to do that best they could. This would not 
be a recipe for a close and cooperative alliance. 
 In December of 1958, General Norstad alerted the Standing Group of NATO that Thor 
and Jupiter missiles would soon be available to Allied Command Europe. In light of the arrival 
of these weapons, Norstad encouraged NATO nations to start the production of advanced 
missiles. Norstad’s call for a combined research program declared the American dedication to 
limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe.369 
 In addition to the introduction of IRBMs to NATO, in April of 1959 General Norstad said 
that other atomic weapons programs were also coming that would improve the defense system of 
Western Europe. He told the North Atlantic Council that the Heads of Government meeting in 
1957 approved multiple systems including Honest John rockets, aircraft, as well as the IRBMs. 
Each of these required separate agreements with each nation that agreed to accept them. 
However, each of these new agreements would still fall under the broader NATO defense 
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system. He told the NAC that Allied Command Europe would have a stock of warheads for use 
irrespective of nationality.370 
 Although the U.S. would provide the warheads for different NATO nations to use in their 
defense, only the approval of President Eisenhower could release these warheads. This was an 
important distinction between the Anglo-American agreement and the NATO stockpile 
agreement. The British, with their own nuclear stockpile, had their own independent retaliatory 
capability outside of the IRBMs offered by the U.S. Also, the British, at this time, sought to 
develop their own IRBM system, either through purchase or research and development. Britain 
was in a league of its own concerning atomic capability in Western Europe.  
 General Norstad explained to the NAC how these weapons would come to the individual 
member states and what agreements would cover their use and deployment. He said that each 
nation would enter into two different bilateral agreements. The first would agree to the stockpile 
placement or weapons deployment in the territory of the nation. The second would allow for the 
release of some atomic data from the U.S. to the subject nation. This data was technical in nature 
and more for planning purposes, not research information, or specific weapons design 
information.371 
 The release of this type of data would help the nation plan to use the atomic weapons. It 
did not require a change in the McMahon act as the research and development agreement with 
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the U.K. required. Norstad told the NAC that the second agreement allowed for the nation to 
have “full atomic capability.”372 
 The problem with Norstad’s characterization of the second agreement lay in its intention. 
Since the release of the technical data did not require changes in the McMahon act, it did not fall 
under the restrictions placed on scientific development information concerning nuclear weapons. 
This meant that this data, although helpful in planning purposes, was not effective in developing 
future nuclear weapons. In this light, Norstad’s offer of nuclear weapons, to include IRBMs to 
Allied Command Europe, was a move to limit nuclear weapons proliferation. General Norstad as 
the senior American commander would still be the primary authority for releasing the weapons 
to individual nations, although officially it would come from President Eisenhower.373 
 Again this was different in character than the British agreement. President Eisenhower 
had to communicate personally with the Prime Minister in order to give approval. Since the 
weapons discussed by General Norstad would fall under NATO control, the President could 
authorize General Norstad to give approval for their use. This was not just a technicality. It 
represented Britain’s level of importance in the alliance. The President had to explain his case 
directly to the Prime Minister in the event of a nuclear attack. This was not the case in the other 
agreements presented to NATO. Of course, if the individual nations disagreed with the decision 
to launch an atomic strike there is little doubt that President Eisenhower would then have had to 
discuss this issue with the head of state the urgency of the situation, but only if required. 
                                                 
372 Norstad Statement to NAC Concerning IRBM, 3. 
373 Norstad Statement to NAC Concerning IRBM, 3. 
228 
 
 Another important difference Norstad discussed was that of financing the infrastructure 
and development of nuclear weapons for NATO. In his address, he commended the NAC for 
their respective nations taking the responsible path of sharing the burden of paying for building 
nuclear storage sites. He hoped that this would continue as NATO started to develop its own 
IRBM program. Norstad said that he believed such weapons should provide protection for all of 
Western Europe and not just individual nations in the region.374 
 This raised another issue concerning the European IRBM program. Paying for something 
implied a certain amount of ownership or at least an interest in the use of a weapon system. Only 
Britain and the United State paid for the IRBMs stationed in the United Kingdom. This meant 
that there was little leverage any other European nation could use in controlling such weapons. 
On the other hand, with the NATO IRBM program if every Western European nation in the 
alliance paid for a portion of the weapon system it would be impossible to exclude any paying 
nation completely from discussions about their use. 
 Norstad did reference the Anglo-American IRBM agreement in his statement to the 
NAC. He implied that the agreement was similar in terms to what he was offering the other 
NATO nations. He explained that the U.S. was now negotiating agreements of the same kind 
with member states in the alliance. As shown above, this was not the case. There were striking 
differences between the type of agreement offered to Britain and those offered to the rest of the 
NATO alliance.375 
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 Much of the differences between the two types of agreements stemmed from the British 
possession of an independent nuclear capability. This allowed them certain exemptions from the 
political agreements that covered the deployment of IRBMs. The unique terms of the British 
agreement allowed subsequent cooperative nuclear weapons research between the U.S. and the 
U.K. Nuclear weapons provided not only military benefits but also political and psychological 
benefits when it came to control of nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe and nuclear 
weapons research cooperation with the United States.  
 The introduction of IRBMs to NATO caused concern in Britain. Walworth Barbour, 
Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission in London, sent a telegraph to the State Department on 14 
August 1959 outlining some of these issues. Richard Powell, the Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Defense, brought up the main concern of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, which 
was the expansion of nuclear weapons on the European continent. Powell reminded Barbour that 
the U.S. and U.K. agreed “at Bermuda to ‘drag feet’ as effectively as possible on the creation of 
a fourth country nuclear capability.” Secretary Powell wanted to ensure that the U.S. was still 
standing by this policy. Powell communicated that Macmillan worried that the NATO IRBM 
program would erode the proliferation policy agreed to in Bermuda.376 
 The agreement between Eisenhower and Macmillan did not lead to any overt action. The 
consensus did influence how Eisenhower approached the issue of France and nuclear weapons. 
The offer of IRBMs under American ownership would not meet the conditions the de Gaulle set 
for deploying nuclear weapons on French territory. However, Eisenhower, in the spirit of 
limiting nuclear proliferation, did not want to offer to France key technology or weapons that 
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would bring about an independent French nuclear program. Eisenhower did not seem to 
anticipate what this rejection would do to de Gaulle’s perception of France’s position in the 
alliance.  
 Powell cautioned Barbour that the possession of missiles could possibly lead to 
clamoring for ownership of warheads as well. The Prime Minister, according to Powell, did not 
want to have to explain the independent possession of nuclear weapons by France or Germany to 
his people. Powell wrote that, in the British estimation, the NATO IRBM program exacerbated 
the proliferation problem in Western Europe, which would cause problems with the Soviet Union 
as well if it expanded to West Germany.377 
 Macmillan and other senior British leaders understood the problem of possessing the 
missiles but not the warheads. In the Prime Minister’s estimation, as communicated by Richard 
Powell, missiles would eventually open the door to warheads, which would then beget 
independent nuclear nations in Western Europe. Any expansion of the nuclear weapons, 
especially outside of the NATO framework offered by General Norstad, stood to undercut the 
British position of being the only other independent nuclear nation in the alliance, except the 
U.S. Although France had a nuclear weapons program, it did not yet have a successful test. As 
seen by the British Permanent Secretary’s position concerning the NATO IRBM agreement, the 
Prime Minister wanted to delay this as long as possible. 
 Powell told Barbour that the Prime Minister would support the U.S. and its position. 
However, Macmillan thought that the best course of action was to choose either to delay the 
expansion of nuclear weapons, including the NATO IRMB program, or to put as much emphasis 
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behind the program as possible to ensure its success. The Prime Minister preferred to push back 
the expansion of IRBMs to Western Europe but in the end would fall in line with the American 
decision.378 
 Macmillan communicated his reservations to Powell concerning France and nuclear 
weapons. The Prime Minister did not think that the French would be amenable to the NATO 
program. Instead he argued that the French would demand a joint decision making process 
between the senior alliance members, including the U.S. This would mean that France, if the 
British Minister was correct, wanted to impose its authority on the employment of IRBMs in 
Britain and not just IRBMs deployed to France under NATO control. This would put France in 
the same league as Britain, although France did not have a successful independence nuclear 
weapons program. However, as General Norstad explained, the NATO IRBM program did not 
impact the Anglo-American IRBM agreement. The situation would change in 1960 when France 
had its first successful nuclear test but it would still take until the middle of the 1960s until 
France had a viable nuclear arsenal.379 
 Macmillan’s concerns about France betrayed the differences between the NATO IRBM 
program and the bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom. Macmillan did not want de 
Gaulle to pressure Eisenhower into agreeing to a joint decision making agreement concerning 
nuclear weapons. This would remove Franco-American IRBMs from NATO control and put 
them in the same category as the Anglo-American IRBMs. Again, the possession of nuclear 
weapons had political ramifications. The Prime Minister did not want to expand the joint 
decision making process concerning atomic weapons to include any other nation.   
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 Nuclear weapons provided political leverage. Possession of an independent atomic 
arsenal, as well as Eisenhower’s affinity for the United Kingdom and its Prime Minister, allowed 
Britain to move into the top-tier of NATO. The two-tier system in NATO raised tensions in the 
alliance. It conveyed the importance of a state having its own nuclear arsenal. Britain and the 
United States created policies to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and cement the split 
nature of NATO in the late 1950s. By 1959, there was some sense in NATO, from General 
Norstad’s staff, that the special relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. was problematic. The 
IRBM agreement between the two nations, which the British unsuccessfully tried to expand to 


















After World War II, French leaders faced similar problems as British leaders. Post war 
French premiers, Vincent Auriol, Rene Coty, and Charles de Gaulle, had to contend with a 
crumbling empire and a diminishing role on the global stage. Almost immediately after the 
cessation of hostilities in World War II, French soldiers deployed to Indochina to restore French 
hegemony in the region. They were not received warmly and so France was the one of the first 
NATO nations to spill blood in the Cold War.   
As the Cold War continued and Arab nationalism began to expand through North Africa, 
the conflicts moved closer to France. By 1954, Algeria rose up in rebellion. Putting down this 
conflict required substantial effort in manpower and material, it also cost France much in the 
public eye. However, this was not the only problem that Coty and de Gaulle struggled with 
through the 1950s.  
Gamal Abdel Nasser threw gasoline on the fire of decolonization with his nationalization 
of the Suez Crisis. As shown previously, France desperately wanted to stop Nasser from 
succeeding in his attempts to dictate terms to the European powers. Coty, the French president 
during the crisis, learned how the lack of nuclear weapons deprived him of the ability to deal 
with the United States on equal terms. Due to the Algerian war and popular unrest about French 
actions in quelling the uprising, Coty would not have the opportunity to remedy the problem.380 
General Charles de Gaulle picked the torch from Rene Coty and led France in the wake 
of the political turbulence that unseated the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle took the pursuit of 
independent French nuclear weapons to a new level. These weapons were not just for national 
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defense, they would be part of the French national identity. A powerful nuclear arsenal would 
show that France was worthy of great nation status.France detonated its first nuclear weapon in 
1960 on a test range in Algeria. Although the test was successful it was clear that time was 
running out on France’s desert testing facilities. General Ailleret, commander of the Special 
Weapons Section, reported two years earlier that the Algerian site was too problematic for long-
term use.381 
Domestic and colonial concerns were not the only thing that hamstrung de Gaulle in his 
rush to develop an independent French nuclear force. His allies, Eisenhower and Macmillan, 
worked to passively frustrate French nuclear efforts. At the Bermuda Conference in 1958, the 
American and British leaders agreed to delay French efforts to gain nuclear weapons in order to 
stem the proliferation of atomic arsenals in Europe.  
During the planning of the deployment of IRBMs to Britain, Eisenhower made the 
decision to expand the program to other NATO nations. His intent was to ensure that all of 
America’s allies had access to the security of America’s nuclear umbrella. The problem with the 
expansion of this program was that the framework of the Anglo-American agreement offered 
little guidance. The U.S.-U.K. IRBM agreement provided for concessions that would not be 
available to other NATO nations. This was particularly galling to de Gaulle who did not think 
that his nation deserved such second-class status.  
President Eisenhower made the offer of IRBMs to Britain in the wake of the Suez Crisis. 
This was a bilateral agreement that put the missiles directly under British control but the 
warheads remained under American control. It required the approval of both the British Prime 
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Minister and the President of the United States in order to launch the missiles. This was 
fundamentally different from the offer of IRBMs made to the NATO alliance in 1958. This 
agreement put the missiles under the authority of NATO, specifically SACEUR, with bilateral 
agreements with each nation that agreed to accept the weapons. The weapons offered to NATO 
would be part of the joint defense plan for the alliance; the missiles offered to the British did not 
fall under NATO authority. 
 In early 1958, the United States offered to NATO nations the ability to cooperate in the 
defense of the alliance by housing atomic material in their nations. This would be under the 
atomic stockpile agreement. The nations would not actually own the warheads. They would 
operate under the broader defense plans of NATO, headed by SACEUR General Lauris Norstad. 
France, under Rene Coty, seemed receptive to such an agreement.382 
 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles were a part of the overall stockpile policy. The 
intent was to get these weapons deployed to European nations in order to bring the alliance 
closer together and prepare it for a combined nuclear weapons program. General Norstad’s 
judgment of the French position, as described in a telegram by John Tuthill the Minister for 
Economic Affairs at the American Embassy, was largely positive. Tuthill conveyed to John 
Foster Dulles that Norstad looked for France to set the example for deploying IRBMs to Allied 
Command Europe (ACE). After the French agreements moved through the approval process in 
the North Atlantic Council, the U.S. would discuss IRBMs with Italy and other willing NATO 
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nations. At the time, General Norstad referenced the Anglo-American bilateral agreement as a 
possible framework for a Franco-American agreement but made no promises about this.383 
 At the time of General Norstad’s talks about deploying IRBM to France, President Coty 
was receptive to including his nation in the larger NATO defense framework. The Anglo-
American agreement did not incorporate the IRBMs in Britain into the broader NATO defense. 
They were de facto a part of the defense structure, in that they did help provide some deterrent 
value for Western Europe. However, these weapons fell under British and American joint 
command, with specific requirements for their deployment. Specifically, in order to launch these 
weapons, the United States President and the British Prime Minister had to communicate and 
agree on their use. 
 In a meeting between Ambassador Crouy-Chanel, General Norstad, and General Ely 
concerning the proposed IRBM deployment to France, the discussion shifted to who would own 
the missiles. Ambassador Crouy-Chanel communicated that the French position was that France 
would eventually want some ownership over the stockpile. However, the French government did 
not want to make this a serious issue at the time. General Norstad agreed that the U.S. and 
France would have to come some understanding about how these weapons would fall into a 
defense plan, whether through NATO or failing that a bilateral agreement covering the weapons 
between the two nations.384 
 General Ely asked how France would control these weapons. Norstad said that, under his 
plan, two or three squadrons would fall under French authority. There would be an American 
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officer on the French staff who would be the liaison between the two governments. This was a 
similar arrangement to that of the Anglo-American agreement.385 
 General Ely continued by discussing the production of future weapons by Europe as a 
whole. These more advanced IRBMs would use solid fuel. General Norstad told Ely that the 
American position was that a European IRBM program was the best solution. He reminded Ely 
that the United Kingdom already had a lead in that particular technology.386 
 What General Norstad did not say was that the British were hesitant to abandon their own 
solid fuel IRBM for a combined European program. As discussed earlier, the British possession 
of an independent nuclear weapons program allowed the nation to have greater prestige in the 
alliance. If it abandoned its own independent program for a pan-European nuclear program it 
would have to lose some of its prestige and admit it could not continue to improve its 
independent nuclear program without European support due to the increased fiscal strain of 
improving its nuclear arsenal.  
 Another issue with using the Anglo-American IRBM agreement for a framework for a 
French accord was that it was still under development. Dulles, in response to Tuthill’s telegram 
on 10 January 1958, reminded him that the U.S.-U.K. agreement was not final. The Secretary 
told Tuthill that the Anglo-American IRBM agreement, because it was not final, would not be a 
good framework for a Franco-American pact. However, Dulles was in general agreement with 
Norstad’s proposals concerning the developing situation concerning IRBMs in France.387 
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 By the end of January 1958, France made its position clear about the IRBMs. French 
Ambassador Crouy-Chanel said his government wanted the IRBMs deployed to France. He told 
General Norstad that the government wanted to start to lay out specifics of an agreement the 
following week.388 
 French cooperation in the Allied Command Europe IRBM program in early 1958 came 
with few conditions. The government did not state any specific needs or concessions on the part 
of the United States in order to get the approval for deploying these missiles inside of France. 
President Coty and Ambassador Crouy-Chanel wanted to conclude the agreement to deploy 
IRBMs as soon as possible and did not want to set up any roadblocks that delayed this. 
 Although the discussions concerning the NATO atomic stockpile and the deployment of 
IRBMs to France seemed to be going smoothly, there were some signs of trouble. The First 
Secretary of the French Embassy, Russell Fessenden, wrote to General Norstad about his 
concerns with the proposal. The French National Defense Committee had to meet to approve any 
agreements concerning the atomic stockpile or IRBMs. In order to accept the proposed NATO 
plan, the committee would have to reverse its previous stance on this issue. Fessenden wrote that 
the French Foreign Office hoped that the committee would adopt a helpful policy concerning 
atomic issues. The office wanted to encapsulate the stockpile and IRBM proposals into one 
document in order to make this easier. However, the National Defense Committee still had the 
approval authority; nothing could proceed until it gave its ascent.389 
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 Another unsettling issue Fessenden brought up in his memo was an Associated Press 
story reporting that some members of the defense committee wanted to slow down the proposed 
atomic agreements between NATO and France. The news story claimed that some inside the 
committee hoped to get some concessions from the United States or NATO in order to grant 
approval of the atomic agreements. If this were true, the French IRBM program would not 
receive unanimous approval inside the defense committee and could end up dividing a fragile 
government in France.390 
 The process for getting French approval would not be free of obstructions. Adding to this 
trouble was the fact that the National Defense Committee would have to go against precedent in 
approving the deployment of foreign weapons to France. Getting approval from the entire French 
Government would not be as easy as it seemed. France, during this time, was working on its own 
nuclear weapon. As this project advanced, it would make getting an agreement between NATO 
and France concerning IRBMs more difficult. Since the NATO framework differed 
fundamentally from that of the Anglo-American agreement concerning IRBMs, getting France to 
agree to a second-class status in NATO would become impossible if the metric for determining 
status in the alliance became possession of an independent nuclear weapon.  
 The French atomic program was making steady progress in 1958. A group of French 
military officers led by General Buchalet came to the United States in February of that year. The 
group intended to study how to conduct atomic test, measure the data, and effectively analyze the 
results. The commission witnessed an American nuclear test at the Nevada testing site. Buchalet 
told Horace Torbet, Director of Western European Affairs for the State Department, that his visit 
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would save the French Government millions of dollars. Buchalet continued by stating that France 
would be able to use procedures developed by the Americans instead of having to research and 
create the same techniques on their own.391 
 Atomic testing was not the only subject Buchalet discussed with Torbet. According to the 
general’s conversation, Torbet believed that the French would have a successful atomic test 
soon, although he did not specify a date. One thing holding up the French testing was the lack of 
plutonium. Buchalet conveyed to Torbet that the weapons testing had to take a backseat to 
nuclear testing for energy purposes, since this did not destroy the radioactive material the way 
that testing bombs did.392 
 If France’s atomic weapons program was successful, it would give French leaders more 
leverage in promoting France as a leading member of NATO. It would possibly improve 
France’s ability to craft bilateral agreements similar to the Anglo-American pact concerning 
atomic weapons, assuming cooperation from the United States. An independent nuclear weapons 
program would give France more strength in arguing for concessions that were the same as the 
Anglo-American IRBM agreement in its bilateral agreement with the U.S. However, this would 
mean that the weapons would not fall under NATO directly, detracting from the NATO stockpile 
plan that Eisenhower championed. It would also make clearer the power of independent nuclear 
weapons programs in determining status in the alliance. This could possibly lead other nations to 
want an independent weapons program of their own. However, as long as France did not have its 
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own atomic weapons, it could not hope to be in the top-tier of the NATO alliance, unless the 
metric for judging within the alliance power changed.  
 While the French government seemed stable and cooperative, under President Coty, the 
U.S. offer of IRBMs received a positive reception. Through the beginning of 1958, the French 
government accepted the proposal as it came. It did not offer many amendments, although there 
were rumors of problems for the agreement in the National Defense Committee, the French 
President, at the time, wanted to make this agreement final as soon as possible. However, the 
coming instability of the French government would change American enthusiasm for the 
deployment of IRBMs to France. The rise of Charles de Gaulle to lead the new government 
would destroy any hopes of including France in the ACE IRBM deployment.  
 In addition to concerns about the impending successful test of a French atomic weapon, 
there were other concerns about France’s position in the international arena. John Foster Dulles, 
in a telegram to the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adeneaur, covered some of the 
Secretary’s chief worries. He wrote that the ability of the French government to maintain its 
influence in North Africa worried him. Dulles compared France’s position in North Africa to that 
of its predicament in Vietnam in 1954. He did not think that the France would be able to 
summon the will to continue to forcefully impose its will in the Maghreb. This would mean 
France would have to accept its status as a post-colonial power.393 
 Dulles continued with his telegram by discussing the possible implications of French war 
weariness from its North African conflicts. If they continued to fight such a conflict, Dulles 
worried that that it would lead to political instability in France. The possibility that the ruling 
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French government would have to reach out to French Communists for support to remain in 
power disturbed him because it would make communism more powerful in an influential 
Western European nation. This, Dulles feared, could undermine NATO in Western Europe. He 
compared the threat of a Communist resurgence in France to the left-wing of the government 
bringing down the European Defense Community during the Indo-China conflict earlier in the 
decade.394 
 France, although a democracy and a part of NATO, struggled with an influential 
Communist political party in the nation and any instability could provide enough opportunity for 
it to become more powerful. Dulles’ worries about the stability of the Coty government were 
indicative of the doubts about the possibility that soon American and French interests would 
diverge. This would call into question the advisability of giving France nuclear weapons or 
storing them there under any agreement. If France did come under a Communist government, or 
a government that included a significant Communist presence, the rest of NATO would then face 
a French nation armed with atomic weapons that was possibly sympathetic to the Soviet Union. 
Communist could have functioned in the French political system just as other parties did. In the 
1950s, Americans were paranoid about Communism, making any possibility of a communist 
electoral victory a serious security concern.  
 This fear of instability in France came to fruition of April of 1958. Prime Minister Felix 
Gaillard resigned after the bombing of a Tunisian village, which part of the French effort to 
secure its colonial holdings in North Africa. Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, 
invited Armor Houghton and other State Department officials to a discussion about the 
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implications of the recent fall of Gaillard’s government. Pineau told the U.S. delegation that 
many in the French government felt that the U.S, after the Suez Crisis, abandoned the nation. 
Pineau continued by telling Houghton that Eisenhower’s recent visit to Paris did help heal the 
rife somewhat but that there was still some resentment.395  
 Armory Houghton described the turmoil in France with the lack of a government in a 
telegram to the State Department on 14 May 1958. Houghton described the problems both 
domestically and in the colonial areas of North Africa. In the Maghreb, the Algerian situation, 
according to Houghton, could inflame support for the Communists. If the French were unable to 
bring the conflict to a quick resolution, it would give to the communist party, the Labor Union 
Popular Front, an opportunity to increase its political influence. He wrote that the Communists 
continued to try to turn every event to their profit and continued to be a threat.396 
 During this turmoil Charles de Gaulle seemed to draw ahead of those jockeying for 
control of France. According to Houghton, de Gaulle’s path to leadership in France became 
clearer every day. He continued to gain support as many began to see him as the only viable 
person to lead the Republic. Houghton closed his telegram with a serious warning. He cautioned 
Dulles that the struggle in France had high consequences. The winner in this conflict would lead 
the nation.397 
 By May of 1958 it was clear that de Gaulle would be the new French Prime Minister. 
Houghton sent a telegram to the Secretary of State describing the initial steps de Gaulle wanted 
to take to restore stability. He would dismiss the French Assembly for six months, with the 
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option to extend it to a year, and would rule by committee until there was a new Assembly.  
Regarding NATO, de Gaulle would accept that the alliance was a part of the defense of Western 
Europe. However, he believed that France should play a larger role. De Gaulle wanted France to 
have a bigger part in planning and organizing the defense of Western Europe; he did not want 
France to only act at the behest of the United States. Ideally, de Gaulle wanted to build a 
community of European nations around France. He did not see France’s role as a partner nation, 
rather he thought it should lead Europe. This claim about the importance of France in Europe 
was on that French leaders have made for centuries and was one of the causes for continuous war 
in Europe. 398 
 De Gaulle’s intentions for France domestically were not too troubling, at least as it 
concerned U.S. interests in the region. But the French leader’s designs for NATO and 
reorganizing the alliance required a shift away from the two-tier structure established by the 
Anglo-American IRBM agreement. De Gaulle wanted a more prestigious position in the alliance 
for France. He did not think that NATO, in its contemporary form, adequately accounted for 
France’s importance to the defense of Europe.  
 The problem was that the two-tier structure centered on nuclear cooperation and 
independent atomic arsenals. France, while it did have an atomic program, did not have an 
atomic weapon yet. Eisenhower and Macmillan did not want France to join the atomic tier of 
NATO. Both concluded that they could not actively stop France from pursuing nuclear weapons 
but neither should their nations help France attain an independent atomic capability. De Gaulle’s 
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intentions for NATO, specifically France’s role in the alliance, conflicted with Eisenhower and 
Macmillan’s appraisal of French importance in the alliance.  
 This issue came up in a preparatory memorandum for John Foster Dulles in advance of 
his meeting with de Gaulle in July of 1958. Burke Elbrick advised Dulles that the primary 
purpose of his upcoming discussion should be to declare the importance of de Gaulle in the 
relationship between the France and the U.S. He told the Secretary that restoring personal contact 
and improving the relationship between the two men was a vital part of bettering the Franco-
American alliance. Elbrick cautioned Dulles that de Gaulle’s focus on French prestige and his 
“anti-Americanism” were potential obstacles he needed to be aware of.399  
 Next on Elbrick’s list of concerns was the impact of an atomic France. He outlined the 
two issues that formed the foundation for de Gaulle’s atomic designs. Elbrick wrote that the 
French premier wanted to make sure that America treated France as an equal nation relative to 
the U.K. Another problem that would result if France did have a successful nuclear test was how 
it would influence nuclear cooperation with Britain. De Gaulle, in Elbrick’s estimation, would 
want to ensure that France received similar concessions like national ownership of missiles and 
the promise of technical and scientific cooperation in atomic weapons research. He continued by 
writing that the French leader would want France to return as a member of the “three-power 
club” and have a leadership role in the alliance.400 
 This would have been a radical change in the relations between the U.S. and France 
concerning nuclear matters but one that should have been anticipated. In late 1957 and early 
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1958, a nuclear agreement seemed imminent between the two nations. The proposed agreement 
would fall under the NATO structure and introduce IRBMs under the auspices of Allied 
Command Europe. However, with de Gaulle leading France and wanting to increase what he 
perceived as the diminished prestige of the nation by joining the nuclear club, such an agreement 
seemed ill-suited to either American or French interests. As the French Empire collapsed so did 
its power and prestige. Nuclear weapons were a means to regain some of this lost dignity.  
 As the July meeting between Dulles and de Gaulle grew closer, both American and 
French diplomats worked out the agenda. In a meeting between the French Ambassador, Herve 
Alphand, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Burke Elbrick, the two tried to set the 
scope of topics for the discussion. The French Ambassador proposed a discussion of IRBMs and 
nuclear arms for the meeting. This item, according to the Alphand, was important to his 
government. Another area of concern was the McMahon Act, which controlled atomic 
information. The French Ambassador was eager for Dulles and de Gaulle to discuss how to 
change the legislation in order to facilitate cooperation between the two nations on atomic 
matters. Regarding the IRBMs, the Ambassador stated that de Gaulle wanted the missiles. 
However, he wanted them under an agreement similar in nature to the Anlgo-American 
understanding. De Gaulle did not want these weapons to fall under the control of SACEUR.401 
 Again de Gaulle’s interpretation of the status of France in the alliance represented quite a 
change from the proposed agreement under SACEUR. The original offer of IRBMs to Allied 
Command Europe intended the missiles to be part of a unified defense effort controlled by 
SACEUR. This would allow General Norstad to ensure that these missiles fulfilled NATO 
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defense requirements as well as met U.S. security needs. If the French did not agree to the 
missiles under the framework of SACEUR then it would make it more difficult to get other 
NATO nations to agree to the Allied Command Europe program. De Gaulle, as communicated 
by his ambassador, did not intend France to be the example for deploying IRBMs under NATO 
authority. National sovereignty was no small matter for the French leader. De Gaulle was not 
about to give up France’s prerogative in European affairs to an American general. 
 Prior to leaving for his meeting with de Gaulle, Dulles and the President discussed some 
potential difficulties with the upcoming talks. The Secretary told the President he felt that the 
U.S. should assist the French wherever possible. De Gaulle, according to Dulles, could be the 
only thing keeping a lid on instability in France and he wanted to help maintain some normalcy 
in that nation if possible. Dulles understood that the new French leader presented some problems 
for the administration but he was still important.402 
 Of particular concern for Dulles was de Gaulle’s focus on French nationalism. The 
Secretary worried that with de Gaulle leading the French people he would demand a greater role 
for it and himself on the international stage. Dulles said that the French premier’s concern for the 
prestige of France manifested itself in two distinct forms. The first was a desire for an 
independent French nuclear arsenal. The second was a belief that the U.S, U.K, and France 
should work as one to lead global affairs. Eisenhower did not agree with the idea of this shared 
leadership role. Concerning any atomic issues, the President told Dulles to be clear about what 
the U.S. was willing to do. Possibly the administration would push for a sympathetic 
interpretation of present regulations relating to such issues. It is important to note that 
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Eisenhower did not discuss altering legislation at this time, as he wanted to do and was able to do 
for the British IRBM agreement.403 
 The conversation between the Secretary of State and the President uncovered the serious 
concerns both had about how de Gaulle’s leadership changed the relationship between America 
and France. De Gaulle’s perception of French importance on the global stage continued to be a 
sore point. Nuclear issues, because they were one manifestation of French inferiority, also 
continued to be a problem between the U.S. and France during the late 1950s.  
 Secretary Dulles arrived in France to meet with de Gaulle on 5 July 1958. Dulles opened 
the meeting cordially by reminding de Gaulle of France’s assistance to the United States in 
gaining its independence. He also reminded the General of the high regard that the President had 
for de Gaulle and France. Dulles wanted to repair the problems between the two nations and he 
told de Gaulle that he hoped the General would be able to return France to its former status as a 
world power.404 
 One of the first defense issues discussed after the opening statements was NATO’s role in 
securing Western Europe. Dulles told de Gaulle that he believed that NATO was the reason that 
the West could provide a defense against the Soviet Union. The Secretary voiced his frustration 
with how NATO worked, especially as member nations continued to advocate for a broader 
range of issues to the Council. He still thought that it was a vital organization. Dulles told the 
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General that, although inefficient, the expansion of NATO to a political body allowed it to 
continue to remain relevant to the nature of the Soviet threat.405 
 Dulles, with this statement, started to lay the foundation for the American position 
against any three-member world leadership group. By stressing the importance of NATO as both 
a military and political body in the defense of Western Europe he was also implying to de Gaulle 
that this was the primary alliance that the U.S. intended to use to counter the Soviets in Western 
Europe. Although Dulles sympathized with the General about some of the problems of the 
alliance, he made it clear that de Gaulle’s hope of subverting the organization was a nonstarter 
for President Eisenhower. Dulles told de Gaulle that “Great Powers had always had and would 
continue to have special responsibilities.” The Secretary said that such power should not be 
overpowering but implied. He stated that the, “formalization of groupings for directing the free 
world would be resented, but there was no reason why this should not exist in fact.”406  
 The irony of this conversation was that de Gaulle wanted to create a formal three-power 
group within NATO because France was outside the informal power structure that included 
Britain and the United States. Dulles offered little comfort to de Gaulle concerning his need to 
see France invited into the inner circle of NATO. Although nuclear weapons were not the only 
reason France was not in the upper echelon of NATO, it was representative of the junior status of 
France relative to the U.K. and the U.S. 
 The next subject was that of nuclear weapons and their role in the defense of Western 
Europe. Dulles said that the U.S. did not have an operational ICBM program at the time but that 
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its long-range bomber force compensated for any disparities between the Soviets and Americans 
in force projection. Another important advancement of American technology was the IRBM. The 
Secretary told the General that these missiles would provide security against the Soviet ICBM 
capability until the American ICBM was online. Dulles reminded de Gaulle that President 
Eisenhower directed that the U.S. put emphasis on ICBMs five years ago and that prior to that it 
was not a high priority project for the American defense community. He also told the General 
that it was important to be able to effectively deploy the IRBMs in order to make the most of 
their capability.407 
 Secretary Dulles’ point about the necessity to deploy the IRBMs correctly communicated 
the importance of France to this program. Prior to the fall of the previous government there was a 
general understanding that the new IRBMs would come to France first, although under a NATO 
framework. Afterwards, they would go to other NATO member states. Bringing up the subject of 
these missiles announced to de Gaulle that the U.S. still had an interest in getting France 
involved in the broader NATO defense. The problem was crafting an agreement that de Gaulle 
would approve of.  
 Another issue covered was the willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons in 
the defense of its allies. One problem with offering U.S. allies a nuclear umbrella was that they 
had to trust that the American political leadership would agree to their use in the event of a 
Soviet attack on a member nation. Dulles told de Gaulle that the President was beginning to 
outline a project that would give NATO control over nuclear weapons. The Secretary told the 
General that with this program NATO member states could be confident that nuclear weapons 
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would be part of any defense structure. Dulles extended an offer to train French personnel in 
using such atomic weapons. This was going to be a NATO program that aligned with NATO 
plans.408  
 Again, Dulles’ proposal intended to assuage de Gaulle’s interest in making France more 
important in the alliance. The Secretary told him that the U.S. was willing to train French 
personnel in the use of atomic weapons. He also expressed to de Gaulle, Eisenhower’s ambition 
to create a plan that would remove the decision to use certain atomic weapons from Washington 
D.C. and place it in the hands of NATO. Of course, delegating more decision-making authority 
to NATO did not raise France to the same level as Great Britain in the alliance. Although Dulles 
hoped to alleviate some of de Gaulle’s frustration with this delegation, the proposal did not have 
the intended effect. Britain’s independent nuclear program seemed to offer a more senior 
position in the alliance.  
 As part of the NATO nuclear initiative, Dulles told the de Gaulle that the U.S. hoped to 
limit nuclear proliferation. He hoped that France could help start such a project and then it would 
expand to other NATO nations. The Secretary told de Gaulle that, although he was not 
suggesting that France desist from its independent nuclear program, it was wasteful for other 
European nations to start trying to create individual atomic arsenals, when NATO could provide 
a unified deterrent. This would allow smaller states in the alliance to have the ability to trust in a 
nuclear deterrent that they otherwise could not independently create.409 
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 Although Dulles did not ask de Gaulle to stop trying to create an independent French 
nuclear arsenal he made it clear that the U.S. wanted to stop the expansion of atomic weapons in 
Europe. He offered de Gaulle the ability to be the first nation in the alliance to agree to this 
policy and then help spread it. This would provide France a leadership role in a sense, but not on 
de Gaulle’s terms. However, this would require that de Gaulle accept the fact that France, 
although it might produce a successful nuclear test, was not capable of creating an independent 
nuclear deterrent. Further, it would require de Gaulle to acquiesce to combining France with the 
rest of the non-nuclear NATO nations into one nuclear cooperative. Britain, of course, would not 
have to face this choice. Even if it joined such a program, it still retained special agreements with 
the United States that accorded it the ability to continue to improve its independent nuclear 
deterrent.  
 De Gaulle then took over control of the meeting and began describing his vision of 
France and its role in world affairs. First, de Gaulle felt that France’s role in the alliance and in 
world affairs did not correlate to its actual prominence. He wanted this expanded to reflect the 
part that France already played on the international stage. De Gaulle reminded the Secretary that 
France would soon be a nuclear power, although it would take many years until it could have an 
effective deterrent.410 
 Regarding Dulles’ proposal of a NATO controlled atomic deterrent, de Gaulle told the 
Secretary that France would be willing to agree to this with some concessions. De Gaulle would 
accept such a program, if the U.S. gave France nuclear weapons or provided atomic technology 
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in order for France to manufacture its own weapons. According to de Gaulle, this would allow 
the alliance to use its resources more efficiently.411 
 De Gaulle’s counter proposal did not support the intention of the planned expansion of 
atomic weapons, specifically IRBMs, to NATO. The intent of this, as explained in chapters five 
and six, was to give NATO nations some control as a collective group over atomic weapons. The 
U.S. could not give France nuclear weapons because of limitations placed on the government by 
legislation. It also could not give France atomic information to allow for the production of 
nuclear weapons again because of legislative restrictions. Even if these transfers were possible, 
they would not result in an expanded NATO nuclear capacity but an increased French deterrent. 
In any event, Eisenhower would have never agreed with de Gaulle’s requests. 
 In connection with de Gaulle’s proposal for nuclear weapons he discussed how he 
envisioned controlling their use. He did not think that having SACEUR involved was good for 
France. If atomic weapons would be in France, de Gaulle wanted to have control and custody of 
them. He agreed that such weapons could support a broader NATO defense plan but only if their 
use also supported French interests.412 
 De Gaulle did not want atomic weapons or material under a NATO agreement. He 
wanted atomic weapons given to France alone. Then and only if it fit French interests, would de 
Gaulle agree to their use in order to support NATO plans. This was drastically different from the 
IRBM agreement or NATO stockpile agreement presented to Allied Command Europe by 
General Norstad. It was also different from what Eisenhower offered to Macmillan. The U.S., 
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due to legislative roadblocks, could not give nuclear weapons directly to any nation. De Gaulle’s 
estimation of French prestige and his laser-like focus on French interests drove him to policy 
conclusions that ran counter what President Eisenhower wanted to accomplish in Europe. 
 Another problem de Gaulle brought up to Dulles was the organization and scope of 
NATO itself. The General did not think that NATO was broad enough. He suggested it should 
include North Africa and the Middle East. De Gaulle told Dulles that since NATO did not 
adequately address securing the Mediterranean, French security suffered from the alliance’s 
restricted geographic focus. The General told the Secretary that France had security needs in 
Europe and Africa and NATO had to reflect such concerns.413 
 Again de Gaulle’s central focus on French prestige came through clearly. No alliance will 
necessarily answer every security concern of each individual member state. Each sacrifices the 
focus on their unique security needs because there is a greater security threat facing them. De 
Gaulle, by suggesting that the entire NATO alliance dramatically change in order to answer 
French concerns, placed the needs of France above the alliance as a whole. He wanted to shift 
the paradigm for determining the relative power of nations and deemphasize the influence of 
independent nuclear deterrents. De Gaulle wanted the alliance to focus on a perimeter defense 
oriented on North Africa, with less emphasis on deterring a Soviet attack with nuclear weapons. 
He would have a difficult time convincing Eisenhower and Macmillan that this was a more 
effective way to defend Western Europe.  
 In closing the meeting, de Gaulle rephrased his main concerns. He wanted France to play 
an important role in the defending the West. While he did not demand any formal agreements to 
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codify this, he wanted it made clear in practice during summits and strategy sessions. Concerning 
nuclear weapons, de Gaulle said, that any such weapons deployed in France, including missiles 
or warheads, would fall directly under French control with some U.S. assistance. Finally, he 
reminded Dulles of the necessity to reorganize the command structure and scope of NATO in 
order to include Africa and the Middle East to align with French security needs.414 
 General Norstad brought up the issue of the lack of French cooperation in nuclear issues 
in October of 1958 when he met with the new French Permanent Representative to NATO, 
Ambassador Geoffrey de Courcel. He asked the new representative what the obstacles for getting 
French agreement to the deployment of IRBMs were. De Courcel said that if NATO agreed to 
institute some of de Gaulle’s ideas concerning its organization and granted France a more 
prominent role in the alliance, then the nuclear issues could find some resolution. De Courcel 
also blamed American intransigence concerning the atomic stockpile but offered no details for 
this point of tension. Norstad replied that he would not approach France about anything 
regarding the IRBMs or the atomic stockpile unless the French brought the issue to him. If 
France could not agree to the atomic stockpile, Norstad told the French representative that the 
U.S. would have difficulty maintaining its air assets in the nation. If France rejected the 
deployment of any nuclear weapons in its borders it meant that U.S. aircraft deployed to French 
bases would be less secure. If these aircraft did not have access to nuclear weapons it was 
problematic to keep them in France because they lacked the ability to execute their mission. 
They would only be targets and not weapons.415 
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 General de Gaulle’s views about NATO, as related by de Courcel, were troubling. They 
did not find much support from other member nations and only impeded the expansion of the 
NATO nuclear program. Norstad’s response to the French representative revealed that the U.S. 
did not have any intention of increasing France’s role in the alliance to align with de Gaulle’s 
estimation of its importance. Nuclear weapons became a bargaining chip in this discussion. De 
Gaulle hoped that Norstad and the U.S. would agree to his demands in order to get French 
participation in these programs. However, this assumed that President Eisenhower agreed with 
de Gaulle’s judgment about French prestige and its position in the alliance.  
 These issues came up again when the Permanent Representative de Courcel left his 
position in January of 1959. De Courcel and General Norstad discussed common ground 
between France, Great Britain, and the United States. Africa was one area where the two agreed 
that there was some consensus. De Courcel said that de Gaulle did not need any formal 
agreement and that he wanted to deal with the U.S. and U.K. in good faith. Norstad reminded de 
Courcel that the problems between NATO and France had more to do with the heavy-handed 
manner that de Gaulle used in allied relations. These measures alienated France from the rest of 
the alliance and would not endear de Gaulle to Eisenhower or Macmillan.416 
 This communicated that Eisenhower and Macmillan did not share de Gaulle’s estimation 
of the strategic situation. Although all nations agreed that securing Africa was important, the 
problem was how best to do this. De Gaulle continued to press for direct French involvement 
through its traditional colonial centers of power. In order for the U.S. and the U.K. to support this 
meant that these nations would have to concede to French colonial holdings in North Africa. This 
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would prevent President Eisenhower from supporting nationalist Arab groups in the region in 
favor of an imperial power imposing its rule on a subject people.   
 The NATO stockpile and atomic weapons also came up in this conversation. Norstad 
reminded the French representative that other NATO nations agreed to the deployment of atomic 
weapons under NATO control as well as the NATO atomic stockpile agreement but France 
continued to resist this proposal. General Norstad told de Courcel that if the French did not 
reverse their position, he would recommend the withdrawal of the 9 U.S. Air Force squadrons 
deployed to France. In response, de Courcel told Norstad that France would not accept nuclear 
weapons deployed inside the nation without being in direct control of them. According to de 
Courcel this was especially true since France still lacked atomic weapons of its own. He told the 
general that France was “a Great Power” and “not Benelux.”417 
 De Courcel’s position evinced the importance of nuclear weapons in determining the 
position of a nation in the alliance. He implied that the deployment of nuclear weapons outside 
of French control was galling, particularly because France did not have such weapons under its 
own control. The only nation in Europe with that capability was Great Britain. De Courcel’s 
description of France as a superior nation was also telling. He used the term Benelux when 
referring to Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg, implying that allowing NATO to deploy 
nuclear weapons in its territory would relegate France to subordinate status in the alliance. The 
two-tier informal structure of the alliance in place in the late 1950s clearly frustrated de Gaulle. 
However, he did not have the leverage to change France’s status in the organization. French 
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prestige continued to suffer as the French President struggled to convince Eisenhower and 
Macmillan that a nonnuclear France was a vital member state.  
 Hugh Gaitskill, the leader of the opposition in the British House of Commons, and the 
British Ambassador to France, Hubert Jebb, discussed several security and NATO related topics 
with de Gaulle in January of 1959. De Gaulle again brought up the structure of NATO. He said 
that the small states had too much influence; he wanted to reorganize it so that the large states, 
i.e. France, the U.S. and the U.K, would have a prominent role in directing the alliance. De 
Gaulle said that the three large powers were the only ones who truly had global responsibilities 
and that the alliance organization should reflect that.418 
 De Gaulle’s sense of French prestige determined his outlook on the alliance. The two-tier 
structure accorded importance in relation to nuclear capability and not to territorial holdings or 
responsibility. He chastised the U.S. in his conversation when he said that America acted as if it 
were able to go to war unilaterally. De Gaulle sought to expand NATO’s role in order to force 
the U.S. to face what he considered the reality that it could not go to war alone. By expanding 
NATO into North Africa and the Middle East, de Gaulle wanted to make the alliance a “strategic 
instrument.”419 
 One consistent problem between de Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Macmillan was the different 
perceptions of the strategic importance of Africa. De Gaulle continued to argue that Africa, 
particularly French holdings in the north, were vital to any defense of Western Europe. This 
interpretation, if accepted by Eisenhower and Macmillan, would mean that holding France in the 
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alliance was vital to its effectiveness. De Gaulle looked to increase French prestige by creating a 
reason for a larger role in the alliance for France. However, this required that Eisenhower and 
Macmillan agreed with his perception of the strategic situation and France’s importance in that 
framework. 
 Military cooperation came up later in the discussion, particularly SHAPE’s role in the 
defense of Western Europe. SHAPE, with General Norstad in charge, was the main proponent 
for coordinating the defense of Western Europe. De Gaulle stated that war was an important act 
and one that had to harness national will. He felt that the U.S. concentration on SHAPE deprived 
nations inside the alliance of an independent identity in their own defense. He did not think that 
an American officer should be in charge of defending Europe.420 
 One nation that prospered under the SHAPE system, in de Gaulle’s estimation, was Great 
Britain. He felt that it was only proper that the French fleet and its bomber force would be 
independent, similar to that of the U.K.421 The problem with de Gaulle’s analogy between France 
and Great Britain came down to the possession of nuclear weapons. Great Britain, as an 
independent nuclear power, could maintain its deterrent outside of NATO. However, for France, 
any nuclear weapons it used would have to come from the U.S. or a common European program. 
No agreement proffered to a NATO member state without its own nuclear arsenal provided for 
those weapons to be outside of the alliance’s control. Again possession of an independent 
nuclear deterrent offered Great Britain a unique place in the organization. Something de Gaulle 
felt was due to France. 
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 Ambassador Jebb asked de Gaulle about his position on nuclear weapons and their use 
for defending NATO. The French leader said that he did not think that the alliance should use 
these weapons unless there were a unanimous consent from the U.S, U.K, and France. De Gaulle 
admitted that his positions regarding nuclear weapons stemmed from the French lack of such 
weapons. The only exception to the unanimous decision making, in his judgment, could come in 
cases of self-defense when the Soviet Union attacked one of the nuclear powers.422 
 Nuclear weapons or the lack thereof, played a critical the power struggles in the alliance 
during the late 1950s. De Gaulle did not feel that, under the proposed agreement, France could 
prevent the launch of nuclear weapons from its territory. Ambassador Jebb pressed him on this 
issue by stating that France would have a veto over any nuclear attack in the NATO proposed 
IRBM and stockpile agreements. However, de Gaulle argued that he could not prevent any plane 
from flying out of France armed with nuclear weapons. He also could not stop President 
Eisenhower from using atomic warheads if he thought it was necessary.423 
 Although the issue of possessing nuclear weapons was important, a corollary of this was 
also an important problem. De Gaulle did not see in the agreement the ability for France to 
ensure that an atomic strike carried out from France would not further jeopardize its security 
situation. As shown earlier, de Gaulle’s proposed solution to this problem was French control 
over U.S. warheads, which was an impossible and unreasonable policy position. By taking such a 
radical position, there was little room for Norstad to negotiate in good faith. It was impossible for 
him, or Eisenhower, to agree to give the French control over atomic warheads. Not even the 
Anglo-American IRBM agreement allowed this.  
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 The American ambassador to France, Cecil Lyon referenced this interview in a 
conversation with the French Minister of State, Louis Jacquinot. Lyon said that de Gaulle was 
mistaken concerning the lack of a French veto. The French minister asked who held the authority 
to use such weapons. Lyon replied that the Supreme Commander held the authority, but he 
suggested de Gaulle get an official brief on such matters from NATO officials. However, Lyon 
assured the minister that France had a veto over the use of such weapons.424 Lyon was right, 
France did have a veto. However, the decision to use such weapons rested with General Norstad 
as SHAPE commander. This streamlined the decision making process but it also put NATO 
nations under the authority of an American general.  
The problem of control of nuclear weapons came up again when the French Ambassador 
presented a series of proposed discussion points that de Gaulle wished to cover in an upcoming 
meeting between the U.S, the U.K, and France. De Gaulle thought it important to discuss a 
cooperative approach to world strategy and how a nuclear deterrent factored into it. Dulles 
replied that the U.S. held “its nuclear deterrent in trust for the free world.”425 
 One of the first manifestations of de Gaulle’s frustration with NATO was the removal of 
the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO. In early 1959, de Gaulle decided to take direct 
control of the fleet and end its affiliation with the alliance. General Norstad did not think that this 
detracted from the military power of the NATO naval presence; rather he thought that the French 
lost more in the fleet’s removal. He believed that the political ramifications to the alliance would 
be more troubling. One thing Norstad did not want to do was to beg de Gaulle to bring his fleet 
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back to NATO. General Norstad argued that the French needed NATO’s assistance in the naval 
realm more than the alliance needed their contribution.426 
 General Ely, President of the French Chiefs of Staff Committee, met with General 
Norstad on 6 March of 59, to discuss the decision to remove the Mediterranean Fleet from 
NATO. Norstad told Ely that there were other remedies; he suggested that the French fleet could 
be put in the same status as the U.S. Sixth Fleet or operate directly under SACEUR. General Ely 
did not respond positively to these suggestions and told Norstad that the decision to remove the 
fleet was not going to change.427 
 A subsequent conversation on 11 Mar 59, between the officers covered a broad range of 
NATO related topics, particularly de Gaulle’s frustration with the alliance. One of the first topics 
that came up was the French position in North Africa. General Ely communicated de Gaulle’s 
position. He stated that the French believed that if they left the region it would invite Communist 
influence into it. Ely noted that such a decision would likely bring open revolt against the 
government in France and this would only help the Communists. De Gaulle, according to Ely, 
saw the French withdrawal from Algeria as the beginning of the end for the free world. The 
differences in the strategic outlooks between de Gaulle and Eisenhower influenced their inability 
to come to an agreement about the IRBMs and nuclear cooperation between the two nations.428 
 General Norstad knew of the Gaitskill interview, he received a copy of the interview and 
referenced it in a conversation with General Ely in March of 1959. Norstad explained that 
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America’s policy for North Africa supported the creation of an Arab alliance. He told General 
Ely that by supporting independent Arab states the U.S. would stop Soviet influence in the 
region. Norstad continued by stating that this position clashed with the French interpretation of 
the situation both in Algiers and previously in Suez.429 
 The differences between the French and American positions concerning France’s status 
in the alliance were stark. De Gaulle saw his nation as fighting for the security of the West in 
North Africa. Any concessions in Algiers would only weaken the West and the alliance. De 
Gaulle believed that North Africa was a vital area of concern for the alliance. This position did 
not win over General Nortsad or President Eisenhower. The disagreement about French 
contributions to the security of Western Europe exhibited why de Gaulle was so aggravated 
about the secondary position of France in the alliance. His estimation of France’s importance 
came, not from its military power, but its strategic importance. However, the alliance’s two-tier 
structure centered on the presence of an independent possession of a nuclear deterrent, which 
France did not yet possess. 
 Another issue implied in this conversation was that of decolonization. De Gaulle wanted 
to retain some influence in French colonies. Although he couched his argument, as presented by 
General Ely, purely in defense terms, French prestige was the foundational issue. France, De 
Gaulle argued, was important because of its position in North Africa. Its colonial holdings, or its 
continued ties to former colonies, gave it a unique position in NATO. However, as Norstad 
explained, President Eisenhower did not think that focusing on colonial ties was an effective 
policy. Rather, newly independent Arab states would make more viable partners in creating a 
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group to resist Soviet incursion if they were truly independent. This undercut French prestige 
because it discounted France’s colonial presence and power in the Middle East and within 
NATO. 
 General de Gaulle’s resistance to the NATO atomic stockpile program and the Allied 
Command Europe IRBM program came largely as a result of the lack of concessions from 
President Eisenhower to align his view of French prestige with that of de Gaulle. Although 
Eisenhower was correct not to accommodate de Gaulle, he did not anticipate the obvious 
negative French reaction. De Gaulle argued that France deserved more importance in the 
alliance; it did not deserve to be told what would happen inside its own borders, especially in 
terms of atomic warfare. De Gaulle argued that France was a vital member of alliance because of 
its strategic importance in North Africa. He argued that this overrode the absence of a lack of 
French nuclear deterrent. The lack of a deterrent was also a problem that France was working on 
but would not be able to compete with Britain for years to come.  
 Neither Eisenhower nor Macmillan wanted France to become a nuclear power. But there 
was little either could do to stop this from occurring. Eisenhower never offered the amount of 
technical help to De Gaulle that he offered to United Kingdom. He also did not agree to give 
IRBMs to France outside the NATO framework, as he did with the U.K. Nuclear weapons acted 
as a barometer for status in the alliance at this time. Although de Gaulle tried to convince the 
U.S. and U.K. of his nation’s importance the alliance, he could not sway their interpretation of 


















 The deployment of IRBMs to Western Europe, although a military issue, influenced the 
political realm of the NATO alliance. President Eisenhower’s use of two different frameworks to 
deploy the missiles created a two-tiered structure in the alliance. First, from the fact that both 
Britain and the U.S. nuclear powers, and second this tiered configuration came from the 
disparate terms offered to NATO nations by Eisenhower. The Anglo-American agreement did 
not incorporate the IRBMs into SACEUR in a formal manner. The offer to other NATO nations 
provided the missiles only through SACEUR and the NATO atomic stockpile.  The deployment 
of Thor missiles to Britain helped heal the rift between the United Kingdom and the United 
States in the wake of the Suez Canal Crisis. The same agreement also alienated France and 
influenced de Gaulle’s decision to remove France from the military alliance. These weapons also 
revealed the influence of the New Look defense policy. Although Eisenhower never removed a 
significant amount of American troops from Europe, he clearly saw the addition of missiles to 
Europe as part of the groundwork for such an event in the future. The deployment of IRBMs 
demonstrated that the perceived military value of a weapons system could make up for any 
perceived deficiencies in its military effectiveness.  
 Judged by their political influence and efficacy the IRBMs, both Jupiter and Thor, were a 
success. The deployment of these weapons helped bring the Anglo-American alliance closer. The 
unexpectedly quick development of the ICBM and advances in solid-fuel rockets soon made the 
Thor and Jupiter missiles obsolete. Although the weapons only remained operational for five 
years they were an effective part of the early Cold War period.   
Eisenhower’s deployment of IRBMs to Western Europe was a small part of the Cold 




deterrent or other strategically important asset. Although in the specifics of the IRBM issue, the 
vital issue was possession of nuclear weapons. The fact that the British had their own atomic 
weapons program meant that Prime Ministers Eden and Macmillan could use their position to 
leverage an advantageous agreement. It also meant that the U.K. could operate as a more equal 
partner in the alliance than the French, who did not possess an independent strategic deterrent.  
The New Look defense policy established atomic weapons and Massive Retaliation as the 
paramount form of national defense for both economic and defense reasons. Although the usual 
interpretation of the New Look defense policy focuses mainly on its economic rational, there 
were significant military assumptions and reasons that formed the foundation of the defense 
policy. The Solarium Conference was not an economic forum; it was a defense oriented 
discussion. This meeting established the broad outlines of the New Look policy. Although 
Eisenhower certainly focused on the economic aspects of national defense, fiscal concerns did 
not eclipse the need to defend the United States from the threat of the Soviet Union.  
President Eisenhower did worry about the economic implications of defense spending but 
he did not think that it was prudent to sacrifice national defense in order to realize economic 
outcomes. His defense program was able to reduce defense spending, primarily through 
reductions in Army force levels and Army budget reductions. This led to a mid-decade low in 
defense spending to approximately $30 billion dollars. However, Eisenhower was unable to 
sustain such a relatively low defense budget. By the end of his administration, defense 
allocations rose to $40 billion dollars. Much of this increase came in the Air Force budget, which 




The reason for the increased defense spending was another focus of the New Look 
policy. In order to reduce the burden of securing the nation from the Soviet Union, the Air Force, 
with its strategic force projection capability, took over the primary role in security. This made 
economic sense because it would allow Eisenhower to reduce the amount of money America 
spent funding large ground divisions deployed to Europe. However, this required spending more 
on Air Force assets, particularly atomic weapons, diminishing much of Eisenhower’s defense 
savings. As a result of the supremacy of the Air Force, nuclear weapons formed the basis for the 
New Look defense policy. The doctrine of Massive Retaliation was one example of the reliance 
on atomic weapons. President Eisenhower understood that atomic weapons fundamentally 
changed how the U.S. would fight future conflicts; the introduction of such destructive weapons 
changed his conception of future conflicts. The U.S. had to have the ability to fight on the atomic 
battlefield and the Air Force had the capability to do this most effectively.  
Eisenhower’s conception of atomic warfare also explains the problems that the Army 
faced during the 1950s. Since the Army focused on deploying large ground forces to contentious 
regions in order to deter conflicts it was an expensive means of preventing conflicts. This made it 
difficult for Army leaders, such as General Maxwell Taylor, to justify a prominent role for their 
service in Eisenhower’s construct of atomic warfare. Another problem the Army faced in making 
the case for a larger role in national defense was the issue of casualties in a nuclear war.  
The atomic battlefield, in Eisenhower’s understanding, would not be a friendly place for 
densely organized ground units. This is what made the Air Force such an attractive option. With 
Strategic Air Command and then guided missiles, the U.S. could effectively deter any conflict 




Union. If a conflict did break out with the Soviet Union, Eisenhower had no doubt that it would 
require a large nuclear barrage. This again played to the strengths of the Air Force. The Air 
Force could strike targets deep inside the Soviet Union and purportedly, though not probably, 
destroy much of the Soviet war making capability quickly. The promise of immediate efficacy 
contributed to the Air Force’s budget success under the New Look.  
Through the 1950s Eisenhower’s conception of atomic warfare influenced defense 
policy. This, in turn, affected foreign policy as well. As the U.S. continued to increase its 
reliance on atomic weapons in deterring conflicts, it shifted the burden of fighting smaller-scale 
wars to its allies. The premise of the New Look defense policy’s economic savings relied on 
America not getting involved in another limited conflagration, like the Korean War. The 
concentration on nuclear weapons and their subsequent prominence in defense issues made them 
a barometer of political importance in the NATO alliance.  
By the middle of the 1950s there were only two nations with an independent nuclear 
capability in the NATO alliance, Great Britain and the United States. This created a de facto two-
tier structure within the association that would influence how the U.S. interacted with the U.K. 
and other non-nuclear nations, particularly France. The Suez Canal Crisis put tension upon the 
alliance between France, Great Britain, and the United States. Although significant for its 
ramifications in the Middle East, its impact on the European alliance was also important.  
The Bermuda Conference, hosted in March of 1957, was an effort for the U.S. and the 
U.K. to repair the relations between the two nations. President Eisenhower and Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan met on the Caribbean island to discuss how to bring the two states closer 




Along with this promised deployment was the agreement to work for alterations in U.S. law 
concerning cooperation on atomic weapons technology. 
The agreement between Eisenhower and Macmillan did affect the change in relations 
between the U.S. and the U.K. Left out of this agreement was France, which did not have its own 
nuclear weapons program. This was one of the instances where possession of nuclear weapons 
was crucial to the status of a nation inside the NATO alliance. The independent British nuclear 
deterrent was not the only reason for the IRBM program; it also impacted the character and form 
of the agreement that regulated the deployment of the missiles and the future nuclear Anglo-
American cooperation.  
Although the Bermuda agreement established the deployment of IRBMs, these missiles 
were not ready for full-scale production at the time of the accord. When Eisenhower made this 
offer in March of 1957, he did not expect to expand the program to other NATO nations. The 
Soviet launch of Sputnik increased the intensity of the research and manufacture of guided 
missiles, particularly the ICBM and IRBM. At the time of the launch there was only one system 
that could hit Soviet military and industrial targets from Western Europe, the IRBM. ICBMs, 
according to estimates at the time, would not come online until the middle of the 1960s. This 
made IRBMs the only weapon system that could quickly establish the United States and, by 
extension, its allies as formidable powers in the missile age.  
In light of the Sputnik launch, President Eisenhower agreed to expand the deployment of 
IRBMs to any NATO nation willing to accept them. This raised the question of how to broaden 
the scope of the deployment of these missiles to the rest of Europe. The framework of the Anglo-




effect negating much of the power of the alliance. President Eisenhower offered the weapons 
through the North Atlantic Council and the warheads through SACEUR. This would ensure that 
the missiles would continue to work within alliance to secure the broader security of Western 
Europe, and insured that nuclear weapons remained under American control. 
This concern about protecting the power of the alliance exposed Eisenhower’s hesitation 
to encourage the proliferation of independent nuclear programs throughout Europe. This would 
detract from economic resources that the European nations could dedicate to building 
conventional forces, which would allow the U.S. the ability to withdraw some of its ground 
troops. The President did not see U.S. troops in Europe as part of the permanent American force 
structure. Rather, he wanted them to assume some of the duties of defending America’s allies 
until those states could provide for their own defenses. Once this occurred, the United States 
could drawdown some of its ground forces and maintain its strategic defense of Western Europe 
by using its nuclear weapons in the region and its ICBMs and strategic bomber force from the 
continental United States.  
One of the nations affected by the expansion of the IRBM program to NATO was France. 
Although initially receptive to the deployment of IRBMs to its nation, the situation changed 
when Charles de Gaulle came to power. He wanted France to assume a larger role in the affairs 
of the alliance. Specifically regarding the IRBMs, he wanted an agreement that was similar to the 
Anglo-American pact concerning the weapons and future nuclear cooperation. De Gaulle would 
not accept the proposed agreement that came through the auspices of SACEUR and the NATO 




Much of the disagreement concerning the proposed deployment of IRBMs came from 
disparate evaluations of the France’s position in the alliance. De Gaulle argued that France was 
vital to the organization because of its position in North Africa. French colonies in the Maghreb, 
according to de Gaulle, would be able to stop any Soviet incursion that looked to retrace the 
route of Nazi Germany in World War II. This made France a key part of securing Western 
Europe, at least according to French leaders.  
Neither President Eisenhower nor Prime Minister Macmillan shared de Gaulle’s 
estimation of French importance to the security of Europe. The differences between the two 
strategic assessments were one of the reasons that France did not receive the same consideration 
when it came to deploying IRBMs to Britain. In addition to the conflict over strategic importance 
was the possession of nuclear weapons. In this situation, de Gaulle again overestimated his 
position.  
The French nuclear weapons program successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in 
1960; it would not have a viable weapons program until the middle of that decade. At the time of 
the initial IRBM deployment the French nuclear weapons program was an unknown entity. Both 
Eisenhower and Macmillan knew of its existence but were uncertain of how soon it would come 
to fruition. Neither wanted France to become a nuclear nation but both understood that there was 
little they could do to stop such an event. One important thing that Eisenhower could withhold 
from France was technical assistance.  
President Eisenhower did not want France to spend its resources building its own nuclear 
arsenal, which he saw as redundant because of the presence of an American deterrent. He did not 




his efforts from building a common European defense. Altering the command and control 
agreement of the IRBM agreement from the model used by the Anglo-American form was 
another way Eisenhower sought to use the IRBM deployment to realize a larger policy goal.  
The Anglo-American agreement was outside of NATO command and control. The Thors 
deployed to Britain would complement and coordinate with SACEUR but the Prime Minister 
and the President would have to agree to fire the missiles. For the missiles offered under 
SACEUR, President Eisenhower could delegate the decision to launch the missiles to the 
American commander in Europe. De Gaulle would not accept France being placed in a 
subordinate position relative to Great Britain, or to giving up its sovereignty on issues of 
security. The changes in the IRBM agreement alienated France and set the stage for its eventual 
withdrawal from the military side of the NATO alliance.  
The deployment of IRBMs to Europe had two important goals. The first was to affect a 
rapprochement between the United States and the United Kingdom in the wake of the Suez 
Canal Crisis. The second was to answer the domestic security concerns in light of Sputnik by 
expanding the deployment of IRBMs throughout Western Europe in order to increase America’s 
missile capability. Although the weapons left operational service by 1963, they had a dramatic 
impact on the relationship between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These 
weapons, although not militarily important, were significant because of their impact on the 
NATO alliance. This is indicative of how peacetime military deployments can have second and 
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